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Abstract 
 
Tracing is a process by which a claimant shows that an asset represents a 
substitute for an original asset for the purposes of making a claim in 
respect of that substitute. 
Orthodox tracing theory says that this process involves the 
following of the value inherent in the original into the substitute. 
Orthodox theory also states that tracing is a neutral process, 
unconnected to any claims that may be made in the substitute. 
The effect of accepting this orthodoxy has been that the true 
nature of the tracing process has become obscured. In particular the 
failure of orthodox theorists to correctly identify tracing as being an 
exercise that can only be justified within the context of a fiduciary 
relationship has led to the widespread belief that it is possible to trace at 
common law. It will be argued in this thesis that this cannot be the case 
because the common law allows no claims with respect to substitute 
assets, and this makes the tracing exercise redundant. The notion that it 
is possible to trace at common law is contrary to properly understood 
authority and has no normative foundations. Its origins lie in a case that 
is now universally accepted as containing no common law reasoning. 
Despite this the right to trace at common law remains the prevailing 
orthodoxy. None of the cases cited in support of that orthodoxy have 
been satisfactorily explained. The most significant ones fail to 
adequately deal with the inherent difficulties in treating money in a bank 
account as being the equivalent of a physical mixture of tangible assets. 
The lack of any proper normative explanation of the right to trace 
expounded in these cases makes their utility even more questionable. 
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This thesis will argue that the rationale behind tracing is such that 
it can never be utilised to explain non-fiduciary liability. 
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Introduction 
 
The central argument of this work is that the common law recognises no 
claims to substitute assets. The notion that it does so is a historic 
mistake that has been perpetuated unnecessarily, despite the fact that it 
conflicts with other settled areas of law. Moreover, the notion has no 
normative force which could give such interference any credence. Thus, 
it will be argued that the process whereby a claimant shows that a 
substitute asset represents an original asset in which the claimant had 
common law rights, has no purpose at common law. 
Discussions of substitute assets in private law inevitably centre 
around the law of tracing. To establish the veracity of the central 
argument it will be necessary to look closely at tracing, to understand its 
principles and limits, and to see how errors in the proper interpretation 
of the doctrine of tracing have led to errors in our understanding of the 
claims associated with that doctrine. 
In the course of this thesis the expression “the orthodox theory of 
tracing” will be used. It is not possible to refer to any one work in order 
to determine the precise contents of that orthodox theory. Rather it 
must be regarded as a distillation of the leading judicial and academic 
pronouncements on the subject, although the works of Lionel Smith and 
Peter Birks, and both judicial and academic contributions of significance 
from Lord Millett, have done much to form the foundations of orthodox 
thinking.1 Doubtless no single contributor agrees with all of the 
                                                     
1 The leading monograph on the subject remains Lionel Smith, The Law of Tracing, 
(Clarendon Press 1997). Other significant contributions to the development of the 
orthodox position came from Smith himself in ‘Tracing’ in A. Burrows and Lord 
Rodger of Earlsferry (eds), Mapping the Law: Essays in memory of Peter Birks (OUP 
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propositions listed below but, taken together, they can be said to 
represent a coherent statement of how tracing is generally thought to 
operate, and when and why claimants are permitted to commence the 
tracing process.  
The following propositions, it is suggested, make up the orthodox 
theory of tracing. They can be separated into those that describe what 
tracing is, and how it differs from other, similar, processes; those that 
explain how tracing is supposed to operate; those that tell us when a 
claimant may undertake the process; and those that describe the 
normative justification for the process. 
In the first category are the following: 
a) there is a useful distinction to be made between tracing, 
following and claiming. So, according to Robert Chambers:  
In The Law of Tracing Dr Lionel Smith usefully distinguishes three different 
concepts: following, tracing and claiming. We follow assets, trace value and 
claim rights.”2  
In Foskett v McKeown,3 Lord Millett stated that: 
The process of ascertaining what happened to the plaintiff’s money involves 
both tracing and following. These are both exercises in locating assets…the 
process of following and tracing are however, distinct. Following is the 
process of following the same asset as it moves from hand to hand. Tracing is 
                                                                                                                                                        
2006) 119 and from Peter Birks in An Introduction to the Law of Restitution 
(Clarendon Press 1989) 83-85, 358-401, ‘Mixing and Tracing: Property and 
Restitution’, (1992) 45 CLP 69, ‘On Taking Seriously the Difference Between Tracing 
and Claiming’ (1997) 11 TLI 2, ‘The Necessity of a Unitary Law of Tracing’, in R. 
Cranston (ed) Making Commercial Law (OUP 1997), ‘Property, Unjust Enrichment 
and Tracing’, (2001) CLP 54, 231. At a judicial level the decision of the House of 
Lords, and in particular the judgment of Lord Millett in Foskett v McKeown (2001) 1 
AC 102 may be seen as an exemplar of the orthodox position. 
2 R. Chambers, ‘Tracing and Unjust Enrichment’, in J. Neyers, M.McInnes and S. Pitel 
(Eds), Understanding Unjust Enrichment, (Hart 2004) 263. 
3 (2001) 1 AC 102. 
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the process of identifying a new asset as a substitute for the old…tracing is 
also distinct from claiming. It identifies the traceable proceeds of the 
claimant’s property…it enables the claimant to substitute the traceable 
proceeds for the original asset as the subject matter of his claim. But it does 
not affect or establish his claim. That will depend upon a number of factors 
including the nature of his interest in the original asset. 
Importantly, as we shall see, these distinctions are utilised not just as 
aids to theoretical thinking, but as part of the substantive law itself. 
b) that following is a simple exercise involving the following of a 
single asset as it passes through various hands. For Lionel 
Smith therefore, following is the: “purely physical exercise of 
locating a thing.”4 
According to Lord Millett: 
Following is the process of following the same asset as it moves from 
hand to hand.5 
Sarah Worthington says that: 
A claimant follows her original asset from one person’s hand to another, so 
that at the end of the process she can point to her asset as being the very 
property which is the subject of competing claims by different parties. Note 
that the asset being claimed is precisely the same at the start as at the end of 
the exercise.6 
With respect to how tracing operates the following propositions are 
widely regarded as correct: 
c) tracing involves using the “rules of tracing” to identify assets 
that may be regarded as substitutes for an original asset. Thus: 
                                                     
4 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing, (Clarendon Press 1997) 6. 
5 Foskett v McKeown (2001) 1 AC 102, 127. 
6 S. Worthington, Equity (2nd edn Clarendon Law 2006) 89. 
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The context of tracing is substitution. Tracing identifies a new thing as the 
potential subject matter of a claim on the basis that it is the substitute for an 
original thing which was itself the subject matter of a claim.7 
According to Peter Birks: 
The rules of tracing do not themselves confer rights. They answer the 
question whether one asset is wholly or partly the substitute for another.8 
And according to Eoin O’Dell: 
The plaintiff would like to be able to argue that the value which once inhered 
in (the original asset) in the recipient’s hands now inheres in the (substitute). 
The rules of tracing perform that function.9 
d) these rules involve the following of a stream of value through a 
series of transactions and it is this process which explains why it is that 
the substitute asset may be regarded as such. Smith’s formulation of this 
is that: 
The only connection which the plaintiff has to the new asset is that it was 
acquired with the old asset. The defendant acquired the value inherent in the 
new asset with the value inherent in the old asset. That is why we say that we 
trace value: it is the only constant that exists before, through and after the 
substitution through which we trace.10 
Simon Evans’ explanation is that: 
Tracing identifies property in the defendant’s hands as being connected with 
some item of value that the claimant has lost or that the defendant has 
acquired at the claimant’s expense. It enables the claimant to point to that 
property as the new location of his or her value.11 
 
 
                                                     
7 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing, (Clarendon Press 1997) 6. 
8 P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn Clarendon Law 2005) 199. 
9 E. O’Dell, ‘Tracing’, (1999) 21 Dublin University Law Journal 131.  
10 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing, (Clarendon Press 1997) 119. 
11 S. Evans, ‘Rethinking tracing and the law of restitution’, (1999) 115 LQR 469. 
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e) although the rules for tracing at equity and common law may 
differ, this is an outmoded way of thinking because tracing, being a mere 
exercise in identification, has no need to locate its authority in either 
part of our law. Peter Birks maintained that: 
More radically the very notion of there being two sets of rules for tracing is 
now shown up as rationally indefensible. It cannot be that a mere process of 
identification can be conducted on different bases in different cases as 
though the law might choose in such business to use its good or bad eye.12 
In Foskett v McKeown,13 Lord Millett said that: 
Given its nature there is nothing inherently legal or equitable about the 
tracing exercise. There is thus no sense in maintaining different rules for 
tracing in law and in equity. One set of tracing rules is enough.14 
The following two propositions sum up the orthodox position on when it 
is possible to set the tracing process in motion: 
f) claims following the tracing exercise may exist at either 
common law or in equity.15 
g) it is not necessary, in order to make a claim in respect of a 
substitute asset in equity, to show that the defendant was in a fiduciary 
relationship with the claimant. Lord Millett is certain of this: 
There is certainly no logical justification for allowing any distinction between 
them (i.e. between rules for tracing at common law and rules for tracing in 
equity) to produce capricious results in cases of mixed substitutions by 
                                                     
12 P. Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’, (1996) 26 University 
of Western Australia Law Review 1,83. 
13 (2001) 1 AC 102. 
14 Ibid 128. 
15 Although direct quotes to this effect are not easy to find the belief that it is correct 
is true almost by definition. The cases discussed in Parts 2 and 3 are proof of this. 
Indeed there is a sense in which this is what this entire thesis is about.  For a detailed 
analysis see L. Smith, The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press 1997) 283-368. 
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insisting on the existence of a fiduciary relationship as a precondition for 
applying equity’s tracing rules.16   
Richard Calnan agrees: 
The claimant’s ability to trace does not depend upon the defendant being a 
fiduciary: it arises from the claimant’s proprietary interest in the asset 
concerned. Why would a remedy devised to vindicate a person’s property 
rights be dependent on the establishment of a personal duty of good faith?17 
The final proposition concerns the normative justification for 
allowing tracing at all: 
h) claims contingent on tracing are part of either the law of unjust 
enrichment of the law of property. Peter Birks wrote that: 
It follows that, so far as concerns the acquisition of rights what we have to 
understand the effect and nature of non-consensual substitutions. The 
causative event must be allocated to its correct genus, which can only be 
unjust enrichment.18  
Graham Virgo, by contrast, argues that: 
At the heart of Foskett v McKeown is the recognition that the restitutionary 
claim of the beneficiaries fell within the law of property and was concerned 
with the vindication of property rights rather than with whether the 
defendant was unjustly enriched at the expense of the claimant.19 
In order to justify the central argument of this thesis set out at the 
start of this introduction, it will be necessary, on the way, to set out 
reasons for disagreement with nearly all of the eight points made above. 
It will emerge in argument that, taken individually and collectively, these 
propositions generate a false understanding of how tracing works. 
                                                     
16 Foskett v McKeown (2001) 1 AC 102. 
17 R. Calnan, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency, (OUP 2010) 8.66. 
18 P. Birks, ‘Property, Unjust Enrichment and Tracing’, (2001) 54 CLP 231. 
19 G. Virgo, ‘Vindicating Vindication: Foskett v McKeown Reviewed’, in A. Hudson 
(Ed), New Perspectives on Property Law, Obligations and Restitution (Cavendish2004) 
203, 204. 
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It will be argued that the notion that tracing is a process that must 
be rigidly separated from claiming is an over-simplification. Tracing and 
claiming are best regarded as overlapping parts of a single process. 
Because the availability of claims to substitute assets is far more 
restricted than the orthodox theory allows, it makes sense to restrict 
tracing to only those cases in which a claim would be possible if a 
substitute asset can be identified.  
I will further argue that following cannot be explained as a simple 
exercise in identification. It is, generally speaking, a normative exercise 
in the allocation of claims. Moreover, the failure to understand the 
conceptual impossibility of following ownership of funds through bank 
accounts has led to serious misunderstandings of how both following 
and tracing work. 
I will then argue that tracing is not about the following of value 
from one asset to another via a series of transactions. The meaning of 
value has proven to be somewhat elusive when used in this context. 
Whichever explanation has been provided for its meaning, such 
explanation has never managed to establish how its movement can be 
tracked from asset to asset. The rules of tracing cannot be explained in 
terms of such a transactional process. In fact tracing, no less than 
following, concerns the normative allocation of claims: it is the process 
by which the law identifies assets which are deemed to represent 
substitutes for original assets in order to justify the transmission of 
claims. 
I will go on to argue that the proposition that, because tracing is 
merely an identification process, it does not make sense to have 
separate identification rules at common law and in equity is 
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fundamentally misconceived. This is because it overlooks the point that 
since the common law does not allow claims to rights in substitute 
assets it has no interest in any process of identification of such 
substitute assets whatsoever.  
I will argue, however, that contrary to orthodox thinking, it 
matters a great deal whether the defendant in a claim in respect of a 
substitute asset is a fiduciary or not. If he is not then such a claim is 
unavailable and no tracing process can take place. As will be explained, 
equitable claims to the return of assets in specie, which do undoubtedly 
exist, are fundamentally dependent upon the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship between claimant and defendant.  It will be argued that 
neither the law of property nor the law of unjust enrichment offers any 
explanation for these claims. Indeed, it is the lack of any possible proper 
basis that forms one of the pillars of doubt respecting the existence of 
any right to claim at common law, as opposed to equity, in respect of 
substitute assets. The other is the lack, properly understood, of any 
coherent authority for that right. 
The remainder of the work is laid out as follows: 
Part 1 is introductory, although it sets out some important 
principles. First, the nature of following is examined and explained an 
essentially normative exercise. Second, tracing is considered and 
revealed also to be a normative exercise in claim allocation. 
Part 2 looks at what will be compendiously described as “common 
law tracing”.   
Chapter 3, looks at how the notion that it is possible to make 
claims to substitute assets at common law was mistakenly developed 
from cases that were essentially concerned with equitable rights. This 
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leaves the common law without an analytical basis to support such 
claims. The two alternatives that have been put forward as being the 
underpinning of common law rights in substitute assets are looked at in 
Chapters 4,5 and 6.  
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the notion of tracing as being the 
vindication of property rights, and thus as part of the law of property.  
Chapter 6 looks at the radically different notion that claims to 
substitute assets are claims based on the defendant’s unjust enrichment 
at the claimant’s expense. This has nothing to do with “old rights” in the 
original property being vindicated. Rather it concerns establishing a new 
claim with new rights.  
Chapter 7 looks at equitable claims to substitute assets. In this 
chapter, the normative basis of those claims is explained. This is 
followed by an examination of one of the inevitable consequences of 
that basis. This is that tracing may only be utilised where the defendant 
to a claim is a fiduciary, who has acquired rights in the course of 
performing his fiduciary endeavour, or has acquired rights by exploiting 
an opportunity arising in the course of that endeavour. This has the 
effect of firmly placing tracing where it belongs. It is an equitable 
process whose only purpose is to assist courts in upholding the fiduciary 
relationship. 
Finally, the conclusion will look at the implications for claims to 
substitute assets generally. It will be argued that we must abandon the 
notion of tracing as being anything other than a metaphor that describes 
how courts allocate claims and that such claims are exclusively claims in 
equity.
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Chapter 1. Following. 
 
Introduction 
 
It was explained in the introduction that the orthodox theory of tracing 
encompasses two propositions with respect to following. 
The first is that there is a useful distinction to be made between 
tracing, claiming and following, and the second is that following is a 
simple exercise involving the following of a single asset through various 
hands. The validity of these propositions will be examined in this 
chapter.  
The importance of understanding fully what is happening when 
we follow an asset is not merely of interest as a topic in its own right; it 
is a prerequisite to a complete understanding of tracing.  
The basic premise that there is a distinction to be made between 
tracing and following is one that is supported in this work. Indeed it 
could hardly be otherwise in a thesis, one central objective of which is to 
show that the common law allows no claims contingent upon a 
successful tracing exercise. It is unquestionably true that the common 
law allows claims contingent upon successful following. The essence of 
the law of conversion, for example, is that the claimant is showing that 
his asset is in the hands of, or has been through the hands of, the 
defendant. 
Unless we make the distinction between tracing and following 
clear the point that only one of these processes can result in a claim at 
common law will be lost.  
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Moreover, failing to distinguish between the two can lead to 
unnecessary confusion. Thus, in a seminal article,1 published before the 
distinction between tracing and following was first established, Kurshid 
and Matthews set out to demonstrate the proposition that tracing at 
common law has no proper foundation in precedent.2 Much of the 
argument is extremely difficult to follow however, because there are 
several concessions in the body of the work to the availability of the 
right to trace at common law, concessions which appear to defeat the 
entire argument. It is not until one realises that the word tracing is being 
used to describe both the process of identifying the same asset in 
different hands and the process of identifying of a substitute asset in the 
same hands that it is possible to understand the central thesis, which is 
that the common law has no basis for allowing substitute assets to 
represent existing assets.3 
Despite the fact that this work supports the necessity of 
distinguishing between tracing and following, it is not possible to deny 
that there are difficulties with the way in which the distinction is 
generally expressed. As Lionel Smith’s formulation, quoted at the outset 
of this work,4 suggests, following seems to be regarded as a simple 
matter; it is merely about identification, and does not even appear to be 
particularly related to legal matters. I can follow an asset whether it is, 
                                                     
1 S. Kurshid and P. Matthews, ‘Tracing Confusion’ (1979) 95 LQR 78. 
2 They were actually showing that claiming was not possible at common law but they 
did not regard the two propositions as being distinct. 
3 E.g. “The right to trace at law subsists only so long as the goods remain in their 
original form”, S. Kurshid and P. Matthews, ‘Tracing Confusion’ (1979) 95 LQR 98, 
which is clearly a reference to following if one accepts the distinction between the 
two. 
4 See text accompanying footnote 4 to the Introduction. 
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or ever has been, mine or not, and I can follow irrespective of whether I 
have any legal reason for doing so or not.  
Lord Millett tells us that following’s focal object is one asset, 
which we follow from person to person. This is now a widely accepted 
proposition, but some care is nonetheless needed before we can adopt 
it without reservation. 
First, despite appearances, there is a distinctively normative 
aspect to following. This is not clear if we take the simplest of examples. 
A steals B’s bicycle and sells it to C. B can clearly just follow his bicycle 
from his own hands into first A’s and then C’s. It is just a question of 
finding the bicycle. However, as will be shown later in this section, this 
simple example is not typical of the cases that deal with questions of 
following. They are generally more complex, and involve choices that the 
law has had to make as to what does, or does not, constitute the same 
asset. Suppose that A, having stolen the bicycle, breaks it up into its 
constituent parts, and sells those on to various parties. Can B follow 
each part? What if the part in question has been incorporated onto a 
different bicycle? What if what was stolen was not a bicycle but a vat of 
oil which is then mixed into a larger vat?  
As we shall see in the remainder of this chapter the law does 
indeed have answers to all of these questions, but they are based on 
normative considerations not factual ones. They are grounded in 
convenience, or on what is seen to be just, not on whether, factually, 
identification remains possible.  
Second, the simplicity of our first example disguises another 
important element of following. Following is also about the 
identification of intangibles as well as things. Although this is largely 
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uncontroversial, it does serve to emphasise the point that following’s 
apparent simplicity is somewhat overstated.  
The obvious intangible that we can follow is a right.5 If A owes B 
£100 and B assigns the debt to C then we can say that the right to be 
paid £100 by A can be followed from B to C. This, again, emphasises how 
careful we must be before accepting the notion that following is a 
simple process of identifying a thing as it moves from one hand to 
another. 
Third, most following cases involve money in one form or another 
and consideration needs to be given to the question of whether 
different rules are, or should be, applicable to the following of money 
from those pertaining to the following of other assets. 
Fourth, despite the fact that everyone seems to agree now on 
what following is, and how simple it is, statements such as the following 
still arise: 
“the difference between following and tracing is essentially this: 
following refers to the cases where owner A seeks to claim his property in the 
hands of another”.6  
On the orthodox understanding, however, this apparently 
unexceptionable statement is wrong. Following, in accordance with that 
theory, is not about ownership at all. That is the realm of claiming. 
Following is about identification only. It is neutral. I can as well follow 
your bicycle from your hands into those of a bona fide purchaser from 
you as I can my bicycle from the hands of a person who steals it from me 
                                                     
5 In the Hohfeldian sense as the converse of a duty. See W. Hohfeld, Fundamental 
Legal Concepts as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (Yale University Press) 1923. 
6 M. Smith, ‘The Vindication of an Owner’s Rights to Intangible Property’ (2013) 7 
JIBFL 412. 
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into the hands of a purchaser from that thief who knows that it has been 
stolen. 
Fifth, the apparently eminently sensible dislocation between 
following and claiming becomes increasingly hard to justify as we move 
along the chain of complication. In our initial example it would appear to 
be reasonable to say that B can follow his bicycle. On its own that says 
nothing about any claim that he may have in respect of it. However, 
when we get to those examples where the question of whether an asset 
can be followed is resolved by a normative decision put into legal reality, 
the division becomes harder to justify. This is because the only purpose 
of deciding whether following is allowed in such circumstances is to 
establish the respective rights of the parties. Up until the point at which 
the law is invoked it is easy to understand following as a purely neutral 
process. From that point onward this is a far more difficult conception. 
Finally, although perhaps least importantly, despite the apparent 
certainty with which the distinction between following and tracing is 
proclaimed, such a distinction does not represent either academic or 
judicial practice prior to the end of the 20th Century. 
In the highly important case of in Re Hallett’s Estate,7 Mr Justice 
Fry, at first instance, used the word ”trace” to describe the exercise that 
the claimant wished to undertake 18 times and the word follow just 
once. In the Court of Appeal the word trace was only used once and 
follow over 50 times. The expressions seemed to be interchangeable. 
In Sinclair v Brougham,8 the terms also seem to be used 
interchangeably. There are countless references to tracing as the 
                                                     
7 (1878 H 147), (1880) 13 Ch D 696. 
8 (1914) AC 198. 
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objective of the claimant’s application, but the judgments are also 
liberally sprinkled with references to following, when the asset being 
followed is not the same as the asset with which the claimant started 
the exercise. 
In In Re Diplock,9 Lord Greene MR said: 
The claims in rem rest upon the application of the principles alleged to 
underlie the well known case of In Re Hallett, expanded (as it is said) in 
Sinclair v Brougham as to enable the appellants to “follow” or “trace” the 
moneys paid to the several respondents into the various assets held by such 
respondents. 
Since all of the claims involved substitute assets (inevitably so because 
the original asset was money, the claimant’s title to which was lost upon 
being deposited with the defendants) Lord Greene cannot be taken to 
be saying that following and tracing are alternatives. He is saying that 
the exercise may be described as following, or it may be described as 
tracing, but it is essentially the same exercise under different names. 
This is the least important of the difficulties which we will look at 
with respect to following since it is perfectly arguable that what Lionel 
Smith has essentially done, by distinguishing between tracing and 
following, is to give us a tool with which to make our analysis of this 
difficult area clearer rather than suggest any change in the law itself. 
Given this we shall not trouble ourselves with this point any further. 
A Simple Example. 
 
We can commence our detailed examination of following by returning to 
the simple example with which we introduced the subject; A steals my 
bicycle. He gives it to B, who sells it to C, a bona fide purchaser who 
                                                     
9 (1951) AC 251. 
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knows nothing of the theft.  Following, here, merely involves 
identification. I can follow my bicycle into B’s hands and then into C’s. Is 
there a problem with the breaking of the following chain? Suppose, for 
example, that I can identify my bicycle in C’s hands but cannot show that 
it came to him directly from B? In practical terms the answer is “no”. It is 
not a requirement of a claim in conversion, for example, that the 
claimant shows how the defendant came into possession of the asset. 
Even if following and claiming are therefore completely separate 
processes, it makes no sense to say that the following process must 
involve the identification of my asset through all of the intermediate 
hands that it has travelled. To that extent Smith’s statement, that 
following involves merely the physical identification of a thing,10 is a 
better description than Lord Millett’s contention that following involves 
the tracking of the asset from hand to hand.11 
Specification and Accession. 
 
We can make the examples more complex than this without losing sight 
of the basic model. Even though these examples are only slightly more 
complex, it is already possible detect a movement away from the notion 
of following as a mere process, to one where normative decisions have 
to be made. 
Suppose that the asset that we wish to follow has become affixed 
to another asset. Where separation of the relevant parts is relatively 
straightforward, we say that I may separate those parts and reclaim my 
asset, or at least sue in conversion for interference with it. So, in Hendy 
                                                     
10 See text accompanying footnote 4 to the Introduction. 
11 See text accompanying footnote 5 to the Introduction. 
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Lennox (Industrial Engines) Ltd v Grahame Puttick Ltd,12 generating parts 
were attached to engines. Each part was readily identifiable and just as 
easily separated from the engine. The parts were subject to a retention 
of title clause and, the parts not having been paid for, the supplier did 
therefore retain that title. 
Where, however, the separate parts of the new asset cannot be 
straightforwardly removed (as for example when I paint your canvas 
with my paint) the owner of the greater and more valuable thing 
becomes the owner of the new combined asset.13 
The above process is known in English law as accession. Another is 
known as specification.14 This occurs where my asset is taken by you and 
worked upon to produce a new product. In Re Peachdart Ltd,15 leather 
was supplied on retention of title terms for the purposes of making 
handbags. Upon the receivership of the buyer (who was the 
manufacturer of the handbags) a distinction was made between the 
leather that had already been incorporated into handbags and that 
which had not. Cases of this sort are ancient16 and it was once the rule 
that a claim could be sustained in respect of both the unused leather 
and the used leather.17 In respect of the latter the effect was to make 
the claimant the owner of the handbags. 
                                                     
12 (1984) 2 All ER 152. 
13 Wood v Ash (1586) Owen 139; Appleby v Myers (1867) LR 2 CP 651; Seath v Moore 
(1886) 11 App Cas 350.  
14 These terms have been coined as a result of the not-overly creative process of 
taking the original Roman name for it (accessio, specificatio) and adding the letter 
“n”. 
15 (1984) Ch 131. 
16 The Case of Leather (1490) YB Hil 5 Hen 7 f 15. 
17 Ibid. Also Anonymous (1560) Moo KB 19. 
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Re Peachdart appears to be decided upon the basis of the 
intentions of the parties, which the court took to be that title to the 
leather passed to the manufacturer as soon as it had passed the point at 
which it had any independent value as a raw material.18 It is clearly 
relevant in Peachdart that the delivery of goods from seller to 
manufacturer had occurred as a result of a contract, since it is a 
fundamental tenet of contractual interpretation that the court seeks to 
determine the intentions of the parties. 
We can take the Peachdart example a stage further. In Borden 
(UK) Ltd v Scottish Timber Products Ltd,19 resin belonging to the 
claimant was mixed by the defendant with woodchips that belonged 
to him, to produce chipboard. The Court of Appeal held that the 
chipboard was a new product. Having been incorporated into that new 
product, title to the resin became meaningless and the resin had 
ceased to exist.20 This is by no means a necessary conclusion. The New 
York Court of Appeals decided a similar matter differently as far back 
as 1850.21 
We can see in these cases a very definite movement away from 
the notion of following being a simple process of identification. 
Hendy Lennox is, in reality, barely distinguishable from the simple 
bicycle example given at the outset of the section. It was possible to 
point to the generators in Hendy Lennox in exactly the same way as it 
                                                     
18 Re Peachdart Ltd (1984) Ch 131, 142. 
19 (1981) Ch 25. 
20 My Italics. Unless the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction over the laws of physics as 
well as the laws of England their reasoning is clearly incorrect. The resin continues to 
exist, albeit it in an altered form. All that the court could have meant was that legally 
the resin had ceased to exist, but this is a conclusion not a reason on which to base a 
conclusion. 
21 Silsbury v McCoon (1850) 8 NY 379, 1 NYCA 471. 
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would have been possible to point to my bicycle in C’s garage. The 
engines were effectively just a storage place for the generators. But the 
same is also true in the painting example, and in Peachdart and, to a 
lesser extent, in Borden. The problem in these cases is not establishing 
whether any of the claimant’s original asset constitutes a part of the 
new asset. It is in deciding the purely normative question of to whom 
ownership of the new asset should be given.  The reality of these cases is 
that the following trail has not ended if following is a merely mechanical 
process of identification. What has ended is the ability of the owner of 
the original asset to assert any claim to the new asset based on his title 
to the original. Doubtless these are sensible and practical rules, but they 
cast some doubt on the assertion that following is a neutral exercise that 
exists completely independently from claiming. The question of who 
owns the new asset is inextricably linked with whether it is legally 
permissible to follow the original asset into the new one. 
Consideration of such matters as intention, as occurred in 
Peachdart, are irrelevant where following is conceived of as a 
mechanical process. This is either the Raleigh bicycle that you stole from 
me or it is not. No amount of intention will make it otherwise. Intention 
is only relevant at the stage when what needs to be decided is who is to 
have ownership of any new asset created by joining together, or mixing, 
assets from different sources. At that point the difference between 
following and claiming is far from apparent. 
This point is further enhanced by the case of Jones v De 
Marchant.22 In this case a husband took certain skins, to which he had 
title, and added them to other skins, to which he did not have title, in 
                                                     
22 (1916) 28 DLR 561.  
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order to make a fur coat. The court held that the owner of the converted 
furs had title to the coat. On the face of it this case is incompatible with 
Peachdart. What appears to be the crucial factor in Jones v De Marchant 
was that one of the parties was a wrongdoer. Again, there is nothing to 
be said against the reasoning, but it cannot be argued that the reason 
follows from the nature of following as presented at the outset of this 
chapter.  
Mixtures. 
 
We now turn from cases where one asset is attached to another, or 
where one asset is combined with another to form a new asset, to cases 
where effectively identical assets are mixed together to form a single 
mass. Such a mass can either allow ready separation into individual parts 
(as with grains of corn from two different sources placed in the same 
silo) or not (as with oil from one source being placed into a bunker with 
oil from another). 
Superficially, it may be thought the analysis of such cases would 
be identical with those already discussed.  Where the mass can be 
readily separated, as with say corn ears in a silo, then following might be 
thought very similar to a Hendy Lennox type case, whereas when it 
cannot, as in oil in a bunker, it would seem more appropriate to apply a 
Borden type of analysis. This is not the reality however, because, unlike 
in Hendy Lennox the parties who have contributed to the mixture cannot 
show exactly which parts of it belong to them. True the mixture is 
readily divisible into its individual parts, but this is in itself insufficient. In 
order to successfully follow both into and out of the mixture it is 
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necessary for the follower to identify the exact assets that are his. And 
he clearly cannot do so in our example. 
English law (probably unlike Roman law)23 appears to have treated 
both of these situations in the same way, although exactly how that 
treatment is best described is not totally certain.  
Where the mixing is accidental or consensual there are two 
obvious alternative approaches. First the mixers could follow their asset 
into the mixture and continue to have ownership rights in respect of the 
asset that is the object of the following exercise. This is to treat the 
mixing as if it did not produce a new product at all. Suppose that A and B 
each contribute 50 sheep into an indeterminate mixture of 100 sheep. 
Using this approach if A were to non-consensually dispose of the entire 
100 sheep to C then B would have claims in conversion against both A 
and C.24 This is how Lionel Smith believes that following into mixtures 
works. 
Since following identifies part of the mixture with the contribution, it allows 
the assertion over that part of the mixture of the original25proprietary rights 
which were held in the contribution.26 
But this is the easy example. It becomes far more difficult when the 
mixture is depleted in any way. What if 50 of the sheep are stolen before 
A disposes of the remainder? According to Smith: 
The law appears to be that (B) can assert that her contribution exists in any 
part of the mixture subject to27 the right of the other contributors to do 
likewise.28 
                                                     
23 P. Birks, ‘Mixtures’ in N. Palmer and E.McKendrick (eds) Interests in Goods (2nd 
edn) Lloyds of London Press 1998.  
24Jackson v Anderson (1818) 4 Taunt 24.  
25 Italics in the original. 
26 L. Smith The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press 1997) 70-76. 
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So, in our example both A and B can claim that of the 50 sheep that 
remained after the theft each was the owner of 25.  
There is some authority to support this approach. If we go back to 
the original example, where there are still 100 sheep in the mixture, it 
would seem that, if B sold only 40 of those sheep, A could not sue either 
B or C in conversion since he could not show that any of the stolen 
sheep were his.29 This would clearly indicate a continuing ownership 
approach to the mixture. 
Despite these authorities, however, the better view appears to be 
that English law has adopted the second of the possible alternative 
approaches and treats the mixture as a new product and the mixers as 
joint owners of that product (again in proportion to their input).30 
Smith dislikes this because “if mixing creates a tenancy in 
common, it is of an unusual sort”31 and he certainly has a point. For 
example, if one contributor to a mixture disposes of the entire mixture 
this would appear to constitute the tort of conversion on the grounds 
that the mixture must contain that which belongs to the other party.32 
However, as generally understood, at common law it is not a conversion 
for one tenant in common to dispose of the commonly owned asset.33 
                                                                                                                                                        
27 Italics in original. 
28 L. Smith The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press 1997) 73. 
29 Wiles v Woodward (1850) 5 Exch 557; Sandeman v Tyzack (1913) AC 680; Jones v 
Moore (1841) 4 Y & C 351. 
30 Buckley v Gross (1863) 3 B & S 566, 122 ER 213; Indian Oil Corporation Ltd v 
Greenstone Shipping SA (Panama) 1988 (QB) 345; Glencore International AG v Metro 
Trading International Ltd (2001) 1 Lloyds Rep 284.  
31 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press 1997) 75. 
32 Jackson v Anderson (1811) 4 Taunt 24, 128 ER 235 (CP); Wiles v Woodward (1850) 
5 Exch 557, 155 ER, 244. 
33 Mayhew v Herrick (1849) 7 CB 229, 137 ER 92. 
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Despite this apparent irreconcilability it nonetheless appears that is the 
way that the law is developing.  
Attempts to reconcile the cases have proven almost impossible, 
with Matthews suggestion that there is joint ownership as between the 
contributors to the mixture and a third party but not as between the 
contributors themselves,34 provoking Birks to say that he would “have to 
be dragged screaming to that degree of flexible pragmatism”.35 
One major reason for the irreconcilability of the cases is that they 
appear to be talking past one another – as Matthews points out36 none 
of the cases supporting continued ownership was even cited in Indian Oil 
Corporation. 
Whatever the merits and demerits of the argument, however, the 
joint ownership cases are largely more modern than the continued 
ownership ones and the type of co-ownership that Smith finds so 
difficult to comprehend has become commonplace as a result of the Sale 
of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995. This allows pre-paying buyers of goods 
in bulk to acquire an interest in common, and also provides that any 
such co-owner is deemed to consent to a delivery or removal of goods 
out of bulk by another co-owner, insofar as those goods fall within the 
co-owner’s undivided share. 
It is difficult to reconcile this discussion with the orthodox notion 
of following as a simple process of identification. That difficulty is 
exacerbated when we discover that there are completely different rules 
                                                     
34 P Matthews, ‘Proprietary Claims at Common Law for Mixed and Improved Goods’ 
(1981) CLP 159 
35 P. Birks, ‘Mixing and Tracing’ (1992) 45 CLP 69. 
36 P. Matthews, ‘The Legal and Moral Limits of Common Law Tracing’ in P. Birks (ed) 
Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon Press 1995) 23, 43. 
 37 
that apply when one of the mixers is a wrongdoer (in the sense that the 
mixing itself constitutes a wrong). As was said above, why this should be 
the case is difficult to explain if following is a mere mechanical process 
of identification. If A wrongfully mixes 50 of his sheep with 50 identical 
sheep of B, A can either identify 50 of those sheep as his or he cannot. 
Why he mixed them is irrelevant, unless following has a normative 
element to it. The rule that has been adopted is a rule of evidence only. 
It does not displace clear facts as to identity. In general, the rule is that 
the mixture created is a tenancy in common but that where there is 
doubt as to the relative ownership between the wrongdoer and the 
innocent party (because the mixture has decreased in size for example 
or part of it has been stolen) then doubts must be resolved in favour of 
the innocent party.37 
Following Money. 
 
Until now the discussion has centred on the following of tangible assets. 
Money, in the form of currency, is a tangible asset in exactly the same 
way as corn or oil and it might therefore be expected that the rules 
relating to the following of those products would also apply to money. 
This does not, however, appear to be the case. Thus, in Jackson v 
Anderson,38 where A mixed his coins with those of B and sold them to C, 
B was able to claim in conversion against both A and C. Provided that B 
was able to identify his coins he was entitled to follow them. The 
explanation for this outcome would seem to be that provided that B was 
able to follow his coins into the mixture he could show that those coins, 
in which he still retained title, had been converted by both A and C. 
                                                     
37 Indian Oil Corporation Ltd v Greenstone Shipping SA (Panama) 1988 (QB) 345. 
38 (1811) 4 Taunt 24, 128 ER 235. 
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However, as was explained above,39 this no longer seems to be the 
explanation for such cases in respect of general assets. It now appears 
that such cases are treated as ones of common ownership. Birks 
certainly thinks that this is the normal case, but where the mixing of 
money is involved he rejects the common ownership model in favour of 
the continuing ownership one.40 This would seem to be lacking in 
principle. 
The greatest problem for an understanding of the process of the 
following of money has been created by the misunderstandings that 
have arisen from the notion that money has no earmark. It may well be 
the case that there are evidential difficulties in distinguishing between 
different coins and this may make identification difficult, but the same 
may be said of ears of corn. This is not a reason, however, for 
implementing a general rule that where the evidential difficulties can be 
overcome, and the money can be identified, it nonetheless can never be 
followed. Nevertheless, the expression that “money has no earmark” 
seems to have been interpreted as meaning rather more than that there 
are evidential difficulties associated with following money. Thus the 
Court of Chancery, in Whitecomb v Jacob,41 held, as a rule of substantive 
law, not as a rule of evidence, that money paid to an agent by a third 
party represented part of the agent’s estate in the event of the agent’s 
insolvency, whereas if that money had been invested by the agent in 
                                                     
39 See text accompanying footnotes 30-36 above. 
40 P. Birks, ‘Mixing and Tracing’ (1992) 45 CLP 69, 79. 
41 (1710) 1 Salk 160, 91 ER 149. 
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further goods then the goods would have been part of the principal’s 
estate.42  
As far as the Courts of Equity are concerned this, somewhat 
unprincipled, doctrine was rejected in Hallett’s Case,43 although this 
rejection was expounded by Jessell MR, in a somewhat cavalier manner, 
by simply stating, without reference to any authority, that the doctrine 
did not represent the law at that date, even if it did at the time that 
Whitecomb v Jacob was decided. 
Having been rejected in equity, this then left the possibility open 
that the notion that money has no earmark meant that, at common law, 
money could not be followed into a mixed fund.  But this is clearly not 
the case. Jackson v Anderson44 is a good example to the contrary and in 
Pennell v Deffell,45 Knight Bruce LJ said that the normal common law 
principles for mixing applied to money. 
Purely in respect of following, therefore, the expression money 
has no earmark is meaningless. However, once we move from the realm 
of following to that of claiming matters are somewhat different. When it 
comes to making claims in respect of followed money, commercial 
necessity requires that different considerations apply than do with 
respect to other assets. As a result, money as currency is an exception to 
the nemo dat rule. This is to what the expression “money has no 
earmark” truly relates. According to Lord Mansfield: 
It has been quaintly said that “the reason why money can not be followed is 
that it has no earmark”: but this is not true. The true reason is, upon account 
                                                     
42 See also dicta to very similar effect by Willes J in Scott v Surman (1742) Willes 400, 
125 ER 1235, 404. 
43 In re Hallett’s Estate (1880) Ch D 696. 
44  (1818) 4 Taunt 24. 
45 (1853) 4 De G M & G 388, 43 ER 551. 
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of the currency of it: it cannot be recovered after it has passed in currency. So, 
in case of money stolen, the true owner can not recover it, after it has been 
paid away fairly and honestly upon a valuable and bona-fide consideration: but 
before money has passed in currency, an action may be brought for the money 
itself.46 
If A steals B’s fifty pound note and buys a bicycle from C with that note, 
then (as long as C has no knowledge of the origins of the note) the title 
that A passes to C in respect of the note is not such title as A himself 
possesses (which is defeasible to B), but is a brand new title, good 
against the whole world. This is not true, in general, with respect to 
other tangible assets. Without such a rule, commerce would be 
impossible. If every time that a person purchases goods with notes or 
coins at a supermarket, the supermarket is at the risk of a third party 
suing it in conversion in respect of those notes or coins, there would 
soon be no supermarkets left. Moreover, the doctrine of relativity of 
title would compound this difficulty. In the example given above, if B 
had himself stolen the fifty pound note, C’s title would be defeasible to 
both B and the person from whom B stole the note. This would create 
ineradicable difficulties. Sales of goods for money would become 
impossible if the seller could not be certain that he would obtain good 
title to the money tendered for that sale. 
The expression “money has no earmark” does make sense when 
applied to claims to followed money therefore. Confusion has arisen 
because of the failure to properly distinguish between the processes of 
following and claiming when using the expression. 
 
                                                     
46 Miller v Race (1758) 2 Kenny 189, 96 ER 1151, 459. 
 41 
Following Money Through Bank Accounts. 
 
We have seen that following is largely about identification, and the ways 
that the law has adapted to the evidential difficulties associated with 
such identification. If we take the mixing of two vats of oil into a single, 
larger, vat, then we can say that the mixture is undoubtedly the product 
of the two original vats, and all that we have to do is to decide the basis 
on which we allocate ownership of the new mixture. The new mixture, 
importantly, is something that is capable of being owned. It is itself an 
asset. Money as cash is very similar in terms of the process of 
identification, but for reasons of commercial reality we say that once it 
comes into the hands of a bona fide purchaser identification ceases to 
matter. The purchaser has a title to that money good against the entire 
world. 
However, the vast majority of our cases do not concern money as 
a tangible commodity. They are not about notes and coins in the hands 
of the defendant. They involve transactions that result in money passing 
through (in some cases many) bank accounts. These accounts may be in 
credit, they may be overdrawn, they may move from one state to the 
other, they may be the result of transactions from a single source, they 
may be the result of transactions from many sources. Crucially, 
whatever state they are in, they have one critical difference from the vat 
of oil that we considered above. 
This difference is so fundamental that it means that none of the 
following rules described above can relate to it. Money in a bank 
account is not the property of the account holder and as such it cannot 
be the subject of the process of following. 
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In the criminal case of R v Preddy,47 the appellants had been 
charged with, and convicted of, mortgage fraud under s15(1) of the 
Theft Act 1968. The section required the prosecution to show that the 
defendant had “by deception… dishonestly obtained property belonging 
to another”. The property in question in this case was supposedly 
money standing to the credit of the lending institution with its bankers. 
The House of Lords overturned the conviction. Lord Goff said that the 
question of whether the money constituted property at all was 
irrelevant because even if it did it could not be described as property 
belonging to the lending institution. His Lordship said: 
Let it be assumed that the lending institution's bank account is in credit, and 
that there is therefore no difficulty in identifying a credit balance standing in 
the account as representing property, i.e. a chose in action, belonging to the 
lending institution. The question remains however whether the debiting of 
the lending institution's bank account, and the corresponding crediting of the 
bank account of the defendant or his solicitor, constitutes obtaining of that 
property. The difficulty in the way of that conclusion is simply that, when the 
bank account of the defendant (or his solicitor) is credited, he does not 
obtain the lending institution's chose in action. On the contrary that chose in 
action is extinguished or reduced pro tanto, and a chose in action is brought 
into existence representing a debt in an equivalent sum owed by a different 
bank to the defendant or his solicitor. In these circumstances, it is difficult to 
see how the defendant thereby obtained property belonging to another, i.e. 
to the lending institution.48 
                                                     
47 R v Preddy, R v Slade, R v Dhillon (1996) AC 815. 
48 Ibid 834. 
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The notion of asserting a pre-existing title to the contents of a bank 
account on the basis that one’s money constitutes part (or indeed all) of 
the contents of that account thus makes no sense. 49 
The correct position was explained by Lord Millett in Foskett v 
McKeown: 
We speak of money at a bank, and of money passing into and out of a bank 
account. But of course the account holder has no money at the bank…there is 
merely a single debt of an amount equal to the final balance standing to the 
credit of the account holder.50 
This is not to say that a bank account holder has nothing. He is a 
creditor of the bank to the value of the balance on his account and as 
such he owns a chose in action against the bank to that value.  
This is not, however, the same thing as owning the contents of the 
account. If, in breach of trust, A transfers £10 from B’s account to his 
own and then purchases a pen with that £10 then, even if A’s bank 
balance stood at 0 before the transfer, he is not in any sense using B’s 
£10 to purchase the pen. As a result of the transaction B’s credit balance 
with his bank, and thus the value of his chose in action, has been 
reduced by £10 and A’s has increased accordingly but B’s £10 has not 
been transferred to A. Any rights that B may have against A in such cases 
cannot therefore arise from B showing that he has a persisting title to 
the transferred funds. He unquestionably has a personal claim against A 
                                                     
49 Despite its fundamental nature the impossibility of treating money in a bank 
account as an asset of anyone but the bank has passed the courts by on regular 
occasions. There are countless examples of their treating bank deposits as if they 
were the equivalent of cash under the bed. See Sinclair v Brougham (1914) AC 398; 
McDonald v Denys Lascelles Ltd (1933) HCA 25; Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (1993) 
HCA 4, (1993) 176 CLR 344; ITS v G P Noble Trustees (2012) EWCA Civ 195. 
50 (2001)1 AC 102, 127-128. 
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in respect of the value transferred but that is not the same as saying that 
he has a claim to any particular £10. 
 
Mixed Bank Accounts. 
 
The typical situation with which this section deals is where A, in breach 
of trust, puts money belonging to B into his bank account and then 
subsequently withdraws funds from that account to make a purchase on 
his own behalf. 
Peculiarly the law seems to have adopted an analysis that treats 
such situations as being analogous with the irreversible mixing of 
physical assets. In Foskett v McKeown Lord Millet said that the “same 
principle operates whenever the mixture consists of fungibles, whether 
these be physical assets like oil, grain or wine or intangibles like money 
in an account.”51  
The question of course therefore arises as to exactly what that 
principle might be. We have already seen that following is not a simple 
process of identification – that it involves a whole series of normative 
decisions as to the proper allocation of claims. We have also seen that 
the allocation of claims resulting from unauthorised transfers in and out 
of bank accounts is not based on any surviving proprietary interest of 
the innocent party in the contents of the wrongdoer’s bank account. 
To return to our discussion above, we have seen that, where A 
mixes his money with that of B in a bank account, any claim that B might 
have in respect of his money does not depend upon showing that he 
retains any title to the money which is the subject of the mixing. 
                                                     
51 Ibid 141. 
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The bank account makes the bank a debtor of A to the value of 
the account and gives A a chose in action in respect of that debt. When 
A transfers money out of the bank account, then the chose in action is 
destroyed and is replaced by a brand new one to the value of the new 
balance on the account. Critically the debt owed to A, and therefore the 
chose in action, is not made up of a whole series of different 
contributions. It is not cumulative. It is a single item. Thus, if A mixes £50 
of his money with £50 of B’s, he is a creditor of the bank to the value of 
£100. If he now withdraws £40, his right against the bank to the 
payment of £100 is extinguished, and replaced by a new right to the 
value of £60. It follows from this that it makes no sense to ask, in the 
context of a mixed bank account, which of the parties to the mixture has 
contributed what money to an asset purchased from that mixture. 
Despite this what has been developed are a series of what have 
been described as evidential tie-breakers,52 designed to do the very 
thing that cannot be done – determine the relative contributions of the 
parties to the mixture.  
One suggestion, put forward in Re Diplock, was that where there 
are two parties to a fund which entirely consists of contributions made 
by themselves, and which has been mixed by a fiduciary agent, then the 
two parties, both being innocent, share the fund pari passu.53 
By contrast, in Clayton’s Case,54 the court adopted a ‘first in first 
out’ method of determining who had a claim to a mixed fund. The first 
payments into the fund were also to be regarded as the first payments 
                                                     
52 P. Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’ (1996) 26 University 
of Western Australia Law Review 1, 85. 
53 (1948) Ch 465, 539. 
54 Clayton’s Case: Devaynes v Noble (1816) 1 Mer 529, 35 WE 781. 
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out of it. This is such a patently unfair method of determination that, 
despite the fact that it has been subsequently followed,55 it is treated 
more as a rule of evidence to be adopted in want of anything better 
than as a strict rule of law.56  
The best-known case on wrongful mixtures is In re Hallett’s 
Estate,57 where the Court of Appeal again equated the position of the 
wrongful mixer of a bank account with the wrongful mixer of physical 
products. The explanation for the outcome of the case appears to be 
that, where A wrongfully mixes his money with that of B in a bank 
account, any monies drawn from that account should, in the absence of 
any clear evidence of intention to the contrary, first be treated as being 
the money contributed by the wrongdoer. The basis of this assumption 
is that, since A is entitled to withdraw his own money, this is what it 
should be assumed that he is doing.58  
That this is only a rule of evidence rather than a rule of law can be 
seen from the case of James Roscoe (Bolton) Ltd v Winder,59 where the 
balance in the mixed account fell, at some stage, to below the level 
contributed by the innocent party. When more money was subsequently 
put into the account, the innocent party could not be heard to say that 
he had a claim to any money above the lowest level to which the 
account had fallen. It was clearly impossible that such money could be 
his, because he had made no contribution to the account after the 
                                                     
55 Pennell v Deffell (1853) 4 De GM & G 372, 43 ER 551; Barlow Clowes International 
v Vaughan (1992) 4 All ER 322; Charity Commission for England and Wales v Framjee 
(2015) 1 WLR 16. 
56 Russell-Cooke Trust Co v Prentis (2002) EWCH 2227. 
57 (1880) 13 Ch D 696. 
58 Ibid 728. 
59 (1915) Ch 652.  
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account had fallen to the lowest level. Thus there was no evidential 
difficulty to solve. 
By way of contrast, In Re Oatway,60 A, in breach of his fiduciary 
duty, mixed his own money with that of B and purchased shares from 
the mixed fund. The court held that, since A was not entitled to 
withdraw the purchase money from the account, B could opt to adopt 
the transaction and take the shares rather than the money. This 
reasoning is diametrically opposite to that in Hallett’s Estate. In that case 
the reasoning was that A should be taken to have acted in good faith by 
using his own money when he had sufficient in the balance to do so, 
whereas in Oatway the court seems to be saying that the trustee was 
liable for the new rights acquired with the trust fund because he had no 
entitlement to withdraw any funds at all. 
These cases all describe rules designed to deal with a perceived 
evidential gap. Some may be thought of as being better, or fairer, than 
others, but they all suffer from the same basic flaw. There is no 
evidential gap to fill, because the gap supposedly consists of a lack of 
certainty as to which of the parties to the mixed account owns which 
item of money. But the question is illusory. 
Suppose that A withdraws £40 from an account in which he has 
mixed money of his own with that of B and that with the £40 he 
purchases shares that subsequently turn out to be worth £1 million. The 
cases that we have looked at say that because there is an evidential 
difficulty as to who owns the £40 with which the shares were purchased, 
some formula or other must be devised to solve that difficulty. Oatway, 
for example, suggests that the £40 should be regarded as belonging to B 
                                                     
60 (1903) 2 Ch 356. 
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and goes on to say that B can therefore assert his rights to that £40 in 
the shares purchased with it. 
But there is no evidential difficulty to solve. A’s actions have 
resulted in the rights that he had in respect of the balance in his account 
of £100 being destroyed and replaced by rights in respect of the new 
balance of £60 and the acquisition of title in the shares. 
There may be very good reasons for allowing B a claim in such 
circumstances to the £40 or to the shares, or to either, depending upon 
his ability to exercise an option, but such a claim is in no way resultant 
from B’s ability to claim any title to the £40 itself. We can make any 
decision we like about the scope of liability in such cases but they are 
normative decisions. They do not follow from the rules that we have 
adopted in respect of physical mixtures (which it should be noted are 
themselves normative decisions). 
Following and Tracing. 
 
There is little harm in distinguishing between following and tracing. 
Indeed, it is, analytically speaking, desirable to do so. However, it is 
important, when doing so, not to fall into the trap of thereby over-
simplifying the following process and turning it into a simple matter of 
identification. It is not. Normative decisions abound in determining 
when following can and cannot take place. The fact that we have 
different following rules where the mixing of assets takes place as a 
result of wrongdoing from those pertaining when there has been no 
wrongdoing demonstrates this point. Moreover, the line between 
following and tracing can be a very thin one indeed. If continuing 
ownership explains proprietary interests in a mixture, then that is 
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obviously based on notions of following. However, if the mixture is to be 
treated as being subject to common ownership, then it is a substitute for 
the assets which make it up and is therefore dependent upon tracing 
rules. This is the same asset and the same factual circumstances. All that 
has changed is the explanation for the interests of the parties.61 Care 
needs to be taken, however, that the narrowness of the line between 
the two processes does not obscure the very different normative 
justifications for each of them. Failure to take such care can lead to this: 
B steals A’s corn which he converts to whiskey. A can recover the whiskey. 
B steals A’s corn, which he swaps for whiskey sold to him by C. Why can’t A 
recover the whiskey?62 
which might be thought of as a good example of missing the point. 
Following and Claiming. 
 
Here, again, the starting point is that it does no particular harm to 
distinguish following from claiming, and that at a certain level the 
distinction is reasonably clear. Suppose that I can follow my bicycle 
though the hands of A into those of B, in whose garage I can now show 
that it resides. Of itself this says nothing about the rights that I have in 
the bicycle. If A has stolen the bicycle then I have a claim in conversion 
against both A and B. But what if I have left the bicycle with A and made 
it generally known that A is to be my agent for the disposal of the 
bicycle? If B purchase it but subsequently, for whatever reason, I have 
changed my mind about the sale, the identification of the bicycle in B’s 
garage will not avail me. The transfer was made under an exception to 
                                                     
61 As we saw above that explanation is itself far from universally agreed. 
62 M. Smith, ‘The Vindication of an Owner’s Rights to Intangible Property’ (2013) 7 
JIBFL 412. 
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the nemo dat rule and B has obtained whatever title that I had with 
respect to the bicycle. Merely following the bicycle says nothing about 
rights and claims. 
But this analysis is not conclusive. It depends upon a neutral view 
of following that, as was explained above, is not easy to sustain. In our 
example we can, of course, say that in both cases I can follow the bicycle 
from A to B, but that in one instance I can make a claim in respect of it, 
whereas in the other I cannot. It could equally be said, however, that in 
the first case (the theft) I can follow the bicycle from A to B but in the 
latter case I cannot. If following is mere identification, then this way of 
expressing the matter is of course incorrect.  But take the case of A 
stealing B’s paint and attaching it to his canvas to produce a painting. 
We say that it is no longer possible to follow the paint because it has 
become in some way or another now at one with the canvas. But this is 
just not true in any sense other than a legal one. We can perfectly well 
identify the paint and scrape it off. Its molecular structure does not 
make it as one with the canvas. It is not that we cannot physically follow 
the paint, it is that we may not legally do so. Following constitutes a 
process which involves a series of legal rules whose only purpose is to 
enable the follower to make a claim (or deny him one) with respect to 
an asset. It is not a neutral, value free process and it is certainly not a 
synonym for identification. 
So, what then of the supposed distinction? It may be that it is best 
expressed by saying that being able to follow an asset tells the follower 
that he may have some claim in respect of that asset, but not precisely 
what the claim is. When he no longer can sustain any claim then we can 
say that the following process has come to an end.  
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Finally, it should be mentioned that we are in this work, and in all 
works where this matter has been discussed, speaking of following in a 
legal context. No doubt all people are at liberty to idly ‘follow’ their 
asset (or indeed any asset) for no good reason, other than that they wish 
to do so. Such conceptions have no place in legal works. It is no aid to 
clarity of thinking to describe that process as following. 
Conclusion. 
 
Following is not, in most instances, a simple exercise in the location of 
assets. Most of our following cases involve a normative decision-making 
process. The purpose of the process is to determine who, legally, may be 
said to have title to an asset, or part of an asset. Considerations, such as 
wrongdoing, which have nothing to do with the question of physical 
identification, are take into account when such determinations are 
made. Critically, for the remainder of this work, it was established in this 
chapter that money passing through bank accounts cannot be regarded 
as being analytically similar to the treatment of physical mixtures. 
Money in a bank account does not belong to any of the parties who have 
contributed to the balance on that account. It belongs to the bank. 
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Chapter 2. Tracing. 
 
Introduction. 
 
This chapter will be concerned with tracing and establishing what we 
mean when we talk of the process of tracing. 
It has been said that tracing is about substitutions, and that the 
distinction between tracing and following is that following is about the 
identification of the same asset (or what is legally regarded as the same 
asset) as it moves through a variety of hands, whereas tracing is 
concerned with identifying assets, which are in, or have been through, 
the hands of the defendant and that may be regarded as substitutes for 
an asset which was originally in the hands of the claimant.1  
Having looked at following we now need to turn to a more 
detailed analysis and explanation of tracing. This will involve looking at  
exactly what it is that is supposed to be being traced, how the tracing 
process is said to work, and the rationale behind that process. 
It is first necessary to define more precisely what we mean by the 
expression “tracing”. According to Lionel Smith: 
Tracing identifies a new thing as the potential subject matter of a claim on 
the basis that it is the substitute for an original thing which was itself the 
subject matter of a claim.2 
This is the exchange product theory of tracing, and represents the 
overwhelming orthodoxy on the subject. The substitute asset is the 
                                                     
1 Perhaps the definitive expression of this position is set out in the opinion of Lord 
Millett in Foskett v McKeown (2001) AC 102, 128. 
2 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press 1997) 6. 
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product of the original asset, so that any rights that the claimant had in 
the original asset are transmitted to the substitute. 
The heart of this work concerns common law claims to substitute 
assets which have been identified as substitutes by the process of 
tracing. The above definition makes no distinction between tracing at 
common law and tracing in equity.3 
For the purposes of this work, tracing at common law will mean 
those instances where the claimant’s rights in the original asset were 
legal rights and where the rights that he wishes to assert with respect to 
the substitute asset are also legal rights. The rights in the substitute that 
are being asserted can supposedly result in either proprietary claims or 
personal claims. 
It is important to bear in mind the point that common law tracing 
involves the assertion of legal rights with respect to the substitute asset 
or as a consequence of the defendant having come into contact with the 
substitute asset. It is not the purpose of this work to cast any doubt on 
the notion that where the claimant can show a legal right in the original 
asset he can, if that asset was the subject of the breach of a fiduciary 
duty, claim an equitable right in any substitute.4 Indeed it will be 
suggested in Chapter 7 that the central purpose of tracing is to assist in 
                                                     
3 It is a matter of considerable disagreement as to whether there are separate rules 
for tracing at common law and in equity. The logic of the argument put forward in 
this work is that there is only one set of rules but for reasons very different to those 
normally set out by supporters of unitary tracing. In their view tracing is simply an 
identification process (not dissimilar to their understanding of following) and it 
makes no sense, therefore, to have separate sets of rules. One can either identify an 
asset as a substitute for another or one cannot. In this work it will be argued that 
tracing is not a process allowed at common law at all and therefore there is by 
definition only one set of tracing rules – those adopted by equity.  
4 Although any claim will not, as will be shown, depend upon the claimant 
establishing that the one right is a substitute for the other. 
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the protection of the rights of beneficiaries from the results of breaches 
of fiduciary duties by defendants.5 
It is important to know what it is that is supposed to be the 
subject matter of the tracing exercise. In the quotation from Smith cited 
above he uses the word “thing” as representing both the subject matter 
of a potential claim and also as the subject matter of an original claim. 
This does not tell us enough  
To take an example, suppose A is the trustee of a bracelet for the 
benefit of B. A, in breach of trust, sells the bracelet for £100. Smith’s 
“things” here might be the bracelet and the £100, but for reasons 
explained below this seems unlikely. There it will be suggested that the 
“things” are the rights that B had in the bracelet and the rights that he is 
asserting in the £100, rather than the assets themselves. However, even 
this is only a starting point because, although it tells us what is the 
subject matter of the claim, rights, it does not tell us how B can establish 
that rights in the £100 represent substituted rights for those he had in 
the bracelet. It does not follow, without more argument, that just 
because B had rights in the bracelet he must have rights in the 
£100.There must be something that links the rights in the bracelet to the 
rights in the £100. That something will enable us to say that the one 
right can be regarded as a substitute for the other.  
For the orthodox theory that something lies in the concept of 
value. What links the rights in the bracelet with the rights in the £100 is 
that A has utilised the value inherent in the rights in the bracelet to 
                                                     
5 See Chapter 7 below. 
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acquire his rights in the £100. Indeed, nothing else, according to 
orthodox theory, links the two sets of rights at all.6 
It will be suggested that this is not a satisfactory answer. In fact, it 
is responsible for a vast amount of confusion about the nature of 
tracing.7 The metaphysical notion of tracing value from one asset to 
another obscures the fact that tracing, no less than following, is about 
the normative allocation of claims. Tracing value has the apparent effect 
of making a successful claim following the tracing exercise inevitable,- as 
if it is in the very nature of things. As will be shown this is not the case at 
all. 
A consequence of the exchange product theory is that tracing is 
seen as an essentially transactional process. It requires the claimant to 
establish a direct link between his original asset and the asset which he 
asserts is the substitute through a continuous series of transactions.8 
The claimant is also, according to some, required to show an unbroken 
chain of title between the original and the substitute assets.9 The 
usefulness of such a characterisation will be considered. At the end of 
this chapter we will have set up sufficient background to enable us to 
properly consider matters of tracing at common law. 
                                                     
6 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press 1997) 120. 
7 T. Cutts, ‘Tracing, value and transactions’ (2016) (79)3 MLR 381; C. Rotherham, 
Proprietary Remedies in Context, (Hart 2002) 89-126. 
8 D. Hayton, ‘Equity’s Identification Rules’ in P. Birks (ed), Laundering and Tracing 
(Clarendon Press 1995) 1. Arguably cases such as Scott v Surman (1742) Wiles 400, 
Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 562, and In re Hallett’s Estate 13 (1879) Ch D 696 
adopt a transactional approach to tracing as well, although as will be seen later in 
this work there are complications with adopting such an argument. Cases such as 
Relfo v Varsani (2014) EWCA Civ 360 may suggest a movement away from a strict 
transactional approach. If we are to follow the analysis in these cases we cannot, 
however, retain the notion that tracing is about following a continuous stream of 
value. 
9 A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 119. 
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Tracing and Rights. 
 
In Smith’s definition of tracing adopted above,10 the emphasis was on 
the identification of things as substitutes for other things. Birks’s 
explanation of tracing also centred around this idea of tracing things. In 
Unjust Enrichment, Birks divided wealth into abstract wealth (which is a 
single fund representing a persons total wealth) and discrete wealth 
(which is the individual items that go to make up that total wealth).11   
Tracing is concerned, he said, with discrete wealth. It deals with 
situations where a claimant can show that one item of discrete wealth 
has been used to acquire another. Tracing differs from following 
because following is about the same asset moving from person to 
person, whereas tracing is about new assets not new people. This is the 
all- pervasive modern view of tracing. It is about determining whether 
the claimed thing is the substitute for, or product of, the original thing.12  
At one level, this makes sense. If A steals B’s orange and swaps it 
for C’s apple it could conceivably be argued that B can show that the 
apple is the substituted product of the orange. It can also be said, 
however, that B can show that the rights that A has in the apple are the 
product of the rights that B had in the orange. That this is the more 
satisfactory way of looking at it can be seen if we give a more 
complicated example. Suppose that A transfers ownership of his bicycle 
to B by mistake, but retains possession of it. B transfers his ownership 
rights to C in exchange for the ownership rights to a bracelet. If tracing is 
                                                     
10 See text accompanying footnote 2. 
11 P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd ed Clarendon Press 2005) 69. 
12 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson (1991) Ch 547; Alumimium Industrie Vaassen BV v 
Romalpa Aluminium (1976) 1 WLR 676; Re Peachdart Ltd (1984) Ch 131; Borden (UK) 
Ltd v Scottish Timber (1981) Ch 25. 
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about rights this still makes perfect sense. A can potentially show that  
B’s title to the bracelet is the product of A’s original title to the bicycle. 
What he cannot meaningfully do, however, is the same exercise with the 
things involved. A cannot argue that the bracelet itself (the “thing”) has 
been acquired in substitution for the bicycle (the other “thing) since he 
has at all times retained possession of the bicycle. But it is lacking in 
principle to reject A’s claim on the grounds that he has retained 
possession of the bicycle when he no longer has any rights in it.  
Despite the constant references to things in our tracing literature 
it is suggested that in reality it is rights not things which are the context 
of tracing. There are dicta which implicitly recognise this to be the case 
and they must be correct. For example in Clough Mill Ltd v Martin,13 
Robert Goff L.J. discussed the well- known retention of title case, 
Romalpa Aluminium.14 Romalpa was concerned with a claim that certain 
monies, which were held by a receiver, were the traceable proceeds of 
aluminum owned by Romalpa as a result of a retention of title clause in 
its contract of sale. According to his Lordship: 
(Romalpa) was concerned with the question whether sellers of aluminum foil 
under contracts containing a Romalpa clause could trace their title into 
money which was the proceeds of sale by the buyers of aluminum foil 
supplied by the seller…the question…was considered on the basis that…title 
to the foil itself had been retained by the sellers.15 
This does have one important implication. If we go back to the apple and 
orange example above, the exchange product theory would argue that B 
can sustain a claim to the apple in A’s hands because the rights that A 
                                                     
13  (1985) 1 WLR 111. 
14 (1976) 1 WLR 676. 
15 (1985) 1 WLR 111, 114. 
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has in the apple can be traced from the rights that B had in the orange. 
The problem is that the rights are not the same. The rights that B can 
claim in the apple are only such rights as A possessed in the apple, which 
in turn are only the rights that C was able to pass to A. B’s rights in the 
orange were his own rights. His rights in the apple are defeasible to 
anybody with a prior and better title than that with which C was able to 
provide A.16 This would suggest either that B cannot trace in such 
circumstances, or that his ability to trace is not dependent upon showing 
that the rights in the apple are the product of the rights in the orange. 
Tracing Value. 
 
We have established that tracing is concerned with connecting the rights 
in asset A with the rights in asset B. In other words, when we talk of 
tracing being about identifying one thing as the product of another it is 
rights, not things, that we are talking about.  
But that does not tell us what it is that we trace – it merely identifies 
what we are tracing from and to. 
It is common orthodoxy that what we trace is value. According to Birks: 
Tracing is no more than the means of finding out where at any relevant 
moment value is located…there are two quite separate questions. One is 
whether the value in question can be located. The other is whether, once it 
has been located a right of some kind may be exigible in respect of it.17 
Lionel Smith says that: 
The only connection which the plaintiff has to the new asset is that it was 
acquired with the old asset. The defendant acquired the value inherent in the 
new asset with the value inherent in the old asset. That is why we say that we 
                                                     
16 C may himself have stolen the apple for example, in which case B’s rights to it are 
defeasible to those of the person from whom C stole it. 
17 P. Birks, ‘Mixing and Tracing’ (1992) 45(2) CLP 69. 
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trace value: it is the only constant that exists before, through and after the 
substitution through which we trace.18     
This is the orthodox position on tracing. It is a transactional 
process in which we start with the value inherent in the original asset 
and we then follow that value as it moves from asset to asset in a 
continuous stream. Moreover, it appears that at each stage of the 
tracing process the claimant must show that he has title to the asset in 
which the value adheres immediately prior to the substitution. 
Thus, according to Burrows: 
If C pays D £1000 by mistake and D exchanges the £1000 for a lottery ticket, 
which wins her £100,000, C can trace to the £100,000 but he will have no 
personal or proprietary rights to that substitute property of £100,000 unless 
he can establish that the £1,000 “belonged to” C in D’s hands prior to the 
substitution.19 
This leaves open the question of what exactly is meant by value? 
Unfortunately, proponents of the view that we trace value through a 
series of transactions have given us little idea of what they mean when 
they say that we trace value. 
In what follows, various possibilities are considered and rejected. 
 
Exchange Value 
 
A layman thinks of the value of an asset in terms of how much money he 
would receive for its disposal. If I ask somebody what value he attributes 
to his house, he will probably tell me the figure that the estate agent put 
on it or the figure which a buyer and a seller would reach in order for a 
                                                     
18 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing, (Clarendon Press 1997) 119. 
19 A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, (3rd edn OUP 2010) 119. Burrows adheres to a 
strict distinction between tracing and claiming which it is suggested at    above may 
not be correct.  
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sale of the house to take place between the two. He would also probably 
recognise that the value changes for reasons entirely extrinsic to the 
bricks and mortar themselves. So, if he were in deep financial distress 
and the house was being repossessed, he might well agree that the 
value of his house had gone down because a prospective buyer would 
probably no longer need to pay as much for it. Value in this sense is a 
measure, calculated in money terms, of the exchange value of an asset. 
It is unlikely, however, that this is the meaning that is attributed 
to the term value in a tracing context.  For example, there is no 
suggestion that, if A, having misappropriated £100 of trust assets, were 
somehow to exchange that £100 for an aeroplane, the beneficiary of the 
trust would be restricted to tracing into a part of the aeroplane worth 
£100. On the contrary in Jones v Jones,20 after committing an act of 
bankruptcy, but before the presentation of the petition, the firm of FC 
Jones transferred money from its bank account to that of Mrs Jones, a 
wife of one of the partners. By the rules of the bankruptcy code then in 
place,21 once the petition had been presented the date of the 
bankruptcy related back to the date of the act of bankruptcy. From that 
date all assets of the bankrupt’s estate belonged to the trustee. This 
meant that the money transferred from the firm’s bank account to that 
of Mrs Jones belonged in law to the trustee. Mrs Jones successfully 
invested that money, amounting to £11,700, in potato futures. As a 
result she made a profit of £50,760. The Court of Appeal upheld the 
proprietary claim of the trustee to the rights in this entire sum of money.  
                                                     
20 Jones v Trustee of FC Jones & Sons (1997) Ch 159. 
21Bankruptcy Act 1914, ss37-38. 
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Evidently, therefore, value does not mean exchange value. The 
relative values of the original and substitute rights are irrelevant.  
In any case the notion of exchange value is a description of what an 
asset can realise, not what the asset possesses. Because of this it makes 
very little sense to conceive of exchange value somehow moving from 
one asset to another.  
Value as Wealth 
 
Possibly, the value that it is said that we trace from one right to another 
is represented by the change in the abstract wealth of the two parties as 
a result of a transaction. Again, this meaning of value corresponds with a 
common-sense notion of the word. If I buy your house, which has a 
market value of £500,000, for £400,000, it might not be inappropriate to 
say that as a result of the transaction my wealth has increased by 
£100,000 and that £100,000 of value has moved from you to me.  
Again, however, it seems unlikely that this is the meaning of value 
when we speak of tracing value. Suppose that A mistakenly transfers an 
asset worth £100 to B for £50 cash. It is easy to see that value has 
moved from A to B. A’s net worth has gone down £50 and B’s has gone 
up by the same amount. But this is not the only way in which value can 
be regarded as moving from A to B. It is not necessary, in order for there 
to be a movement in value from the one to the other, for there to be an 
identifiable transaction between the two. Suppose instead that A 
mistakenly transferred an asset worth £100 to C for £50 cash and C, 
thinking that he had a bargain, wrote out a cheque to his nephew B for 
£50 from his savings account. The outcome of this process is the same as 
in the previous example. A is £50 worse off and B is £50 better off. There 
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has been a movement of wealth and it may not be unreasonable to 
describe it as having been from A to B. However, in the latter case the 
transactional theory of tracing does not permit the movement in value 
from A to B to support a claim even though the overall effect is the same 
– the movement of wealth from A to B of £50.22 B’s rights in the £50 did 
not arise as a result of any transaction with A.  
In any case Foskett v McKeown,23 seems to stand in the way of the 
understanding of value as movements in wealth. In that case one 
Murphy took out a life assurance policy to the value of £1 million, the 
premiums for which were £22,000 per annum. The benefit of the policy 
was assigned to Murphy’s children, the defendants. The first three 
premiums were paid from Murphy’s own resources. It was uncertain 
where the next premium payment came from but the next two were 
removed from an account of which Murphy was the trustee for the 
benefit of the claimants. Murphy committed suicide and the policy paid 
out the proceeds to the defendants.  
It was found, as a matter of fact, that because of the particular 
nature of the policy, the defendants would have received the same 
amount of money from it even if the two premiums that were paid as a 
result of Murphy’s breach of trust had never been paid. 
Despite this fact the claimants succeeded in a claim not just to the 
return of the premiums, but to a proportionate share of the policy pay 
out. They were permitted to trace from the rights that they held in the 
monies in the trust bank account into the rights that that money 
                                                     
22 OJSC OIL Co Yuganreft v Abramovich (2008) EWHC 2613. 
23 (2001) 1 AC 102. 
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acquired in the life policy, and then to follow those rights into the hands 
of the defendants. 
This is not compatible with treating value as an increase in wealth. 
The premiums paid from the trust account contributed nothing towards 
increasing the net worth of the defendants. Lord Millett was not in the 
slightest concerned by this fact: 
The question is one of attribution not causation. The question is not whether 
the same death benefit would have been payable if the last premium or the 
last few premiums had not been paid. It is whether the death benefit is 
attributable to all of the premiums or only to some of them. The answer is 
that death benefit is attributable to all of them because it represents the 
proceeds of realising the policy, and the policy in turn represents the product 
of all of the premiums.24 
It is not at all certain what is meant by saying that “the policy represents 
the product of all of the premiums” but the overall effect is clear.25 
Tracing value requires the claimant to show that he has rights in asset B 
because those rights are a substitute for rights that he previously held in 
asset A, but he does not have to show that the defendant has made any 
profit out of the transaction that has produced the substitution of those 
rights. 
                                                     
24 (2001) 1 AC 102, 137. 
25 In giving his opinion Lord Millett appeared to treat the policy as an asset for which 
the purchase money was an, at the time, unknown number of premium installments. 
He emphasized the point that a life policy was not made up of a series of annual 
renewals but existed as a continuing entity to be paid for annually. The problem with 
this analysis is that if it is correct then the premiums paid for with monies from the 
trust accounts  did not play any part in the purchase of the policy and so it should 
not have been possible to trace from the rights that the trust beneficiaries had in the 
trust funds into the rights associated with the policy. The one did not pay for the 
other. All that the premiums did was to help pay the debt associated with the 
purchase of an asset that had already been purchased. For an examination of the 
validity of this process (known as backward tracing) see M. Conaglen, ‘Difficulties 
With Tracing Backwards’ (2011) LQR 432. 
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The problem therefore remains of understanding what the term 
value means in the context of tracing value. 
Value as Exchange-Potential. 
 
A third possibility that has been suggested is that value means 
exchange-potential.26 Unlike exchange-value, exchange-potential does 
not relate to a particular amount of money. Instead it refers to the 
potential that an asset has to realise any amount of money. So, if A 
steals B’s apple and then exchanges that apple for an orange then we 
can say that the rights that A has in the orange are the traceable 
substitute for the rights that B had in the apple and that what connects 
those rights (i.e. what it is that can be traced) is the fact that A has 
acquired the exchange potential (the value) of the orange by exploiting 
the exchange potential of the apple. 
The first problem with this potential solution to the problem of 
the meaning of value is that it is does not seem to be what the users of 
the term value have in mind. Thus, according to Lionel Smith: 
If a £100 banknote is used to buy a painting, then the value inherent in 
ownership of the banknote is traceable into ownership of the painting. 
Ownership of the painting might be, or might become, worth £10 or £100. 
This does not change the conclusion that this asset was acquired with the 
other; the seller transferred ownership of the painting in exchange for 
receiving ownership of the banknote. This is what is meant by the notion that 
it is value which is traced from the first asset into the second.27 
There is nothing here which supports the idea that Smith believes that 
value means exchange potential. In fact, there is no clue as to what he 
believes value means at all. He certainly says that it does not mean 
                                                     
26  See T. Cutts, ‘Tracing, value and transactions’ (2016) (79)3 MLR 381. 
27 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press 1997) 16-17. 
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exchange value, but that is all that he says. If anything, what Smith 
seems to be suggesting is that we trace are ownership rights, but that 
would leave us with the curious situation in which we say that when we 
trace we seek to show that A’s rights in one asset are a substitute for his 
rights in another asset, and also that what we trace are those same 
rights. This tells us very little that we did not know already and certainly 
does not help us to determine how we can tell that an exchange of 
rights has taken place. Smith pays lip-service to the notion of value, but 
having done so, that notion does no more work until the last sentence, 
when it reappears as a conclusion supported by nothing that has 
preceded it. According to Birks:  
The exercise invariably begins from a point at which it was undoubtedly the 
case that a certain number of units of value, measurable in money but not 
necessarily in the form of money, were held by a particular person, and the 
exercise aims to discover whether all of those units of value can be said to 
have passed into other assets so that they, the original units of value, are 
held by the defendant in those assets.28 
As with Smith, Birks does not furnish us with any explanation about 
what he means by the term value. But he is unlikely to be thinking of 
exchange potential because he insists that the units of value that we 
trace are measurable in money. Exchange potential is not measurable in 
money. In order to be measurable in money, the exchange potential in 
an asset has to be realised via an actual exchange, at which point it is no 
longer exchange potential at all. But once the exchange potential is 
realised it must be as either the actual value of the exchange or as a 
causative increase in wealth. We have already seen, however, that for 
the purposes of tracing, value cannot mean either of these.  
                                                     
28 P. Birks, ‘Persistent Problems in Misdirected Money: A Quintet’ (1993) LMCLQ 218.  
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This is the central problem with the idea of value as exchange 
potential. Even more than exchange value or wealth accretion, exchange 
potential is obviously a metaphorical description. Exchange value cannot 
move from one asset to another as a result of a transaction. It merely 
describes a quality of an individual asset, or more specifically in our 
examples, of a right. 
Another problem with the notion of value as exchange-potential is 
the idea that all assets have exchange potential. Suppose that it 
becomes unlawful to buy or sell apples. A holds some apples in trust for 
B which he, unlawfully, exchanges for oranges with C. Does the 
exchange product theory not allow B to trace into the oranges? The 
apples have no exchange potential29 at all since one of the rights of 
ownership of the apples is no longer the right to exchange them. B 
cannot therefore trace the exchange potential of his apples into the 
exchange potential of the orange. 
Improvements to Assets. 
 
The confusion that is caused by treating tracing as involving the location 
of value can be exemplified by looking at those situations where there 
has been an improvement in the exchange value of an asset in the 
defendant’s hands. Re Diplock,30 was such a case. In this case executors 
of an estate mistakenly paid monies to certain charities, some of which 
was used to improve the quality of those charities land and buildings. 
Although many of the resultant claims were purely personal, certain 
proprietary claims were made with respect to those improvements, 
which were denied because the Court of Appeal held that once the 
                                                     
29 At least they have no lawful exchange potential.  
30 (1948) Ch 465. 
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money was spent on the improvements the claimants could no longer 
trace into it. Smith thinks that this is wrong because the value that is 
being traced can be shown to be present in the enhanced asset and that 
enhancement can only be attributed to that value.31 
But this completely contradicts the orthodox position32 that 
tracing is about substitutions. Smith’s analysis concerns exchange value 
but we know from Smith himself, and from Foskett v McKeown,33 that 
increases in exchange value are supposedly irrelevant to the capacity to 
trace. The inability of orthodox theorists to properly explain what they 
mean by tracing value is the cause of great problems in understanding 
their analysis of tracing. 
Tracing Through Transactions. 
 
As has been said above, the orthodox theory of tracing states not only 
that what we trace is value but also that we trace a constant stream of 
value through a series of direct substitutions, and that tracing comes to 
an end where it is no longer possible to identify such a substitution. 
Moreover, according to Burrows: 
the claimant must establish that it had (legal or equitable) title to the 
property in the substituting persons hands immediately prior to the 
substitution.34 
The courts have, perhaps, not been quite so emphatic on the latter point 
but their general position is not in doubt. In OJSC OIL Co v Abramovich,35 
Christopher Clarke J said: 
                                                     
31 L. Smith The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press 1997) 241. 
32 Clearly supported, indeed if not invented, by Smith. 
33 (2001) 1 AC 102. 
34 A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, (3rd edn OUP 2010) 119. 
35 (2008) EWHC 2613 (Comm). 
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In order to be successfully able to trace property it is necessary for the 
claimant, firstly, to identify property of his, which has been unlawfully taken 
from him (“a proprietary base”); secondly, that that property has been used 
to acquire some other new identifiable property. The new property may then 
have been used to acquire another identifiable asset (“a series of 
transactional links”). Thirdly the chain of substitutes must be unbroken. 
Even if this idea of tracing by direct substitution can be made to work 
when we are speaking of apples and oranges, unsurprisingly, most of our 
tracing cases do not involve apples and oranges or even bicycles and 
bracelets. They concern money, and more specifically, they concern 
money being transferred in and out of one, or more, bank accounts. 
We saw in Chapter 1 difficulties that monies passing through bank 
accounts creates for the orthodox view on following. Bank accounts are 
not repositories of the property of the account holder. They are merely 
the evidence of a debtor/creditor relationship between the bank and the 
account holder. As a result, if A puts B’s money into his bank account 
and then purchases a car utilising the balance on that account it cannot 
be said that he has used B’s money to purchase the car. For the 
orthodox theory, the basis of tracing involves the claimant showing that 
there has been a continuous stream of value which connects the rights 
in one asset to the rights in its substitute, and that that stream of value 
must be identified via a series of direct substitutions. But everything that 
has been said about the difficulties of following money out of a bank 
account applies to tracing as well. In fact, tracing and following out of a 
bank account would appear to be the same thing.  
The solution to this problem has been the adoption of the idea 
that where bank accounts are involved in the tracing process, instead of 
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the need to show a series of direct substitutions, the claimant must 
show one or more transactional links.36 
This is illustrated by the case of Relfo v Varsani.37 The basic facts 
of the case were that a Mr Gorecia, a director of Relfo Ltd, in breach of 
his fiduciary duty to that company caused it to pay $890,050 to Mirren 
Ltd. The next day a company called Intertrade Group LLC paid the sum of 
$878,479 to the bank account of a Mr Varsani.  
The argument of the claimant, the liquidator of Relfo, was that the 
transactions were linked, and part of an overall scheme to benefit Mr 
Varsani who was a friend and colleague of Mr Gorecia. In the Court of 
Appeal Arden LJ acknowledged that: 
At trial Relfo accepted that it could not point to specific transactions passing 
between the Mirren and Intertrade accounts to show how the Relfo/ Mirren 
payment was translated into the Intertrade payment which went to Mr 
Bhimji Varsani’s account with Citibank Singapore. Mirren and Intertrade 
could have had other accounts. 
On the face of it that, at least according to the orthodox account of 
tracing, should have been the end of the matter. There seems no way of 
reconciling liability in this case with the need for direct substitutions.  
However, that was not the end of the matter. Both the court of 
first instance and the Court of Appeal found for the claimant. They did 
this by establishing a transactional link between the rights that Relfo had 
in the initial money and the rights that Mr Varsani had in the proceeds of 
the Intertrade payment.  
                                                     
36 See the dicta of Christopher Clarke J in OJSC OIL Co v Abramovich in the text 
accompanying note 35 above. 
37 (2014) EWCA Civ 360. 
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It has been convincingly suggested that this is a proper course to 
adopt.38 Nevertheless we must be clear about the purpose of a search 
for a transactional link. The notion of a transactional link is a 
replacement for the supposed need to demonstrate direct substitutions. 
It is not an indirect way of establishing that such substitutions have 
taken place. Having established a connection between the rights that 
the claimant had in an original asset and the rights that a defendant has 
in a substitute asset by the process of establishing a transactional link, it 
is not then correct to proceed as if there had been a series of direct 
substitutions all along. The effect of establishing a transactional link is to 
show that the claimant has some sort of claim in respect of the 
defendant’s rights in the substitute. It does not show that the claimant’s 
rights in the substitute are the product of his own rights in the original. A 
transactional link is an evidential step designed to overcome the 
problem that in cases such as Relfo v Vrsani there is no other way of 
showing any connection between the various payments. It says nothing 
about what rights the claimant may then assert in the substitute.  
Because of the relative dearth of cases dealing with the notion of 
a transactional link in the specific context of substitute assets, what facts 
are necessary to establish that link is uncertain, but the best view is that 
it is shown by demonstrating that such a link was the intention of the 
parties involved.39 The parties’ intention was that one, or more, of a 
series of transactions would result in a given outcome.40  Thus, in Relfo v 
                                                     
38 T. Cutts, ‘Tracing, value and transactions’ (2016) 79(3) MLR 381. 
39 Ibid. 
40 The principle that the intention of the parties determines the nature of 
transactions between them is a common one in English law. It applies in the law of 
contract (see Chitty on Contract (32nd edn On-Line Version) Para 14-001; company 
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Varsani it could be argued that it was the intention of Mr Gorecia, in 
causing Relfo to pay Mirren, that this would result in Intertrade paying 
Mr Varsani. This in itself would be sufficient to establish the necessary 
transactional link. 
This certainly appears to have been the approach adopted at first 
instance, where Sales J said that: 
It is a fair inference that the Intertrade payment was the product of a series 
of transactions between a number of entities and across a number of bank 
accounts designed to produce the result that funds paid in the Relfo/ Mirren 
payment were…paid to Bhimji Varsani.41 
Unfortunately, when the case reached the Court of Appeal, in 
dismissing Varsani’s appeal, Lady Justice Arden said: 
I accept Mr Salter’s submission that Mr Gorecia’s intention would not be 
enough in itself to make the Intertrade payment substitute property for the 
purposes of the tracing rules. However intention can be a relevant factor in 
the basket of factors from which a judge may draw an inference that it is in 
fact a substitution.42 
Her Ladyship was now faced with the need to reconcile the 
irreconcilable. The only thing that can possibly link the transactions was 
the intentions of the parties. Absent such an intention the transactions 
have no connection at all. Her Ladyship went on to identify various 
factors which, in her opinion, strongly suggested a link between the 
transactions, such as the previous dealings between the parties, the 
relationships between them, and a number of other similar matters, but 
these factors cannot link the transactions themselves. Links require 
                                                                                                                                                        
law (In re George Inglefield (1993) Ch 1 19); land law (Antoniades v Villiers ((1998) 3 
WLR 1205) and, perhaps most notoriously, in tax law (Ramsay v IRC (1982) AC 300).   
41 Relfo v Varsani (2012) EWHC 2168. 
42 (2014) EWCA Civ 360. 
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something to forge themselves into a chain. That something in this case 
is the intentions of the parties. The factors put forward by Her Ladyship 
are merely strong evidence supporting the proposition that it was the 
intention of the parties that the transactions should be linked.  
By saying that various factors may be put together to allow a 
judge to draw an inference that there has been a substitution, Lady 
Justice Arden appears to be conflating direct substitutions with 
transactional links. A transactional link does not allow a judge to draw an 
inference that there has been a substitution. It cannot, because there 
has not been one. It merely allows the judge to treat the facts as if there 
had been one.  
It is suggested that it would be far easier to understand tracing if 
the metaphorical notions of tracing value through direct substitutions 
were abandoned completely. The decision in Relso v Varsani seems the 
correct one, but it is inexplicable in terms of the orthodox analysis. 
Trying to make it fit into that analysis distorts our entire understanding 
of tracing. 
A similar factual pattern, albeit a more complicated one, occurred 
in El-Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Ltd.43 The question in that case was 
whether it could be inferred that certain monies, used to carry out a 
joint-venture property development in London, represented the product 
of a sophisticated fraud carried out using bank accounts in Geneva and 
Panama.  Millett J held that they could “only just” be held to do so. The 
crucial factors appear to have been the similarities between the sums 
transferred from account to account and the lack of an obvious 
alternative source for the funds. 
                                                     
43 (1993) 3 All ER 717. 
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Again, it is not suggested that the outcome was wrong. But it has 
nothing to do with the exchange product theory of tracing. Rights in one 
asset had not been substituted for rights in another in a direct unbroken 
chain. The transactional link, as described by Millett J, is a fiction 
designed to overcome the problem that the orthodox version of tracing 
cannot accommodate cases such as this. Millett J was no doubt correct 
in saying that there was no other potential source of funds available to 
the fraudster. This certainly suggests that the original source was the 
claimant’s money. But the orthodox theory of tracing is not about the 
original source of the money; it is about substitutions. Tracing is not 
about showing what the original source of the money may or may not 
have been. In fact, according to Millet J’s formulation there is no tracing 
involved at all. He is merely saying that on the balance of probabilities 
the funds for the development were obtained at the expense of (we do 
not even need to use the expression “were a product of”) the claimants. 
It is a holistic exercise looking at the facts of the case as a whole; it has 
nothing to do with movements of value or substitute assets. 
If we accept that it is the intention of the parties that forms the 
basis of the link it is far easier to see how the link between the assets 
can be forged. The entire series of transactions is one transaction. Both 
Millett J and Lady Justice Arden viewed the test for the existence of a 
transactional link as being whether it is a fair inference to be drawn on 
the balance of the evidence. This is unsatisfactory and, at least in the 
case of El-Ajou, apparently, very nearly produced a completely different 
outcome, since Millett J clearly believed that the test was only just 
satisfied in that case. 
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Tracing and Credit. 
 
Understanding transactional links as the product of the parties’ 
intentions also helps in the analysis of another well-known problem 
faced by orthodox tracing analysis, namely issues involving credit. 
Suppose that B purchases a motor car for £500, the payment to be 
made in 30 days. During the course of those 30 days B misappropriates 
trust monies into his bank account and from that account pays for the 
car. Orthodox tracing analysis cannot deal with this situation very well 
because title to the motor car passed at the moment that the contract 
was made. Even if it can be shown that it was trust money that was paid 
to the car dealer, tracing into the car would not be possible because the 
trust money was used to pay off the debt owing to the dealer, not to 
purchase the car. Payment of a debt merely results in the debtor being 
freed from an obligation. There is nothing to trace into as a result of 
such a transaction.44 
In fact, our cases seem divided on whether this process, known as 
backward tracing, is possible.45 Even where they accept that possibility it 
comes largely without analysis. Very often the question of whether a 
case involves backward tracing or not depends upon how the factual 
nexus of the case is understood. Thus, as Penner has pointed out,46 
                                                     
44 See M. Conaglen, ‘Difficulties With Tracing Backwards’ (2011) LQR 432. 
45  Possibly in favour are Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London 
Borough Council (1996) AC 669; In re Diplock (1948) Ch 665; Agip (Africa) Ltd v 
Jackson (1991) Ch 547; Law Society v Haider (2003) EWHC 2486 (Ch). Conceivably 
against are Serious Fraud Office v Lexi (2009) 1 Cr.App.R 23; Re BA Peters plc (In 
Administration) (2008) EWHC 2205 (Ch); Denton v Davies (1812) 18 Ves Jr 499, 34 ER 
406. 
46 J. Penner, ‘Value, Property and Unjust Enrichment: Trusts of Traceable Proceeds’ 
in R. Chambers, C. Mitchell and J. Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Law 
of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2009) 306, 320-322. 
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Foskett v McKeown,47 when properly understood, is a backward tracing 
case, although Lord Millett did not seem to see it as such. Once his 
Lordship had explained that premiums for a life insurance policy do not 
pay for annual renewals of that policy, but effectively represent 
instalments (although, unusually, of an unknown number) for a purchase 
already made, it inevitably followed that the premiums paid with the 
misappropriated monies were merely paid to reduce a debt, rather than 
to pay for the policy itself. Burrows’ explanation, that the tracing process 
went from the misappropriated premiums straight into the monies paid 
out to the beneficiaries, cannot be correct. The premiums did not result 
in the beneficiaries receiving any money. This resulted from the 
realisation of the life policy. Burrows has missed a transactional step. On 
the orthodox approach this is impermissible.  
Smith’s attempt to explain backward tracing is little better. In the 
example of a car purchased on credit, he says, quite correctly, that in the 
hands of the seller rights in the debt created are the traceable substitute 
of the rights that the seller had in the car, and the rights to the money 
that he receives from the settlement of the debt are the traceable 
substitute of the debt. His mistake is to conceptualise the position of the 
buyer as a mirror image of the position of the seller. When the buyer 
purchases the car with credit, the credit is not an asset in his hands, but 
a liability. All that happens when the buyer pays the seller is that the 
liability is expunged. There is no movement of value, that can be traced 
from one asset through to another. Smith’s explanation only works on 
the basis that tracing is concerned with causative increases in wealth. 
Such a belief, however, would be in sharp distinction to the rest of 
                                                     
47 (2001) 1 AC 102. 
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Smith’s work which explains tracing as based on the pursuit of value 
through immediate substitutions. 
A better way of explaining backward tracing is by identifying a 
transactional link dependent on the intention of the parties.  
This accords with the general approach of the law to the effects of 
transactions concerned with the passage of property. In the above 
example it could be said that tracing is possible from the 
misappropriation of the beneficiaries money, through the payment of 
the debt and into the car because it was the intention of the buyer of 
the car to pay for it using trust monies. This intention forms the 
necessary transactional link that allows us to ignore that, in form, the 
claimant is seeking to trace through a debt. Support for this approach 
comes from the decision of the Privy Council in Federal Republic of Brazil 
v Durant.48 The Court rejected Smith’s argument that money used to pay 
a debt can in principle be traced into whatever was acquired in return 
for that debt, on the grounds that:  
It would take the doctrine of tracing far beyond its limits in the case law 
today (and)...as a statement of general application the Board would reject 
it.49 
However, the Privy Council clearly thought that backward tracing could 
be applicable in certain instances. It can occur where: 
The clamant establish(es) a co-ordination between the depletion of the trust 
fund and the acquisition of the asset which is the subject of the tracing claim 
(sic), looking at the whole transaction, such as to warrant the court 
attributing the value of the interest acquired to the misuse of the trust fund . 
This is likely to depend on inference from the proved facts.50 
                                                     
48 (2016) AC 297. 
49 Ibid 311. 
50 Ibid 313. 
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Earlier the court had said that: 
A court should not allow a camouflage of interconnected transactions to 
obscure its vision of their true overall purpose and effect…if the court is 
satisfied that the various steps are part of a co-ordinated scheme.51 
The words “true overall purpose” can hardly refer to anything other than 
the intention of the parties to the transaction. 
Tracing as a Normative Exercise. 
 
The above analysis has made it clear that tracing cannot be conceived of 
as a process of identifying rights in substitute assets by following them 
through a series of transactions. 
In fact, tracing is, like following, a normative exercise in the 
allocation of claims. This was made clear by the Supreme Court of Jersey 
in Federal Republic of Brazil v Durant International Corp,52 where the 
court said: 
The starting point is to recognise the true nature of the exercise with which 
the court is engaged when it is asked to trace a plaintiff’s property …. [It] is 
being asked to identify an asset which represents the plaintiff’s property, in 
other words, an asset which is not in reality the plaintiff’s original property 
but one which the law is prepared to treat as a ‘substitute’ for the original. 
That being the true nature of the process, … the court is liable to be making 
an evaluative judgment … [and] is accordingly making a policy choice as to 
whether the law is prepared to recognise one asset as representing, or as a 
substitute for, another on the particular facts of the case in hand. 
There is no suggestion here of tracing value through transactions. The 
court is simply asking itself when it would be right to treat one asset as a 
substitute for another. It is “making a policy choice”. This approach was 
                                                     
51 Ibid 312. 
52 (2013) JCA 71. 
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supported when Durant came to the Privy Council,53 as the above two 
quotations from the judgment of the Board make clear. 
If further confirmation that tracing is a normative exercise is 
needed it can come, perhaps surprisingly, from Peter Birks. Speaking of 
situations where the price of an original asset is placed into a mixed 
bank account, from which another asset is subsequently purchased, he 
says: 
There is no natural way of saying which debit is represented by which credit. 
That being so, there is no natural answer to the question whether the second 
asset was bought with the price of the first…this kind of problem has led to 
the introduction of artificial rules whose purpose is to prevent the defendant 
from having a wholly fortuitous defence.54 
Later, he says: 
When evidential difficulties have been created by a wrongdoer the resulting 
impasse can legitimately be resolved against the interest of the 
wrongdoer…where a trustee pays trust money into his own account, and 
then draws on the account and dissipates some of the money, the beneficiary 
can insist that what is left is the trust money.55  
Both of these statements are absolutely correct. But they have nothing 
to do with tracing as following value through a series of transactions, 
and everything to do with it being a series of normative decisions as to 
who should have the benefit of a claim.  
Tracing and Claiming. 
 
It is not entirely certain exactly who was the originator of the notion that 
there is a distinction of significance to be drawn between the processes 
                                                     
53 Federal Republic of Brazil and Another v Durant International Corp and Another 
(2016) AC 297. 
54 P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn OUP 2005) 199. 
55 Ibid 201. 
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of tracing and claiming. Peter Birks referred to it in an essay in 1991,56 
and Millett L.J. insisted on the importance of the distinction in Boscawen 
v Bajwa,57 in 1996. Birks returned to the theme in 1997,58 but it is Lionel 
Smith who is generally credited with demonstrating its centrality to the 
orthodox theory of tracing,59 and Smith’s work has subsequently been 
cited with approval on many occasions.60 Eoin O’Dell went so far as to 
describe it as a “truly powerful insight.”61 In Foskett v McKeown,62 Lord 
Millett said: 
Tracing is thus neither a claim nor a remedy. It is merely the process by which 
the claimant demonstrates what has happened to his property, identifies its 
proceeds and the persons who have handled or received them and justifies 
his claim that the proceeds can properly be regarded as representing his 
property. Tracing is also distinct from claiming. It identifies the traceable 
proceeds of the claimant’s property…but it does not affect or establish his 
claim.63 
Whilst it is possible to accept the existence of such a distinction, it is 
critical that its importance is not overstated. If treated as an analytical 
tool, enabling us to see more clearly how, and why, tracing operates, it 
                                                     
56 P. Birks, “Overview: Tracing, claiming and defences” in P. Birks (ed) Laundering and 
Tracing (Clarendon Press 1995) 289. 
57 (1996) 1 WLR 328, 335. 
58 P. Birks, ‘On Taking Seriously the difference Between Tracing and Claiming’ (1997) 
11(1) TLI 1. 
59 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing, (Clarendon Press 1997) 10-15. 
60 For example, P. Birks, ‘On Taking Seriously the Difference Between Tracing and 
Claiming’ (1997) 11 TLI 2;  E. O’Dell, ‘Tracing’ (1999) 21 Dublin University Law Journal 
131; A. Burrows, ‘Proprietary Restitution: Unmasking Unjust Enrichment’ (2001) LQR 
412, 423; R. Chambers ‘Tracing and Unjust Enrichment’ in J. Neyers, M.McInnes and 
S. Pitel (eds), Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Hart 2004) 263; K. Turek, 
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61 E. O’Dell, ‘Tracing’ (1999) 21 Dublin University Law Journal 131. 
62 Foskett v McKeown (2001) 1 AC 102. 
63 Ibid 128. 
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can serve a useful purpose. Clearly the identification of a substitute 
asset says nothing, in itself, about what claim, if any, the claimant may 
have to that substitute. To that extent, therefore, the distinction is 
evident. Where it is necessary to take care, is in allowing this analytical 
distinction to become the basis of conclusions concerning the nature of 
the substantive law.  
Unfortunately, this is what has occurred. Starting from the 
underlying premise that tracing is an entirely neutral, evidential, 
process,64 orthodox theorists have used the tracing/claiming dichotomy 
to argue that there can only be one set of rules for tracing, an argument 
which will be addressed in the next section, and that those rules may be 
invoked by any claimant who wishes to do so, an argument that will be 
looked at in both Parts 2 and 3 of this work.   
The problem facing the orthodox approach is that the underlying 
premise is itself questionable. Tracing is not a neutral process of 
identification. Tracing, as we have seen, is not a simple process of 
following value from one asset to another. Tracing is a normative 
exercise in the allocation of claims. Since this is the case, it is not at all 
absurd, as orthodox theorists maintain, to say that it may only be 
undertaken given certain circumstances, which will themselves 
inevitably be related to the underlying normative purpose of the tracing 
rules. In fact, such absurdity as there is in the argument goes the other 
way. It is the cumulative argument of Parts 2 and 3 of this work that, 
when properly understood, claims to substitute assets may only be 
made against defendants who stood in a fiduciary relationship to the 
                                                     
64 P. Birks, ‘The Necessity of a Unitary Law of Tracing’ in R. Cranston (ed), Making 
Commercial Law: Essays in Honour of Roy Goode, (Clarendon Press 1997) 239, 243. 
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claimant with respect to the original asset. It would be ridiculous to say 
that the law adopts rules for the identification of a substitute asset, 
where it is inevitable from the outset that no claim can be made in 
respect of that substitute. Smith seems to agree with this principle: 
Tracing identifies a new thing as the potential subject matter of a claim on 
the basis that it is the substitute for an original thing which was itself the 
subject matter of a claim.65 
He recognises the point that tracing is an exercise related to a potential 
claim. It would seem to follow that if there is no potential claim there is 
no right to trace. It is thus correct to say, if the argument of this work is 
accepted, that it is not possible to trace, either at common law or in 
equity, against a non-fiduciary defendant. It is true that, even where a 
fiduciary is the defendant it is useful to bear in mind that the mere 
identification of a substitute asset says nothing about any claim that the 
claimant may have, but this is not at all the same thing as saying that, 
because tracing and claiming are entirely separate exercises, tracing may 
be commenced against any person at any time.  
It is important, however, to stress that even as an analytical tool, 
the distinction is not without its difficulties, and is by no means accepted 
by all commentators.66 It is the case that the mere identification of a 
substitute asset says nothing about any claim that may be made with 
respect to it. Putting the matter this way emphasises the distinction 
between the two processes. However, it is equally true that in order to 
make a claim with respect to a substitute asset it is first necessary to 
identify it. This way of putting the matter is far more suggestive of a 
                                                     
65 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing, (Clarendon Press 1997) 6. 
66 C. Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies in Context (Hart 2002) 91. 
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single process divided into separate stages, than of the carrying out of 
two completely separate processes.  
Tracing and claiming may be different exercises but they are 
inextricably linked by the fact that tracing can only take place where a 
claim is potentially available. Where no such claim is potentially 
available it is pointless to say that tracing can take place. 
It is important to understand that it is the potential to make the claim 
rather than the actual right to do so in an individual instance that is 
critical. It may well be the case that a claim to a substitute asset in the 
hands of a defaulting fiduciary fails for some reason. This does not call 
into question, however, the right to trace against that fiduciary. The 
potential to make the claim existed if the substitute asset could be 
identified. But claims at common law and claims against non-fiduciaries 
can never succeed. There is no potential claim, and thus no right to 
trace. 
It therefore makes perfect sense to say that the common law has 
no rules relating to tracing at all, and that equitable tracing requires the 
pre-existence of a fiduciary relationship between claimant and 
defendant. A conclusion on the supposed dichotomy between tracing 
and claiming would therefore be that whilst it is used merely as an 
analytical tool it possibly has some uses, but it cannot be used as the 
basis for conclusions on the substantive law itself. More particularly, it 
cannot be used to justify either the proposition that there cannot be 
different rules for tracing at common law and in equity, or the one that 
tracing in equity does not require the pre-existence of a fiduciary 
relationship. Far from being a powerful insight the dichotomy between 
tracing and claiming is a minor addition to our understanding of the role 
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of tracing in ensuring that fiduciaries acquire no rights in the course of 
the performance of their fiduciary duties. 
Tracing at Law and in Equity. 
 
There is much discussion concerning the question of whether there is a 
distinction to be drawn between the rules of tracing at common law and 
in equity. The weight of authority currently suggests that such a 
distinction does exist. This position was summed up by Rimer J in 
Shalson v Russow:67 
There have traditionally been differences as to the rules applicable to tracing 
at common law and in equity. The common law did not permit tracing into a 
mixed fund, whereas equity did, although it has long been regarded as a 
precondition to tracing in equity “that there must be a fiduciary relationship 
which calls the equitable jurisdiction into being”: Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson 
(1991) Ch 547, 566H, PER Fox L.J. This difference has been criticised. Lord 
Millett voiced his disagreement with it in Foskett v Mckeown (2001) 1 AC 102, 
128, 129, and in his dissenting speech Lord Steyn, at p 113, expressed similar 
sentiments. Mr Smith submitted that I should regard Foskett v Mckeown as 
deciding that there is no longer any difference between the common law and 
equitable rules of tracing and in particular no need to identify a fiduciary 
relationship as a precondition to tracing into a mixed fund. I do not regard 
Foskett v Mckeown as having decided that.68  
Having analysed the speeches of all of their Lordships in Foskett v Mc 
Kewon, Rimer J concluded that: 
Overall my view is that it cannot be said that Foskett v McKeown has swept 
away the long recognised difference between common law and equitable 
tracing.69 
                                                     
67 (2005) Ch 281. 
68 Ibid 314. 
69 Ibid 315. 
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The question then arises as to what the differences are between 
the two sets of rules. Rimer J identifies these as being first, that the 
common law cannot trace into a mixed fund and second, that a pre-
condition of equitable tracing is the existence of a fiduciary relationship. 
The equitable pre-condition will be looked at in some detail in chapter 7. 
It is the supposed inability of the common law to trace into mixed funds 
that will be looked at here. 
Common Law Tracing and Mixed Funds. 
 
The common law’s inability to trace into a mixed fund is generally 
thought to have arisen from the decision in Taylor v Plumer.70 Lord 
Ellenborough CJ in that case held that the right to trace ceased where: 
The means of ascertainment fail, which is the case where the subject is 
turned into money, and mixed and confounded in a general mass of the same 
description.71 
Taylor v Plumer was for a long time regarded as a decision on the right 
to trace at common law. In In Re Hallett’s Case,72 it was held that, 
whatever the position at common law, equity enabled a claimant to 
trace into mixed funds. We now know, of course that Taylor v Plumer 
was not a decision based on the common law at all,73 but the distinction 
identified in Hallett’s Case has been reaffirmed on many occasions.74 
One of the curious side-effects of Taylor v Plumer being recognised as a 
case based on equity is that Lord Ellenborough appears to be saying that 
tracing is not possible into a mixed fund in equity. This did not unduly 
                                                     
70 (1815) 3 M&S 562, 105 ER 721. 
71 (1815) 3 M&S 562, 575, 105 ER 721, 
72 (1880) 13 Ch D 696 (CA). 
73 See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of this point. 
74 Re Diplock, (1948) Ch 465, 518; Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson (1991) Ch 447, 566; Re J. 
Leslie (Engineers) Ltd, (1976) 1 WLR 292; El- Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Ltd (1993) 
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concern the court in Hallett’s Case, however, where it was merely 
concluded that his lordship had made a mistake. Taylor v Plumer is being 
utilised as the source of a line of authority which it cannot support. 
There is little doubt, however, that this line of authority reflects the law 
as it stands today. 
  Orthodox theorists attack this line of authority on the grounds 
that the bifurcation of the rules of tracing is illogical.75 Since tracing is 
merely a process of identification, it makes no sense to have different 
rules for the two branches of the law. This approach fundamentally 
depends upon the insistence on the strict division between tracing and 
claiming which was referred to earlier in this chapter. It turns tracing 
into an exercise in identification wholly isolated from its purpose or 
consequence. Birks gives the example of a thief who steals money from 
the legal owner and who passes that money through various bank 
accounts and then purchases durable and valuable assets with it. The 
stolen money turns out to be trust money. According to Birks: 
It would be a curious system which concluded that the question whether the 
stole money could be traced to those durable assets, and is so, to which, 
must be answered quite differently depending on whether the exercise was 
attempted by the legal or the equitable victim of the theft – that is by the 
trustee or the beneficiary.76 
Birks does not say why it would be curious, however, and it is not at all 
certain that it is. What is curious, perhaps, is Birks’s choice of example. It 
is far from certain in Birks’s scenario that the beneficiary can trace at all. 
If he can, no principled reason has been put forward explain this right. 
                                                     
75 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press1997) 120-130. 
76 P. Birks, ‘The Necessity of a Unitary Law of Tracing’ in R. Cranston (ed) Making 
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The thief has unquestionably received trust money and, if he were a 
fiduciary, it may well be the case that the beneficiary’s rights in the 
money persist into the property purchased with that money. This is, as 
has been explained above, a normative decision and has been the 
subject of many of our cases. But the thief was not a fiduciary77 and 
there is no good reason why the beneficial owner should be in any 
different position in those circumstances to the legal owner. Neither can 
trace, and both should be left to personal remedies against the thief.   
 This is not to say that the notion that there are different rules for 
tracing at law and in equity is correct. It is not. The reason for this, 
however, is that there are no rules for tracing at common law. The effect 
of the misunderstanding of Taylor v Plumer is not, as orthodox theorists 
would lead us to believe, that the distinction between the rules for 
tracing at law and in equity is misplaced, it is that there is no authority 
for the right to trace at law at all.78 To reiterate the point made above if 
the common law does not allow claims to substitute assets it makes no 
sense at all to speak of the rules it has adopted for identifying those 
assets.  
Conclusion. 
 
Most of the confusion surrounding tracing comes from the orthodox 
theorist’s belief that it is a series of steps by which we identify value 
from transaction to transaction and that as a result we can identify, at 
the end of the process, an asset in which the value inherent in the 
claimant’s original asset now subsides. 
                                                     
77 Shalson v Russow, (2005) Ch 281. 
78 See Part 2 for justification for this argument. 
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Even if it were possible to treat tracing of, and through, tangible 
assets in this way (and it is not because there is nothing in the notion of 
value that explains what it is that we are tracing) most of the cases 
concern money moving through bank accounts and in such cases the 
claimant can never show that he has any interest in any such property 
once it has been paid in to the bank. 
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Introduction 
 
Common law tracing was defined in Part 1 of this work, as a process by 
which a claimant, who has common law rights in an original asset, seeks 
to show that a different asset may legally be regarded for the original, 
for the purpose of asserting common law rights in that substitute. The 
argument of Part 2 of this work is that such a process does not exist. 
That it is possible to trace at common law is an almost universally 
accepted proposition.1 That the authority on which much of the edifice 
of the right to trace at common law is built2 cannot possibly bear that 
weight is also, now, generally accepted.3  
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Norman, ‘Tracing the Proceeds of Crime: an Inequitable Solution?’ In P. Birks (ed) 
Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon Press 1995) 95, 10; P. Birks, “Overview: Tracing, 
Claiming and Defences’ In P.Birks (ed) Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon Press 
1995); P. Birks, ‘Mixing and Tracing: Property and Restitution’ (1992) 45 CLP 69; 
P.Birks, ‘On Taking Seriously the Difference Between Tracing and Claiming’ (1997) 11 
TLI 2; P. Birks, ‘The Necessity of a Unitary Law of Tracing’ in R. Cranston (ed) Making 
Commercial Law (OUP 1997); P.Birks, ‘Property, Unjust Enrichment and Tracing’ 
(2001) CLP 54 231; A. Burrows, ‘Proprietary Restitution: Unmasking Unjust 
Enrichment (2001) LQR, 412; R. Chambers, ‘Tracing and Unjust Enrichment’ in J. 
Neyers, M.McInnes and S. Pitel (eds) Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Hart 2004) 
263; D. Fox, ‘Common Law Claims to Substituted Assets’ (1999) RLR 55; R. Goode, 
‘The Right to Trace and its Impact on Commercial Transactions’ (1976) 92 LQR 360; 
C. Rickett, ‘Old and New in the Law of Tracing’ in S. Degeling and J.Edelman (eds), 
Equity in Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters 2005) 119; L. Smith, ‘Unravelling 
Proprietary Restitution’ (2004) 40 Canadian Business Law Journal 317;  P. Millett, 
‘Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud’ (1991) LQR 71; P. Millet, ‘Bribes and Secret 
Commissions’ 1993 (1) RLR 7; R. Grantham and C. Rickett, ‘Tracing and Property 
Rights: The Categorical Truth’ (2000) 63 MLR 903, are just examples of countless 
numbers of judicial and academic dicta that accept the existence of a right to trace 
into substitute assets at common law without discussion. They all differ as to the 
exact nature of that right but its existence is accepted as a given. 
2 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M&S 362. 
3 Trustee of the Property of F.C. Jones & Sons (A Firm) v Jones  (1997) Ch 159; 
Boscawen v Bajwa (1996) 1 WLR 328;  A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, (2nd edn 
OUP 2011) 124. 
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We will look in Chapter 3 at how what was essentially a claim 
based on a fiduciary relationship, and the intentions of the parties 
involved, became extended to cover situations involving agents acting 
outside the scope of their fiduciary authority, and how this, wrongly, 
turned into an acceptance that the common law made claims available 
in respect of substitute assets. It will be shown that some further cases 
which may, at first sight, support the notion of such availability are 
explicable in terms of equitable principles. In each case a fiduciary duty 
could be said to have existed between claimant and defendant. 
In the following three chapters, we move on to cases where no 
fiduciary duty exists at all, or at the very least where, if one does exist, 
the court has explicitly said that such existence played no part in the 
outcome. 
Chapters 4,5 and 6 look at the two most commonly ascribed 
explanations for a common law right to make claims to substitute assets. 
These are, first, that such claims form part of the law of property, and 
act so as to vindicate rights that the claimant had in the original asset, 
or, second, that such claims are part of the law of unjust enrichment and 
operate so as to reverse (or to prevent) the unjust enrichment of the 
defendant at the claimant’s expense. The general trend of the argument 
between supporters of these alternatives has entailed two unspoken 
assumptions. The first is that only one of these two explanations can be 
correct; they are mutually exclusive. The second is that they are the only 
two possibilities. Much of the argument supporting the notion that such 
claims are part of the law of property has been as involved in debunking 
the idea that they may be part of the law of unjust enrichment as it has 
been in positively explaining why it is that the law of property is the 
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correct source. And this also applies in reverse. There has been no 
serious attempt to unearth any other normative explanations for these 
claims and these chapters will not, therefore, address any others.4 
What will emerge from these chapters is not only that there are 
surprisingly few cases in which common law analysis plays a crucial role, 
but also that, even in those cases where it, arguably, may be said to do 
so, courts have failed to ascribe any proper reasoning for the existence 
of a common law right to trace. Given the explanatory collapse of the 
exchange product theory, as outlined in Part 1 of this work, this failure 
leaves a hole, which cannot, it seems, be filled.  
For judicial pronouncements describing how tracing at law 
supposedly works we can look at dicta from cases decided 75 years 
apart. In Sinclair v Brougham,5 Lord Haldane LC stated: 
If money in a bag is stolen and can be identified in the form in which it was 
stolen, it can be recovered in specie. Even if it has been expended by the 
person who has wrongfully taken it in purchasing some particular asset, that 
asset, if capable as being earmarked as purchased with the money can be 
claimed by the true owner of the money. This is a principle not merely of 
equity but of the common law. It is explained in the judgment of Lord 
Ellenborough in Taylor v Plumer6…but Lord Ellenborough laid down as a limit 
to this proposition that if the money had become incapable of being traced, 
as for instance where it had been paid into the broker’s general account with 
his banker, the principle had no remedy excepting to prove as a creditor for 
money had and received.7 
                                                     
4 This is course very different in the case of equitable claims to substitute assets in 
which a viable (indeed convincing) alternative has been provided. See Chapter 7 
below. 
5 (1914) AC 398. 
6 (1815) 3 M&S 362. 
7 (1914) AC 398, 418. 
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In Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson,8 Millett J said: 
The common law has always been able to follow a physical asset from one 
recipient to another. Its ability to follow in the same hands into a changed 
form was established in Taylor v Plumer9…in following the plaintiff’s money 
into an asset purchased exclusively with it no distinction is drawn between a 
chose in action such as a the debt to a bank to its customer and any other 
asset: In Re Diplock10 …money can be followed at common law into and out 
of a bank account and into the hands of a subsequent transferee, provided 
that it does not cease to be identifiable by being mixed with other money in 
the bank account derived from some other source: Banque Belge v 
Hambrouck.11 
There is no indication in either judgment as to the basis of this supposed 
right. Taylor v Plumer,12 is, as we now know, a red herring in this regard13 
and Re Diplock,14 was a case concerning equitable tracing in which some 
dicta of Lord Greene MR seem rather to support the proposition that 
common law tracing is unknown. His Lordship speaking of Sinclair v 
Brougham,15 said: 
It is noticeable that in this…case the common law did not base itself on any 
known theory of tracing such as adopted in equity. It proceeded on the basis 
that the unauthorised act of purchasing was one capable of ratification by 
the owner of the money.16 
By the end of Part 2 it will have been shown that there is no sound 
underlying basis for the existence of the right to trace at common law.
                                                     
8 (1991) Ch 547. 
9 (1815) 3 M&S 362. 
10 (1948) Ch 265. 
11 (1921) 1 KB 321. 
12 (1815) 3 M&S 362. 
13 See text accompanying footnotes 16-23 below for a detailed examination of this 
point. 
14  (1948) Ch 465. 
 15 (1815) 3 M&S 362. 
16 (1948) Ch 465,518. 
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Chapter 3. The Origins of the Notion of Common Law Tracing 
 
Introduction. 
 
In the first two chapters we looked at following and tracing and 
demonstrated that both are normative processes designed to allocate 
claims in respect of substitute assets. Importantly, it was shown that 
tracing does not involve the following of rights as they somehow 
transmit themselves from one asset to another. 
For the next four chapters we will look at the notion of tracing at 
common law. For the purposes of this work tracing at common law will 
mean the supposed process by which a claimant with a legal interest in 
an original asset can establish that he has a legal interest in a substitute 
asset. 
The purpose of this chapter is to show how the notion of common 
law tracing developed in the first place and to show that an error 
occurred in that development – an error so fundamental that it casts 
serious doubt on the entire process. 
Equitable Claims to Substitute Assets. 
 
Equity and Bankrupt Agents. 
 
Until the early years of the 18th century, principals who vested goods in 
agents were faced with the problem that in the event of the agent’s 
bankruptcy the law decreed that anything found in the agent’s hands at 
the time of the bankruptcy became subject to distribution to his 
creditors. 
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In Burdett v Willett,1 Willett, acting as a factor, sold cloth 
belonging to the plaintiff to a third party for £115. Before payment was 
received Willett became bankrupt and died. His wife, as administrator of 
the estate, argued that the unpaid monies should come into the hands 
of the estate, for distribution to its creditors. The Court of Chancery 
disagreed, and held that, although the estate might be entitled to the 
money at law, in equity it belonged to the principal.  
Equity had long adopted the principle that a specifically 
enforceable obligation to convey title to land gave the purchaser a 
proprietary interest, in the form of a trust2 and Burdett v Willett merely 
extended that principle to debts, so that where the court recognised an 
obligation to assign a right in specie (as was the case with a principal and 
a factor) it thereby recognised a trust. 
This represented equity’s solution to the problem outlined above. 
Where the original goods could be distinguished in the hands of the 
factor,3 or an identifiable asset could be found in the hands of the factor 
which had been acquired by him in return for goods exchanged by him 
pursuant to his agreement with the principal, a trust arose in favour of 
the principal. 
It should be borne in mind that the basis of equity’s jurisprudence 
on this issue was agreement. The trustee and the factor had to transfer 
the right in specie to the beneficiary or the principal because that is 
exactly what he had agreed to do. 
                                                     
1 (1708) 2 Vern 638, 23 ER 107. 
2  As was explained later in Beckford v Wade (1805) 17 Ves Jun 87, 34 ER 1181, 96. 
3 Copeman v Gallant (1716) 1 P Wms 314, 24 ER 404, Paul v Birch (1743) 2 Atk 621, 
26 ER 771. 
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Equitable Claims and the Common Law. 
 
Whatever the common law judges’ true thoughts on this matter might 
have been, it soon became clear that it would be pointless for them to 
declare that the rights in question belonged, at law, to the defendant, 
only for the claimant to commence a different action in the courts of 
equity, whereby those rights would be found to be held in trust for him. 
This is illustrated by the case of Scott v Surman,4 which because it 
was tried in a common law court, and because of the background to the 
case being misunderstood, has led certain writers to conclude that it 
represents authority for the right to make claims to substitute assets at 
common law.5 
The facts of the case were that a quantity of tar was shipped by 
the claimants to one Richard Scott, to act as their factor for its sale. Scott 
sold the tar, on the basis that payment was to be made by two 
promissory notes, payable four months after delivery, after the 
deduction of £31 that was owing to the vendees by Scott. The vendees 
delivered the promissory notes, two days after which Scott committed 
an act of bankruptcy. Scott delivered his notes to his assignees in 
bankruptcy (the defendants) who subsequently realised their value. The 
claimants claimed that the money received by the assignees was 
received by Scott as their factor, and should therefore be considered as 
monies received to their use. 
There are two important factors that need to be identified before 
analysing the only judgment given in the case, that of Willes CJ. 
                                                     
4 (1742) Wiles 400. 
5 See M.Scott, ‘The Right to “Trace” at Common Law (1966) 7 Western Australia Law  
Review 463. 
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First, by the bankruptcy regime that was in place at the time 6 
everything in a bankrupt’s hands at the time of his bankruptcy became 
subject to distribution by his creditors. 
Second, this was a case in which the bankrupt factor had acted 
within his authority, in disposing of the claimant’s goods and receiving 
the proceeds in return. In Burdett v Willett,7 it had been decided that the 
proceeds of a sale held by a factor acting within his authority were held 
in trust for his agent, and were not therefore available for distribution to 
the body of creditors in the event of the factor’s bankruptcy. But it was 
not suggested in that case that the principal would, in such instances, 
have any claim to the legal title to the proceeds of the sale. The basis of 
the decision was that, since the factor was under an obligation to 
transfer the proceeds of the sale to the principal, as a result of an 
agreement between the parties, equity would give the principal a 
beneficial interest in those proceeds. A general principle therefore 
emerges that where A disposes of B’s goods to C with B’s authority, legal 
title to the proceeds rests with A, whilst B obtains a beneficial interest 
which, whatever its breadth, is sufficient to defeat A’s assignee in 
bankruptcy. In fact, this may be over-stating the principle somewhat. A 
better formulation may be that, in such circumstances, legal title to the 
proceeds passes to whom C intends it to pass, and the question of who 
has the beneficial interest in the proceeds is a matter of determining the 
                                                     
6 “An Act for the Further Description of a Bankrupt And Relief of Creditors Against 
Such as Shall Become Bankrupts and for Inflicting of Corporal Punishment upon the 
Bankrupt in Special Cases”, 21 Jac 1.Cap 19. 1623. 
7 (1708) 2 Vern 638, 23 ER 1017. 
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intentions of A and B in that regard, with the evidential tie-break falling 
in favour of it being B.8  
The problem facing the court in Scott v Surman was therefore this. 
If they were to find that, as a matter of law, title to the proceeds of the 
sale lay with the factor’s assignees, and, as a result, dismiss the 
claimant’s action, the claimant would simply go to a court of equity for a 
ruling that the proceeds were held in trust for them.  
Wllles CJ did not regard this as a sensible allocation of the 
resources of the assignees or of the court’s time. Having said that all of 
the members of the court were of the opinion that the equity of the 
case was with the claimants, he went on to say: 
Wherever the equity of the case is clearly with the plaintiff, I will always 
endeavour, if I can, and if it be any ways consistent with the rules of law, to 
give him relief at law. And I found my resolution on a maxim of law, that the 
law will always avoid circuity of action, if possible, to prevent trouble and 
expense to the suitors; and for the same reason I think a fortiori we ought to 
endeavour, if possible, to prevent suits in Court of Equity. But to be sure no 
motive whatsoever is sufficient to warrant our determining contrary to law.9 
He then went on to say that in his opinion, based on Burdett v Willett, 
the assets available to the assignees for distribution did not include the 
proceeds of the sale of the tar, because those proceeds were held in 
trust for the claimants. Assets in which the bankrupt did not have both 
                                                     
8 The wider formulation can be seen in cases such as Foley v Hill (1848) 2 HLC 28; 
Burdick v Garrick (1870) 5 Ch App 233; King v Hutton (1900) 2 QB 504; Ex parte 
Cooke (1876) 4 Ch D 123. The reason for adopting the narrower formulation is that, 
certainly in the 20th Century commercial courts have been reluctant to impose such 
equitable reasoning into commercial transactions and in cases such as Henry v 
Hammond (1913) 2 QB 515 and Neste Oy v Lloyds Bank (1983) 2 Lloyds Rep 658 have 
emphasized the point that there must be a genuine examination of the intentions of 
the parties and there must be evidence of a clear intention to create a trust before 
one can be said to have been formed. 
9 (1742) Wiles 400, 402. 
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the legal and beneficial interest did not fall into the bankrupt estate. 
From this he concluded that the common law courts should allow the 
claimant an action in money had and received to enforce his equitable 
interest in the proceeds of the sale of the tar. He stated that: 
It would be very absurd to say that anything shall vest in the assignees for no 
other purpose but in order that there may be a bill in equity brought against 
them by which they will be obliged to refund and account…if therefore the 
bankrupt were seised of a trust estate in lands , for the reasons already 
mentioned I should think that it did not vest in the assignees at all , but that 
the legal estate in that should still remain in the bankrupt for the benefit of 
the cestui que trust.10 
That this was the correct method of disposal of the case was 
effectively confirmed within the following 50 years. In Winch v Keeley,11 
Ashhurst J stated that: 
It is true that formerly the Courts of Law did not take notice of an equity or a 
trust: for trusts are within the original jurisdiction of the Courts of Equity: but 
of late years, it has been found productive of great expense to send the 
parties to the other side of the Hall: wherever this Court has seen that the 
justice of the case is with the plaintiff, they have not turned him round on 
this objection. 12 
However, Willes CJ could not persuade the other two members of 
the court that this was the correct approach to take, and he therefore 
sought to find an alternative explanation, which would permit the 
matter to be disposed of in a common law court without the need to 
send it “to the other side of the hall”. 
                                                     
10 Ibid. 
11 (1787) 1 TR 619. 
12 Ibid 622. 
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This apparently involved an attempt to demonstrate that the 
claimants had a legal interest in the proceeds of the sale. But the 
argument deployed is both confused and confusing. 
The essence of the argument appears to be that had the assets in 
question (the tar) been found in the hands of the factor in specie they 
would have remained the property of the claimants. But, had the 
proceeds been found in the factor’s hands in the form of money, the 
claimants would have no claim at all. Where the proceeds were found in 
a form other than money, they should be treated as if they were still the 
original property of the claimants: 
For why are goods considered still as the owners? Because they remain in 
specie and so may be distinguished from the rest of the bankrupt’s estate. 
But as money has no earmark it cannot be distinguished. Otherwise to be 
sure in reason the thing produced ought to follow the nature of the thing out 
of which it is produced, if it can be distinguished; and so long as it remains a 
debt it is equally distinguishable…The general rule is that if a man receive 
money which ought to be paid to another or to apply to a particular purpose 
to which he does not apply it this action will lie for money had and 
received…to apply this general rule to the present case. The assignees having 
received money which belongs to the plaintiffs and ought not to be applied 
to pay the bankrupt’s debts, and they ought to have paid it to the plaintiffs 
and not having done so this action will lie against them for so much money 
had and received to the use of the plaintiffs.13 
As a supposed foundation of the idea that it is possible to trace at 
common law these dicta are unsatisfactory. 
Nowhere in them, or indeed anywhere else in the judgment, is it 
explained how it can come about that the proceeds of the sale, which 
                                                     
13Scott v Surman, (1742) Wiles 400, 404. 
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were unarguably within the legal ownership of the factor, could transmit 
themselves to being in the legal ownership of the assignees.  
It is possible to get some feel for what is being suggested. This is 
that what has happened is that the thing produced (the promissory 
notes) has followed the nature out of which it was produced (the tar). 
But this is not common law tracing, or anything like it. Tracing, as was 
shown in part 1, is about rights not things. In this case the legal rights to 
the proceeds were unquestionably with the factor. The buyer of the tar 
had intended to pass title to the notes to the factor and the factor had 
been acting within his authority. In fact, in the light of the 20th century 
authorities cited above, it is not even certain, in a commercial context, 
that the principal would even be considered the beneficial owner. Had 
the factor purchased anything with the proceeds of the promissory 
notes he would have been purchasing them with his own money. There 
would have been nothing to trace. 
Willes CJ must have had in mind some sort of equitable tracing. 
This would make sense given his overall impression of the case. If the 
proceeds of the sale of the tar were held in trust for the claimants, then 
they would undoubtedly have been able to trace from those proceeds 
into anything subsequently purchased with those proceeds. Given the 
fiduciary nature of the relationship between the parties, it could well be 
said in this case that the promissory notes were the traceable proceeds 
of the tar. But this has nothing to do with the claimants establishing any 
legal title to those notes.  
Nothing said by Willes CJ explains why the basic rule that, in a 
situation where B sells A’s asset to C, with the authority of A, legal title 
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to the proceeds depends on C’s intention, and the question of beneficial 
ownership depends upon the intentions of A and B, should not apply.  
His Lordship went on to say that: 
The general rule is that if a man receive money which ought to be paid to 
another or to apply to a particular purpose to which he does not apply it this 
action will lie as for money had and received. So held Owen that if money be 
delivered by A to one to buy a horse or any other thing if he do not lay out 
the money accordingly an action of debt will lie or an action on the case for 
so much money had and received to A’s use…if a man receive money for a 
special purpose, and neglect or refuse to apply it, to the uses to which he 
received it, an action on the case will lie for money had and received.14   
This may well be true, but it is impossible to discern even the germ of 
common law tracing in these dicta. He then drew together the threads 
of his argument by saying: 
To apply this general rule to the present case. The assignees have received 
this money which belongs to the plaintiff and ought not to be applied to pay 
the bankrupts debts and they ought to have paid it to the plaintiffs and not 
having done so this action will lie against them for so much money had and 
received to the use of the plaintiffs.15 
This is unquestionably correct, but it is not the same thing at all as saying 
that the reason that it belongs to the plaintiffs is that they had legal title 
to it. It belonged to them under a trust.  
It might well be argued that Willes CJ has arrived in exactly the 
place that he said that his brethren would not accept, but via a rather 
circuitous route. It might also be argued that the case is wrongly decided 
because, once it was found unacceptable to allow a common law claim 
in protection of trust property, the only proper solution was to have 
                                                     
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid 405. 
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found for the assignees and left the claimants to their relief in equity. In 
the absence of any conceptual basis, or indeed any acknowledgment 
that such a basis was required, for permitting the claimants to obtain a 
legal interest in the promissory notes, the case has nothing to say about 
common law tracing.   
We can conclude by saying that what Scott v Surman did was to 
allow the action for money had and received to lie for the realised value 
of a right that already belonged, in equity, to the claimant. The reason 
that the right already belonged in equity to the claimant was the same 
reason as was identified above. The defendant had agreed to sell the 
goods on behalf of the plaintiff, and hand over the proceeds to him, and 
equity treated such an obligation as sufficient to create a trust in favour 
of the claimant. 
Claims such as this are not in any way based upon any ownership 
rights that the claimant had in the original asset. They are based entirely 
on what the defendant had promised to do on the disposal of that asset, 
and equity’s response to that agreement. 
Being based on agreement, all of the above analysis pre-supposes 
an agent acting within the scope of his authority. When it comes to 
unauthorised investments it might be thought that very different 
considerations would apply. 
Agents Acting Outside the Scope of Their Authority.  
 
Surprisingly, this is not the case and a central reason for this is the 
judgment of the court in Taylor v Plumer.16 
                                                     
16 (1816) 3 M & S 562, 105 ER 721. 
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The facts were that one Walsh was a stockbroker for Sir Thomas 
Plumer (the defendant). The defendant gave Walsh monies to purchase 
exchequer bills on his behalf. Instead of doing so Walsh purchased some 
American stock and some gold doubloons in his own name. Walsh then 
absconded, an act of bankruptcy, and was overtaken by agents acting for 
the defendant in Falmouth, from whence he had intended to go to 
America. The agents recovered the securities and the money. The action 
was brought by Walsh’s assignees in bankruptcy, in trover (effectively an 
early form of conversion), for the money and the securities. It was heard 
by Lord Ellenborough CJ in the court of the Kings Bench. The court found 
for the defendant. Taylor v Plumer is of great interest for two reasons. 
The first reason is that the court appears to have extended the 
liability of an agent acting within the scope of his authority, to one acting 
outside that scope, without producing any reasoning to support such a 
step. 
Counsel for the plaintiff argued that since the draft came into 
Walsh’s hands not as a result of any trust, but rather in fraud of it, the 
defendant should not be allowed to recover, an argument which seems 
to reflect the ratios of both Burdett v Willett and Scott v Surman. Lord 
Ellenborough, however, was unwilling to accept an outcome which, as 
he saw it, would be tantamount to allowing the plaintiff to pray in aid his 
own wrongdoing. Relying on his own interpretation of Scott v Surman his 
Lordship said that: 
If the property in its original state and form was covered withy a trust in 
favour of the principal, no change of that state and form can divest it of such 
trust, or give the factor, or those who represent him in right, any more valid 
claim in respect to it, than they respectively had before such a change…for 
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the product or substitute for the original thing still follows the nature of the 
thing itself, as long as it can be ascertained to be such. 
More will be said about this passage below since it represents the 
effective beginning of the whole notion that it is possible to trace at 
common law, but for present purposes, its essential error lies in Lord 
Ellenborough’s use of Scott v Surman to support it. In Scott v Surman the 
reason that Willes J found that a trust had arisen in respect of the asset 
in question was that the agent had promised to convey the proceeds of 
the sale to the principal, and equity treated rights subject to an 
obligation to transfer under such circumstances as being held in trust. 
No such promise or agreement existed in this case. If a trust 
existed, therefore, a reason for it must be found. Lord Ellenborough 
does not tell us what it is because he did not recognise the lacuna. He 
commences with what is essentially a conclusion – that a trust exists-
without explaining why that should be so, and from there goes on to say 
that rights in the substitute are therefore held in trust as well. But why 
should it be that a fiduciary should have to account in specie for a right 
acquired when acting outside his authority? The answer to this question 
will be considered in Chapter 7 of this work but, to anticipate the 
conclusion contained therein, it is that it relates entirely to the nature of 
the fiduciary relationship itself and cannot therefore be utilised to 
explain any claims to substitute assets where such a relationship does 
not exist, and certainly cannot explain common law claims.  
The second consequence of Lord Ellenborough’s judgment is that, 
being delivered in the court of the Kings Bench, it led to the combined 
belief that Taylor v Plumer is a central authority for the existence of a 
right to trace at common law, and that such a right is explained by the 
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claimant’s ownership of the original asset. It is the foundation of a 
number of later judgments, which are themselves regarded as authority 
for the same proposition. 
  That Taylor v Plumer is itself not such an authority is no longer in 
doubt, but later cases cannot be understood without an understanding 
of it, so it would be wrong to treat it as being of historical interest only. 
Sitting, it should be recalled, in a common law court Lord 
Ellenborough said: 
It makes no difference in reason or in law into what other form, different 
from the original the change may have been made, whether it be into that of 
promissory notes for the security of money…or into other merchandise…for 
the product of or substitute for the thing still follows the nature of the thing 
itself, so long as it can be ascertained to be such and the right only ceases 
when the means of the ascertainment fail, which is the case where the 
subject is turned into money, and mixed and confounded in a general mass of 
the same description.17 
The fact that this case was heard in a common law court led to a whole 
series of judgments, some of considerable influence, using it as authority 
for a right to trace at common law.18 
The case was not invariably treated as such, see for example the 
dicta of Lord Jessel MR in Re Hallett’s Estate,19 but it was not until the 
1970s that the now universally accepted interpretation of the case 
began to gain acceptance, to the point that it is now generally agreed 
that Taylor v Plumer, despite being a decision of the court of the King’s 
                                                     
17 (1815) 3 M & S 562, 575. 
18 R v Bunkall (1864) Le & Ca 371; Sinclair v Brougham (1914) AC 398; Banque Belge 
Pour L’Etranger v Hambrouck (1921) I KB 321 CA; Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd 
(1991) 2 AC 548. 
19 (1880) 13 Ch D 696. See also the judgments of James LJ and Bramwell JA in Ex 
Parte Cooke (1876) LR 4 Ch D 123.  
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Bench, and despite being heard before a common law judge, was a 
decision concerning the claimant’s equitable, not common law rights.20 
According to Lionel Smith: 
The most important thing about Taylor v Plumer as a potential limitation on 
tracing to establish common law rights is that the defendant Plumer did not 
establish any common law proprietary rights; his success was due to the 
successful assertion of equitable proprietary rights. It is commonly thought 
that he won because he established that he was the legal owner of the US 
stock and gold. This is incorrect. Plumer actually established that he was the 
equitable owner… and that Walsh, the legal owner, held these assets on trust 
for Plumer. 21  
In Jones v Jones, Millett LJ said that: 
In Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson I said that the ability of the common law to trace 
an asset into a changed form in the same hands was established in Taylor v 
Plumer…In this it appears that I fell into a common error, for it has since been 
convincingly demonstrated that, although Taylor  v Plumer was decided by a 
common law court, the court was in fact applying the rules of equity.22 
An immediate problem with treating Lord Ellenborough’s dicta as 
being concerned with equitable rights is that he seems to be suggesting 
that tracing cannot take place through a mixed fund. The fact that the 
claimant’s money had been mixed with other monies was not, 
historically, regarded as a bar to tracing in equity. This problem was 
dispensed with, somewhat laconically, by Jessell MR in re Hallett’s 
                                                     
20 See S. Kurshid & P. Matthews ‘Tracing Confusion’ (1979) 95 LQR 78; P Matthews, 
‘The Legal and Moral Limits of Common Law Tracing’ in P. Birks (ed), Laundering and 
Tracing (Clarendon Press 1995) 23, L. Smith, ‘Tracing in Taylor v Plumer: Equity in the 
Court of the King’s Bench’ (1995) LMCLQ 240; Boscawen v Bajwa (1996) 1 WLR, 328; 
Trustee of the Property of F.C. Jones & Sons (A Firm) v Jones  (1997) Ch 159. 
21 L. Smith, “Tracing in Taylor v Plumer: Equity in the Court of the King’s Bench’ 
(1995) LMCLQ 240. 
22 Trustee of the Property of F.C. Jones & Sons (A Firm) v Jones  (1997) Ch 159, 169. 
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Estate.23 The Master of the Rolls said that “Lord Ellenborough’s 
knowledge of the rules of equity was not quite commensurate with his 
knowledge of the common law”. 
So it would appear that all that Taylor v Plumer really stands for, 
in this regard, is the affirmation of the position stated in Scott v Surman 
(albeit only in passing by Willes CJ) and Winch v Keeley that where A is 
the legal owner of an asset and B is the beneficial owner the asset is not 
available to the assignee in bankruptcy of A. Despite the fact that the 
case will be mentioned many times in the remainder of this work it has 
nothing to do with common law tracing. 
Following Taylor v Plumer there have been a number of cases in 
which courts have appeared to have decided them on common law 
principles, or in which there have been dicta suggesting that it would be 
possible to do so, but which, on examination turn out to be applying 
equitable principles instead.  
  R v Bunkall,24 for example, was a criminal case, the facts of which 
were that the defendant owned a horse and cart and was engaged by 
one Hart, a blacksmith, to purchase half a ton of blacksmith’s coals and 
deliver them to him. It would appear that, having made the purchase, 
he, without authority, offloaded a quantity for himself before delivering 
the remainder to Hart.  
The criminal prosecution turned on the obscurities of the 
Victorian laws of larceny and embezzlement. Willes J however, during 
argument, cited Taylor v Plumer as authority for the proposition that “if I 
                                                     
23 (1880) 13 Ch D 696. 
24 (1864) LE & CA 372. 
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give a man money to buy a horse for me and he buys a cow for himself 
with it, the cow is mine”. 
We now know, of course, that, if by the word “mine” Willes J 
meant “I am the legal owner of”, Taylor v Plumer is authority for no such 
thing. 
Moreover, in the context of the case the point was made that the 
seller of the coals knew only of the defendant and intended the sale to 
be made to the defendant. There can be no question that the defendant 
was the legal owner of the coal and had purchased it as the agent of 
Hart. Any tracing that was involved must have been equitable tracing. If 
the claimant did have any rights in the coals those rights can only be 
attributed to the rule, discussed in chapter 7 of this work, that a 
fiduciary must transfer to his principle any rights that he obtains in the 
course of the performance of his fiduciary duties. 
In addition, Willes J’s statement was obiter. Judgment was given 
by Cockburn CJ and, although it is difficult to tell from the wording of the 
judgment, it seems that the case was decided on the basis that the 
defendant had appropriated the goods to Hart before taking them for 
his own use. If this is correct, the case becomes simply one of following. 
Hart owned the coal, the defendant took some of it, and Hart identified 
that very coal as belonging to him. 
Cattley v Loundes,25 exhibits similar characteristics, in that it also 
probably depends upon equitable principles which are insufficiently 
expounded. This is a somewhat obscure case, generally ignored by text 
writers. This is undoubtedly due, partly at least, to the difficulty in 
                                                     
25 (1885) 34 WR 139, 2 TLR 136. 
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establishing either the facts of the case, or the details of the judgments, 
from the two, conflicting, reports of it. 
Matthews summary of the facts is that the claimant had been acquitted 
of theft of money from the till of the defendant. It would seem that the 
claimant had been in the defendant’s employment at the time as a 
barmaid, and was resident at the inn, which was her place of 
employment. On the claimant leaving, the defendant refused to release 
certain articles which he maintained were the product of the theft. The 
claimant sued in conversion, but failed.26 
A L Smith is reported as stating in judgment that the true owner of 
a stolen sovereign could claim the two half-sovereigns into which the 
thief changed it27 and Matthews J apparently said that “the money, 
though converted into goods could be followed, and no action in trover 
for them would lie.”28 
No authority is given for either proposition, however, and it is very 
difficult to put the dicta into any context, given the paucity of factual 
information known about the case. 
A tentative suggestion would be that the case was about 
equitable rights. This could well be so if the claimant was indeed an 
employee of the defendant, and some strength, although admittedly not 
much, is added to this possibility by the fact that the reporter in the 
Times Law Reports saw fit, for no apparently good reason, to refer to 
some dicta of Willes J in R v Bunkall,29 which undoubtedly relate to 
fiduciary relationships. This would explain the outcome since a trustee is 
                                                     
26 P. Matthews, ‘The Legal and Moral Limits of Common Law Tracing’ in P. Birks (ed) 
Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon Press 1995) 23, 52. 
27 34 WR 139. 
28 2 TLR 136. 
29 (1864) Le & Ca 371. 
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unable to maintain a claim in conversion against a beneficiary in 
possession for refusing to give up that possession.30 
Finally, and still, admittedly unconvincingly, the case was cited by 
Ames in an American journal for the proposition that: 
It is now well settled that one who has been deprived of his property by 
fraud, or theft, or by any wrongful conversion, may charge the fraudulent 
vendee, the thief or other wrongful converter as a constructive trustee of any 
property received in exchange for the misappropriated property.31 
This is an unsatisfactory description of English law, both then and now, 
and Ames was clearly speaking of American jurisprudence only, but it is 
at least confirmation that one leading scholar regarded Cattley v 
Loundes as a decision on equitable rights. 
Whether the judges in Cattley v Loundes did indeed have 
equitable principles in mind is impossible to say. However, it is clearly 
not a case that can form the basis of any support for the notion of 
common law rights in substitute assets.  
Although both of these cases are somewhat obscure, and possibly 
of little importance, the same cannot be said of Marsh v Keating.32 
  Marsh v Keating formed a central part of the basis of the 
judgments of the House of Lords in Lipkin Gorman,33 and, since that 
latter case is so fundamental,34 Marsh v Keating must be treated with 
respect and examined closely. 
                                                     
30 A. Tettenborn, ‘Trust Property and Conversion: An Equitable Confusion’ (1996) 56 
CLJ 36. 
31 J.B Ames, ‘Following Misappropriated Property into its Product’ (1905-1906) 19 
Harvard law Review 511. 
32 (1834) 1 Bing (NC) 198. 
33 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd (1991) 2 AC 548. 
34 See Chapter 6 for a discussion of Lipkin Gorman.  
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The facts are that Mrs Keating owned £12,000 of Government 
stock, transferable at the Bank of England. One of the partners of her 
stockbrokers forged her signature on a power of attorney, and sold 
£9000 of the annuities to an innocent third party. The monies for the 
sale found themselves into the account that the stockbrokers held with 
Martin & Co, a bank. When the stockbrokers were declared bankrupt 
Mrs Keating brought proceedings against them for a declaration that she 
had a right of proof in their bankruptcy. She had by then written to the 
Bank of England, informing them of what had occurred, and asking them 
to replace her stock, and to pay her all dividends from when the stock 
had been transferred. This the bank did. 
The action brought by Mrs Keating was one for money had and 
received. At no stage was it ever suggested by her that she had any 
proprietary right to the money in the defendant’s hands. The opinion of 
the judges was given by Park J. 
The essence of the judgment was that Mrs Keating was able to 
affirm the sale of her stock and, therefore, could claim that the proceeds 
received by the defendants were received by them to her use. Most of 
what Park J said was refuting the notion that Mrs Keating was unable to 
affirm the transaction, either because the transfer was void and the 
stock was therefore still owned by Mrs Keating, or because ratification 
would effectively be to ratify a felony (the fraudulent transaction).  
In delivering his judgment, Park J used some fairly loose language 
but, on examination, there is little doubt about what he was trying to 
say. Having outlined the considerable practical difficulties that would be 
associated with Mrs Keating having to reaffirm her interest in the stock 
itself the judge went on to say: 
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Is she compelled to adopt this circuitous process or is she at liberty to 
abandon all further concern with her stock and to consider the price which 
was paid by the purchaser for that which was her stock to be her money, and 
to follow it into the hands of the present defendants?35 
He also said that: 
We are of the opinion that the plaintiff below is at liberty to abandon and 
give up all claim to her former stock…and to sue for the money produced by 
the sale of such stock as for her own money, which we think has been 
sufficiently traced into the hands of the defendants below.36 
In other words the question of who owned the stock was irrelevant. The 
only question that mattered was whether Mrs Keating was able to claim 
in respect of the money that was received by the firm as a result of the 
sale. But there is no suggestion that the proceeds of the sale fell to Mrs 
Keating as the legal owner. No doubt the purchaser of the stock 
intended that the proceeds should ultimately end up with the person 
from whom he purchased it, but it is very unlikely that he expected the 
very notes or coins that he used to make the purchase to pass to the 
previous owner.   
As far as the second objection goes the court said that there was a 
distinction to be drawn between ratifying the felonious act (which was 
the act of forgery) and making a claim in respect of the outcome of that 
act (which was the receipt of the sales monies). Mrs Keating, said the 
court, had not sought to affirm the felony. All that she sought to do was 
to:  
                                                     
35 (1834) 1 Bing (NC) 198, 215. 
36 Ibid 214. 
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Abandon all further concerns with her stock and to consider the price which 
was paid by the purchaser for that which was her stock to be her money and 
to follow it into the hands of Marsh & Co.37 
On the face of it these dicta suggest that Mrs Keating could indeed trace 
her stock into the contents of the bank account held by Marsh & Co at 
their bankers. They appear to be saying that she could ratify the contract 
of sale, although, despite the language used by Park J, there appears to 
be no conceptual analysis of whether the act of ratification would lead 
to Mrs Keating obtaining legal title to the proceeds of the sale.  
However, this is an unlikely interpretation of Park J’s dicta for several 
reasons. 
First, this was, as stated above, an action for money had and 
received. At no stage did Mrs Keating ever suggest that the money held 
to the credit of Marsh & Co was her legal property. There was no 
suggestion that any action would lie in trover against Marsh & Co. 
Second, Park J went on to say that: 
If the goods of A are wrongfully taken and sold it is not disputed that the 
owner may bring trover against the wrongdoer or may elect to consider him 
as their agent, may adopt the sale, and maintain an action for the price.38 
These are the dicta that explain the case. It is concerned with 
waiver of tort, and the ratification of unauthorised acts of an agent. 
Our understanding of the doctrine of waiver of tort was fundamentally 
changed by the decision of the House of Lords in United Australia Ltd v 
Barclays Bank Ltd.39 In that case it was explained that waiver of tort has 
nothing to do with the claimant ratifying the tortious action. Indeed, as 
Lord Atkin pointed out, ratifying the tortious action is the very opposite 
                                                     
37 Ibid 215. 
38 Ibid 
39 (1941) AC 1. 
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of what the claimant is seeking to do, since it would give no grounds for 
any subsequent action in money had and received. Waiver of tort is 
merely an election to seek gain based rather than loss based damages.40 
However, there is one exception to this rule. Having explained the 
general restitutionary nature of waiver of tort Lord Atkin went on to say: 
If the plaintiff in truth treats the wrongdoer as having acted as his agent, 
overlooks the wrong and by the consent of both parties is content to receive 
the proceeds this will be a true waiver. It will arise necessarily where the 
plaintiff in truth treats the wrongdoer as having acted as his agent: in that 
case the lack of authority disappears and the correct view is not that the tort 
is waived but by retroaction of the ratification has never existed.41 
Mrs Keating ratified the fraudulent actions of the claimant’s 
employee, as a result of which the claimants acted as her agents in the 
disposal of her stock. They thus received the proceeds as fiduciaries of 
the claimant. When Park J speaks of tracing into the proceeds of the sale 
it is equitable tracing that he has in mind. There is not the slightest 
suggestion that he is speaking of legal rights to a substitute asset. 
Marsh v Keating may not be the simplest case to understand and 
it must be admitted that the case was not argued in equity, so it stands 
on a different basis to Scott v Surman and Taylor v Plumer.  However, 
the firm were undoubtedly Mrs Keating’s agents, so there seems little 
doubt that Mrs Keating at all times retained beneficial ownership of the 
monies in question. Given this, there is nothing in the case to support 
any notion of the right to trace into substitute assets at common law.  
 
                                                     
40 See J. Edelman, Gain-Based Damages (Hart 2002), P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, (2nd 
edn Clarendon Press 2005) 15. 
41 (1941) AC 1 28. 
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Conclusion. 
 
The idea that it is possible to make claims in respect of substitute assets 
at common law derives, almost entirely, from Taylor v Plumer. 
That case said no such thing. It was decided on equitable principles 
alone. Any future case that relied entirely on Taylor v Plumer for 
authority in respect of common law tracing is, at least, unsatisfactory. 
The other cases discussed in this chapter are revealing because they 
have the appearance of being cases in which the common law has 
involved itself in the question of substitute assets. When looked at more 
closely, however, it can be seen that the principles in play are equitable 
ones. They help to explain why it is that the common law, on the face of 
it, seems to have a jurisprudence concerning claims to rights in 
substitutes. But, in reality, they represent a far from satisfactory 
foundation.
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Chapter 4.Tracing and the Law of Property Part 1. 
 
Introduction. 
 
This is the first of three chapters in which we take a closer look at why it 
is thought that a claimant is able to make a common law claim to rights 
in a substitute asset. 
In this, and the next, chapter we will look at the argument that 
tracing operates entirely within the parameters of the law of property.  
It is a widely held belief.1 The leading statement to this effect is that of 
Lord Millett in Foskett v Mckeown. His Lordship said: 
The transmission of a claimant's property rights from one asset to its 
traceable proceeds is part of our law of property, not of the law of unjust 
enrichment. There is no "unjust factor" to justify restitution (unless "want of 
title" be one, which makes the point). The claimant succeeds if at all by virtue 
of his own title, not to reverse unjust enrichment. Property rights are 
                                                     
1 Just a small sample gives us Trustee of the Property of F C Jones & Sons (A Firm) v 
Jones (1997) Ch 159; Foskett v McKeown (2001) 1 AC 102;  C. Webb, Reason and 
Restitution: A Theory of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2016); P. Jaffey, Private Law and 
Property Claims (Hart 2007) 158-184; E. Ball, Enrichment at the Claimant’s Expense 
(Hart 2017) 145-181; R. Grantham and C. Rickett, ‘Property and Unjust Enrichment: 
Categorical Truths or Unnecessary Complexity’ (1997) New Zealand Law Review 668; 
R. Grantham and C. Rickett, ‘Tracing and Property Rights: The Categorical Truth’ 
(2000) 63 MLR 903; R Grantham and C. Rickett, ‘Property Rights as a Legally 
Significant Event’ (2003) CLJ 717; P. Millet ‘Proprietary Restitution’ in S. Degeling and 
J.Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters 2005) 309; J. Penner, 
‘Value, Property and Unjust Enrichment: Trusts of Traceable Proceeds’ in R. 
Chambers, C. Mitchell and J. Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of the Law of 
Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2009) 306; C. Rickett,’ Old and New in the Law of Tracing’ in 
S. Degeling and J.Edelman (eds), Equity in Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters 2005) 
119; G Virgo, ‘Vindicating Vindication: Foskett v McKeown Reviewed’ in A. Hudson 
(Ed), New Perspectives on Property Law, Obligations and Restitution (Cavendish2004) 
203. 
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determined by fixed rules and settled principles. They are not discretionary. 
They do not depend upon ideas of what is "fair, just and reasonable". Such 
concepts, which in reality mask decisions of legal policy, have no place in the 
law of property.2 
Lord Hope perhaps put it more succinctly: 
The purpose of the remedy is to enable them to vindicate their claim to their 
own money.3 
It is noteworthy that neither Lord Millett nor Lord Hope explains 
exactly what it is about our law of property that allows a claimant to 
vindicate his property rights in this way. We are not even told which 
property rights are being vindicated. What is being suggested is that 
simply by dint of the claim being allocated to the legal category of the 
law of property certain consequences inevitably result. But to say that 
“the claimant succeeds, if at all, by virtue of his own title” tells us 
nothing. The question is why should title to the original asset have any 
relevance in determining claims in a substitute? 
For reasons set out below this is not a discussion that can take 
place at a particularly high level of abstraction. It more or less comes 
down to explaining tracing either as being a process of the transmission 
of rights from one asset to its substitute, or of saying that the rights in 
the original property itself includes a right to the proceeds of the 
disposal of its traceable substitute. Neither turn out to be satisfactory 
explanations even at the level of institutional practice, and little attempt 
has been made to elevate the discussion to any higher level of 
abstraction than that. 
                                                     
2 Foskett v McKeown (2001) 1 AC 102 127. 
3 Ibid 118. 
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Property as a Principle. 
 
The major problem faced by anyone trying to explain the normative 
basis for any legal rule as being the principal of property, is that the 
concept itself is not fertile ground for the explanation of rights created 
by positive law. 
In his study, Property and Justice,4 Jim Harris shows that any 
supposition that private property rights are grounded in notions of 
natural law must be rejected. Thus, all property rights are contingent. 
They cannot be deduced from first principles. They depend upon an 
individual society’s conception of what such rights should look like. 
Based on the connection between private property and freedom, 
however, Harris does accept that every citizen of a modern state has a 
moral background right that, his, or her, society, maintain, or introduce, 
a property institution with certain features. The most significant of these 
features are exclusionary and trespassory rules. That is rules which 
protect the owner of property rights from those rights being interfered 
with by others without his authority.  
However, the moral background right has nothing to say about 
the actual content of any property specific rules, and equally little to say 
about when non-property specific rules5 should be permitted to take 
priority over any property specific rules. In addition, it has nothing to say 
about how any property rights created by those rules should be 
enforced or protected.6   
                                                     
4 J. Harris, Property and Justice (OUP 1996). 
5 That is rules of a general nature which are not themselves directly related to the 
law of property but which have an effect on how a property owner may deal with his 
property. Taxation is a non-property specific rule, as is a law preventing fly-tipping. 
6 This is one of the central problems with Eli Ball’s analysis of common law tracing. 
He identifies “the right to trace” as being “an inherent feature of common law 
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We term the greatest right that the law gives to an individual in 
respect of an item of private property “ownership”, but, notoriously, 
English law has no definition of ownership, and scarcely even bothers to 
seek one. But, to reiterate the point, even if a satisfactory working 
definition of ownership rights could be agreed, that would still not tell us 
how such rights should be protected or enforced. That remains entirely 
a matter for the positive law. This point is, in fact, largely 
uncontroversial.7 In an extra-judicially written essay,8 Lord Millett stated 
his approval of Lord Ellenborough’s dicta in Taylor v Plumer,9 to the 
effect that:  
the product of or substitute for the original thing still follows the nature of 
the thing itself. 
He then went on to say: 
Admittedly Lord Ellenborough did not explain why the product or substitute 
belong to the person who owned the original thing: but he obviously 
thought, as I do, that it belongs to him because10 he owned the original thing. 
                                                                                                                                                        
property rights” but gives no reason why that might be the case. In fact he seems to 
acknowledge that it is not possible to provide any good reason when he says that it 
is history just as much as abstract logic or reason that must determine how the law 
operates. This may be true but it amounts to saying that we can trace because we 
can trace. See E. Ball, Enrichment at the Claimant’s Expense: Attribution Rules in 
Unjust Enrichment (Hart 2017) 158.    
7 There are writers who subscribe to notions of natural law property rights but even 
they struggle to explain individual rules of property institutions within those terms. 
See R. Nozick. Anarchy, State and Utopia (Blackwell 1974) 10-12, 150-153; Jeffrey 
Goldberg, ‘Involuntary Servitudes: A Property-Based Notion of Abortion Choice 
(1991) 38 University of California, at Los Angeles, Law Review 1597; G.A. Cohen, Self-
Ownership, Freedom and Equality (CUP 1995); J.S. Mill, ‘Principles of Political 
Economy’ in J.M. Robson (ed), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (Routledge and 
Keegan Paul 1965).  
8 P. Millet, ‘Proprietary Restitution’ in S. Degeling and J.Edelman (eds), Equity in 
Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters 2005) 309. 
9 (1815) 3 M & S 562, 105 ER 721, 726. 
10 Italics in the original 
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In other words the consequence is an ordinary incidence of the English law of 
property.11 
But he made it clear that no explanation can be extracted from any 
abstract conception of property as a principal: 
It is the law of property which deals with the creation, acquisition, disposal 
and transmission of property rights…one of the rules of our law of property, 
common to both equity and the common law, is that the owner of a thing 
can claim ownership of its traceable proceeds. The rule is not a rule of natural 
law…we do not need to have such a rule. We choose to have it.12 
It would seem, therefore, that we cannot look for any explanation of 
rights in substitute assets based on abstract principals of private 
property. 
The Transmission of Rights. 
 
One way of looking at the statements of Lord Millett quoted above is to 
say that he believes that the rights that the claimant held in the original 
asset somehow transmit themselves to the substitute. That this is what 
he did mean is indicated by a further quotation from the same article. In 
speaking of dicta of his in Foskett v McKeown,13 he said that: 
I was concerned to say that a claimant has the same interest in the proceeds 
as he had in the property which they represent.14 
Unjust enrichment theorists dismiss this entire explanation as being 
based on “the fiction of persistence”.15 This is largely part of an agenda 
                                                     
11 P. Millet, ‘Proprietary Restitution’ in S. Degeling and J.Edelman (eds), Equity in 
Commercial Law  (Thomson Reuters 2005) 309, 314. 
12 Ibid. 
13 (2001) 1 AC 102. 
14 P. Millet, ‘Proprietary Restitution’ in S. Degeling and J.Edelman(eds), Equity in 
Commercial Law, (Thomson Reuters 2005) 309 325. Admittedly Foskett v McKeown 
concerned equitable rights in substitute assets but it has nowhere been suggested 
by those who regard the transmission of property rights as explaining these claims 
that common law rights operate in any different way. 
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that seeks to explain claims to substitute assets as being claims to new 
rights based on unjust enrichment, but it not necessary to accept their 
reasoning in order to show that the idea of the transmission of rights 
works at neither the theoretical, nor the practical, level.  
At a theoretical level the problem is that property rights are rights 
to things, and they are not separable from that thing. This, as Chambers 
explains, is why title to unascertained goods does not pass at common 
law. 
At a practical level the problem with the transmission of rights 
theory is that it does not explain the substantive law. One can take a 
very simple example. Suppose that A steals B’s bracelet and then 
exchanges it with C for a watch.  Even if one allows that such an example 
gives B a claim to the watch in A’s hands it is not at all the case that the 
rights that B has in the watch are the same rights as that which he had in 
the bracelet. One of the rights that B had in the bracelet was the right to 
sue anyone in conversion (including both A and C) who came into 
possession of it without his authority. This is not true of B’s rights in the 
watch, since it would seem that conversion does not lie against an 
innocent party who has unknowingly interfered with the claimant’s 
rights to a substitute.16 
Moreover, B’s right in the bracelet cannot be the same right as 
that which he has in the watch because the former is a fully formed 
right, whereas the latter is only a power to acquire a right.17 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn Clarendon Press 2005) 198. 
16 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd (1991) 2 AC 548. 
17 B. Hacker, ‘Proprietary Restitution After Impaired Consent Transfers: A 
Generalised Power Model’ (2009) CLJ 324. Admittedly this may not be a correct 
understanding of Lipkin Gorman but if it is not then it leaves other problems with 
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In addition, the doctrine of relativity of title means that any rights 
that B has in the watch are only those rights that C was able to transfer 
to A. They may well be defeasible to a third party, who can prove prior 
and superior rights.18  
Thus, no rights have transmitted themselves from the bracelet to 
the watch. The rights that B has in the watch are wholly different to 
those that he had in the bracelet. 
Vindication of Original Rights. 
  
Another way of explaining claims in substitute assets in terms of the law 
of property is to say that one of the rights contained in the ownership of 
the original asset is the right to the proceeds of the disposal of that 
asset. In our example above, the watch would be treated as if it were 
the proceeds of the disposal of the bracelet. This is what Charlie Webb 
appears to be saying in his recent work Reason and Restitution.19 
Webb starts from the premise that ownership interests are 
interests in determining the use and enjoyment of a particular asset, and 
that only the owner of the asset has the right to this determination. 
Owners are also entitled to determine how and when they may dispose 
of these interests and one consequence is that owners are in a position 
to acquire other items of wealth through the exchange of their current 
items. Only the owner of an asset is permitted to take advantage of this 
                                                                                                                                                        
understanding the nature of the right in question. See chapter 6 below for a more 
detailed discussion of that case and the problems associated with it. 
18 Armory v Delamire (1772) 1 Str 505, 93 ER 664, Costello v Chief Constable of 
Derbyshire (2001) 1 WLR 1437, G. Battersby and A.D. Preston, ‘The Concepts of 
“Property”, “Title” and “Owner” as Used in the Sale of Goods Act 1893’ (1972) 35 
MLR 288. 
19 C. Webb, Reason and Restitution: A Theory of Unjust Enrichment (OUP 2016) 180-
185. 
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exchange potential. When another person exploits this potential without 
the owner’s authority, by taking that asset into his possession, the 
matter can be simply remedied by the owner recovering the asset. 
However, if the asset has been disposed of it is of course too late to 
require the its return but: 
In these circumstances, however, my interest in that asset…provides a 
ground for recognizing me as having an equivalent interest in the 
substitute…for the substitute is the product of the wealth-acquiring potential 
of the original asset, and since this potential…is mine and mine alone to take 
advantage of, taking the substitute asset to be mine ensures that it is me and 
me alone who derives any such advantage.20 
The first basis on which one can take issue with Webb is that his 
theory seems to be based on a concept of property rights that is largely 
unsustainable.21 
There has been, over the last few years,22 a retreat from the 
Hohfeldian notion of property rights being merely a series of jural 
relationships between individuals with the consequence that the 
difference between rights in personam and rights in rem is a quantitative 
rather than a qualitative one.23 It is no longer quite as acceptable as it 
once was to look down upon the “layman’s” notion of a property right as 
being a right to a thing, in contrast to the lawyers understanding that 
property refers not to a thing itself but to the rights that encompass it. 
                                                     
20 Ibid 184. 
21 See J. Penner, ‘The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property’ (1995-96) University of 
California, at Los Angeles, Law Review 711 for a clear analysis of the issues and J. 
Penner, The Idea of Property in Law, (Clarendon Press 1997) for a more complicated 
one. 
22 For a summary of the debate see J.W. Harris, Legal Philosophies (Butterworths 
1980) Ch 7. 
23 W.N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and 
Other Legal Essays 67 (Walter. W. Cook ed) 1923. 
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But in the retreat from Hohfeld another conceptual hurdle has been 
placed in the way of a proper understanding of property rights, and that 
is the “bundle of rights” notion of ownership.24 
There would be nothing amiss with a bundle of rights conception 
of ownership that merely utilized the bundle to explain incidences, or 
examples, of what ownership entails. The problem is that a process of 
disaggregation has set in which has resulted in all of the various 
incidents being seen, not as individual parts of a single ownership 
concept, but, as actual rights in themselves. Thus, Webb identifies the 
right to exploit the wealth-acquiring potential as a discrete right of 
ownership. 
It is certainly a right that an owner possesses as a consequence of 
his over-riding ownership right of exclusion. Ownership comprises the 
exclusive right to determine the use or disposition of an alienable 
thing.25 The right to utilise the wealth-acquiring potential of the thing  is 
not, however, one the breach of which constitutes a claim any different 
to a claim for the breach of the exclusionary right itself. This makes 
perfectly good sense. Indeed, the alternative would lead to the most 
unfortunate results. 
Thus, in Webb’s example, what the defendant has done is 
interfered with the claimant’s right of ownership by disposing of his 
asset without his authority.  But the defendant has done many things 
that breach his duty; he has taken the asset out of the claimant’s 
possession; he has exploited its wealth-creating potential; he has taken 
                                                     
24 Most famously espoused by A.M. Honoré, in ‘Ownership’ in A.G Guest (ed) Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence (OUP 1961). 
25 See J. Penner, ‘The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property’ (1995-96) University of 
California, at Los Angeles, Law Review 711, 742. 
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away the right to any income that the claimant may have been able to 
realize from the use of the asset and he has taken away the claimant’s 
power to destroy the asset. But these individual breaches of duty will all 
occur every time that a defendant takes an asset out of the claimant’s 
possession. The law deals with such breaches of duty by allowing the 
claimant to bring an action against the defendant. But each incidence of 
ownership does not bring with it its own individual action. In very 
general terms the law deals with all of these breaches of duty in the 
same way – it allows a claim against the defendant in the law of 
conversion or trespass or money had and received. If any individual 
breach of duty brought with it its own separate action we would be left 
with the absurd situation that a claimant could bring multiple actions 
against the defendant in respect of the defendant’s various infractions 
of his duty with respect to the same asset. 
With respect to title what the common law does, when faced with 
a defendant who has interfered with the rights of an owner by 
attempting to transfer title away from him without his authority, is to 
treat the defendant’s actions as having no effect in that respect at all. 
Since only the claimant may take advantage of the wealth-acquiring 
potential of his property, when the defendant purports to do so the 
legal effect is to treat his actions as having failed in this regard.  
So if, again, we take our example, in terms of rights A gains nothing by 
stealing B’s bracelet. To make things simple, assume that both bracelet 
and watch are valued at £100. How can it be said that A has utilized the 
wealth-acquiring potential of the bracelet when he is liable in conversion 
to B for the sum of £100? The wealth potential in the bracelet, having 
been realized, has accrued to B (to whom it should) not to A. Admittedly 
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B may prefer the bracelet to the £100 but, for these purposes, that is not 
relevant, since he cannot have that anyway. In addition, the law treats 
the transaction between A and C as having no effect on whatever rights 
that B had in the bracelet.  C cannot add to his wealth by transferring 
the watch away to D, because C would then be in exactly the same 
position as A. In fact C is arguably worse off than anybody because he 
has lost something that was his (the watch)26 and gained in return a 
liability to B.  
Questions of title have proven difficult for the common law, 
especially in relation to the rights of innocent third parties,27 but the 
resolution of these difficulties has been carefully worked out over many 
generations. Webb has proposed an explanation for ownership rights 
that concentrates entirely on the relationship between A and B. But 
there is a third actor here, namely C. If, contrary to what will be argued 
below, the law of property contains within itself the rules for the 
transmission of property rights, one of them would surely be the right of 
the owner to transfer his property to whomsoever he chooses.28 This is, 
in fact, how the law seems to work. Title to personal property at 
common law passes with the intention of the parties.29 In this instance C 
intended to pass title to the watch to A. He knows nothing of B. Why 
should it be the case that, because of an interference of A with B’s 
                                                     
26 The transfer of the watch to A may of course be voidable, but unless and until C 
actually avoids it, it remains good. 
27 See D.Sheehan, The Principles of Personal Property Law (Hart 2011) Ch 3. 
28 There are of course exceptions to this rule. Laws concerning dispositions on death 
are an example. But equally there must be exceptions to Webb’s notion of the right 
of an owner to exclusively realize the wealth potential of his asset. Capital gains tax 
would be an example of such an exception. 
29 D.Sheehan, The Principles of Personal Property Law (Hart 2011) 56. See also The 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 ss 16-20; Doe d Garnons v Wright (1826) 5 B & C 671, 108 ER 
250; Cochrane v Moore (1890) 2 QBD 57; Re Ridgway (1885) 15 QBD 447. 
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property rights, C’s rights to determine to whom he may transfer his 
property should be overridden? There is nothing at a theoretical level to 
suggest that a right to a make a claim with respect to a substitute asset 
is part and parcel of the rights that the claimant has in the original asset. 
There are further objections to Webb’s explanation. Like Lord 
Millett, he seems to regard the capacity of an owner to dispose of his 
property as emanating itself, from the law of property. This may be true 
of some types of disposal but, in respect of others it does appear to be 
asking too much of the law of property. Realising the wealth-acquisition 
potential of ones property would normally involve exchanging that 
property, but the right to exchange ones property is not one that can be 
ascribed to the law of property itself. The right to exchange ones 
property lies, somewhere, at the boundaries of the law of property and 
the law of contract. The fact that I own a bracelet cannot, of itself, give 
me a right to exchange that bracelet. I may well have a right to give it 
away. I may also have a right that, if exchange is permitted, nobody else 
may exchange it but me (this is merely a derivative of my right to 
exclusive use), but the actual right to exchange requires the existence of 
the institution of contract. The mere fact of ownership is insufficient to 
give me a right to exchange.30 
Thus, even if Webb’s example were good it cannot be used to 
show that the explanation for any rights arising in the substitute asset 
are attributable to the law of property, since they are also dependent 
upon a law relating to exchanges which is itself not a derivative of 
property law. 
                                                     
30 J. Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Clarendon Press 1997). 
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Webb’s is just one example of an attempt to demonstrate that 
ownership of an asset contains within itself the right to a traceable 
substitute. The difficulty with such attempts is that they fail to offer any 
satisfactory explanation of why this should be the case and how any 
explanation links in to the institutional practice of the law.  
It may, of course, be the case that there is no good explanation, 
but that we can see by observation that the law nonetheless does treat 
rights in a substitute as being one that derives from rights in the original. 
As will be seen in this and the next chapter, this, unprincipled, approach 
has led to serious errors in our understanding of the law and to the 
creation of rights for which there is neither a normative explanation nor 
authority. 
Property as a rights-creating event 
 
There is another difficulty in the way of treating rights in substitutes as 
being the vindication of rights in the original asset. This is that it is 
extremely doubtful whether the law of property can be regarded as a 
rights-creating event at all.31 
 Peter Birks’s basic position was that property rights, rights in rem, 
are distinguishable from personal rights, rights in personam, on the basis 
of exigibility. Rights in personam are good only against an individual 
                                                     
31 The main, although by no means only, contributors to this debate have been Peter 
Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Clarendon Press 1989); Unjust 
Enrichment (2nd edn Clarendon Law 2005); ‘Property and Unjust Enrichment: 
Categorical Truths’ (1997) New Zealand Law Review 623; ‘Personal Property: 
Proprietary Rights and Remedies’ (2000) 11 KCLJ 1 and Grantham and Rickett in; R. 
Grantham, ‘Doctrinal Bases for the Recognition of Property Rights’ (1996) OJLS 561; 
R. Grantham and C. Rickett, ‘Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths or 
Unnecessary Complexity’ (1997) New Zealand Law Review 668; R. Grantham and C. 
Rickett, ‘Tracing and Property Rights: The Categorical Truth’ (2000) 63 MLR 903; R. 
Grantham and C. Rickett, ‘Property Rights as a Legally Significant Event’ (2003) CLJ 
717. 
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whereas rights in rem are good against the whole world. But neither 
rights in rem nor rights in personam are sources of rights. They are 
responses to rights-giving events, such as consent, or wrongdoing or 
unjust enrichment.  
Grantham and Rickett, by contrast, maintain that, whilst the 
creation of an original right in rem is indeed a response to a variety of 
possible rights-giving events that do not include the law of property, 
once the claimant possesses the right in rem, that right itself constitutes 
the rights-giving event for the purposes of its vindication. Property is 
thus, uniquely, both a rights-giving event and a response to rights-giving 
events. They argue that the reason that this is not apparent in respect of 
common law property rights is that the institutional practice of the law 
has developed in such a way that common law property rights are 
largely protected by the law of wrongs. But this historical accident, they 
say, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the wrongs in 
question are based, at heart, on rights in rem. They argue that quite 
clearly rights in rem are inert, in the sense that the right attaches to 
property not to people, and they therefore can only be vindicated by 
claims to rights in personam, but the in personam right, whatever its 
form, is merely a vindication of the right in rem.  
The reasons for the difference between the Birksian and the 
Grantham and Rickett approach may well be that they are operating at 
differing levels of abstraction. Thus, if B sells his bracelet to A, A’s rights 
in the bracelet arise as a result of a consensual transaction. The element 
of consent is sufficient to explain A’s rights. If C steals the bracelet from 
A, it may be true to say, at one level of abstraction, that A’s right to 
claim in conversion against C is based on the property rights that he has 
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in the bracelet, but it is questionable whether that explanation goes 
deep enough. If one goes to a higher level of abstraction, and asks why A 
has property rights in the bracelet the answer is that they arose as a 
result of a consensual transfer of the bracelet from B.  
It is true, of course, that if D steals the bracelet from C, it is very 
difficult to identify a “Birksian” reason for C’s right to claim against 
him.32 Neither consent nor unjust enrichment will do. We would 
probably say that D has interfered with C’s right of possession, which has 
arisen due to the mere fact of the possession itself. It is therefore to the 
law of wrongs that we would probably turn for an explanation but, even 
if this is considered incorrect, that gives no greater credibility to the idea 
that the source might be the law of property itself. 
When it comes to substitute assets the Grantham and Rickett 
approach appears to be another attempt to show that the claimant is 
asserting rights in the substitute because the rights that he had in the 
original asset allow him to do so: 
It should not be surprising that the property rights in the traceable product 
arise as a response to the plaintiff’s rights in the original asset. Indeed, it 
would be more surprising if they did not. Property rights are a significant 
matter in the common law and represent one of the fundamental building 
blocks of the Anglo-American legal tradition…from such a perspective the 
idea that a plaintiff’s property rights should be extinguished, to be replaced 
by rights born of unjust enrichment, merely because the subject matter of 
the right has changed form would be a contraction quite out of keeping with 
the otherwise generous protection rights afforded to property.33 
                                                     
32 Which he unquestionably has: Armory v Delamire (1722) 1 Str. 505. 
33 R. Grantham and C. Rickett, ‘Tracing and Property Rights: The Categorical Truth’ 
(2000) 63 MLR 903, 911. 
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Leaving to one side the reference to unjust enrichment, this 
statement exemplifies the property based approach to tracing. But it 
lacks adequate analysis. The fact that a property right is “significant” 
says nothing about its content. Moreover, to say that a property right 
should not be replaced by other rights “merely” because the subject 
matter of the rights has changed form is to miss the point that the right 
only exists at all because of the thing to which it relates. It would 
actually be a lot more surprising if a right to a thing could be transferred 
to a different thing. It would then no longer be a right to a thing at all – it 
would be a right floating around looking for something to which to 
attach itself. 
The Transfer of Personal Property Rights.  
 
Another substantial difficulty that stands in the way of accepting that 
the law of property is the source of rights to substitute assets is the 
internal structure of the substantive law itself. The general principle in 
respect of transfers of property, is that the transfer is governed by the 
intentions of the parties. There certainly seems to be no principle of 
English law which would suggest that where A intends to pass property 
to B, the law will step in and say that legal title has in fact passed to C. 
Thus, s17 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 states that property 
passes when the parties intend it to pass. The next part of the Act details 
rules that are to apply where it is not possible to say when the parties 
intended the property to pass but they are merely default positions to 
take effect in the absence of discernible intention. 
Although in the case of gifts the mode of transfer is different to 
that pertaining to the sale of goods (generally speaking transfer by way 
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of gift must be perfected by delivery or by deed) the intention principle 
remains the same. For property in an asset to pass by way of gift the 
donor must intend to pass it as a gift and the donee must accept it as 
such.34 
With respect to choses in action, the governing law is s136 of The 
Law of Property Act 1925. Without going into detail over precise 
mechanisms, a fundamental aspect of the transfer is the intention of the 
transferor. The assignor must manifest his intention to transfer the 
chose in action and the identity of both the chose in action itself and the 
assignee must be clear. 
Thus, it is reasonably clear that the transfer of legal interests in 
assets requires the intention of the seller, or giver, or assignor that such 
a transfer take place, and also that the transfer be made to an 
identifiable transferee. In the case of gifts where no consideration 
passes from transferor to transferee it is actually made specific that the 
donee’s acceptance is a fundamental requirement of the transfer 
There are, of course, other methods of acquiring legal interests in 
assets other than via consensual transfer. 
It is possible for example to take into possession a previously 
ownerless thing, such as a wild animal. Or if I own an animal and that 
animal has young then I also own the young. More controversially I may 
take into my possession a previously abandoned asset.35  
This is not to say that the law never recognises non-consensual 
transfers. We have already seen that this occurs in the case, for 
example, of accession and mixtures. In these, and in similar cases, the 
                                                     
34 Cochrane v Moore (1890) 2 QBD 57 (CA). 
35 It is not at all certain that this is the case in English law, abandonment being as 
unworked a concept as most others covered by personal property law. 
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law has had to resolve ownership issues in the absence of any obvious 
intention on the part of the parties. It has done its best to create a set of 
fair and workable rules but it is suggested that these cases are 
exceptions to the general rule and that the cause of the exception is 
evidential difficulty in applying that rule. In the majority of transfers the 
transferor has expressed a clear intention to transfer the asset in 
question to the transferee and where this is the case then, with a few 
exceptions that will be discussed below, it is the intention of the 
transferor that is determinative. Obviously, intention can have no part to 
play where there is none but that does not defeat the general point that 
where it does exist it is critical. 
Contrary to the general rule set out above, where there has been 
an unauthorised disposal of B’s asset by A to C common law tracing 
requires us to accept the proposition that C, having intended to transfer 
whatever the proceeds of the disposal may have been to A, has, in fact, 
passed that legal title to B, despite the fact that he is almost certainly 
ignorant of B’s existence. Nothing in the general law concerning the 
passage of title prepares us for such a possibility.  
It should also be borne in mind that, where A passes legal title in 
an asset to B as a result of, for example a mistake, and B then becomes 
bankrupt it is nowhere suggested that A has any common law property 
claim to that asset. Although the two cases are by no means identical 
some explanation is called for as to why it would be reasonable to ignore 
C’s intention to pass title to the asset to A in the first case but not to 
ignore A’s intention to pass title to B in the second case, especially as in 
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the first case B has never previously owned the asset whereas in the 
second case A was at least a previous owner.36 
Remedies for Interference with Property Rights. 
 
One final reason for questioning the proposition that claims to 
substitute assets fall exclusively within the parameters of the law of 
property is that, at common law, claims to interference with property 
rights fall within the purview of the law of tort. Just as the law of 
property does not contain within itself the rules relating to the transfer 
of property, nor does it contain the rules for the vindication of property 
rights themselves. 
Choses in Possession. 
 
It is generally accepted that the common law has no vindicatio.37 With a 
few exceptions,38 it is not possible for a claimant to go to a common law 
court and ask it to compel the defendant to return a specific item of 
property. Instead the common law protects personal property interests 
obliquely via the law of torts.  
Historically trespass to goods and detinue were torts which dealt 
with claims that the defendant was either in possession of goods 
belonging to the claimant and had removed them without the claimant’s 
                                                     
36 P. Matthews, ‘The Legal and Moral Limits of Common Law Tracing’ in P. Birks (ed), 
Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon Press 1995) 23.  
37 . Birks, ‘Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths’ (1997) New Zealand 
Law Review 623. However cases such as Trustees of the Property of F.C. Jones &Sons 
(A Firm) v Jones (1997) Ch 159 and Armstrong DLW v Winnington Networks Ltd 
(2012) EWCH 10 (ch) may be indications that the law is heading in a new direction, 
although there appears to be little in the way of principled reasoning in these cases.  
38 The law relating to the delivery up of specific goods is a possible example although 
even here the remedy is discretionary.  
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authority39 or that the defendant, being in possession of the claimant’s 
goods, refused to return them.40 
Detinue, as a claim, suffered from the major disadvantage, from 
the claimant’s point of view, that it was subject to wager of law. As a 
result the claim in trover emerged as a species of case in its own right.41 
Initially trover required the claimant to show that he was possessed of 
goods that he had accidentally lost and which had been found by the 
defendant who then converted them to his own use. The loosing and 
finding elements were quickly treated as pure fictions which the 
defendant was unable to deny.42 The change from claims in detinue to 
claims in trover did, however, have the disadvantage that the conversion 
alleged in a trover claim had to be a positive act whereas detinue was 
based on a negative act – the refusal to return goods to the claimant. 
Eventually the courts took the view that refusal to return goods was a 
positive act and detinue declined as an action, more or less limited to 
those cases where conversion could not be shown because re-delivery 
was prevented by the loss or destruction of the goods in question.43 This 
use of detinue ceased with the passage of the Torts (Interference With 
Goods) Act 1977, in which detinue was abolished44 and conversion 
(which had been formed in the 19th century out of the action in trover) 
was enlarged to include the cases where re-delivery was impossible. 
                                                     
39 Trespass to Goods. 
40 Detinue. 
41 It was originally an action in trespass in which the claimant alleged that the 
defendant had converted the claimant’s goods to his own use. 
42 Gumbleton v Grafton (1600) Cro. Eliz 781, 72 ER 799; Isaack v Clark (1614) 2 
Bulstrode 306, 80 ER 1143. 
43 Owen v Lewyn (1673) 1 Ventris 223, 86 ER 150. 
44 By s2. 
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Conversion is now so all-encompassing a tort that trespass to 
goods is of declining importance. There is, however, a clear distinction 
between the two. Trespass is a tort against possession, whereas, in 
conversion, the claimant says that the defendant has interfered with his 
rights of ownership.45 It remains an open question as to whether a 
claimant in a trespass action has to be in actual possession at the time of 
the interference complained of or was a person entitled at that time to 
immediate possession. The High Court of Australia seems clearly of the 
opinion that actual possession is required.46 English courts are less 
certain 47 although it is suggested that much of the confusion is caused 
by English courts regarding an immediate right to possession as being 
the equivalent of possession itself.48 
Trespass is a wide-ranging tort. According to Latham CJ in the High Court 
of Australia: 
Unauthorised use of goods is a trespass; unauthorised acts of riding a horse, 
driving a motor car, using a bottle, are all equally trespasses, even though the 
horse may be returned unharmed or the motor car unwrecked or the bottle 
unbroken. The normal use of a bottle is as a container and the use of it for 
this purpose is a trespass if…it is not authorised.49 
 
                                                     
45 Sanderson v Marsden & Jones (1922) 10 Lloyds Rep 467. 
46 Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204. 
47 Wilson v Lombank Ltd (1963) 1 WLR 1294. 
48 See A. Hudson, ‘Trespass to Goods’ in N. Palmer & E.McKendrick (eds), Interests in 
Goods (2nd edn LLP 1998) 809-825. 
49 Penfolds Wines Pty Ltd v Elliott (1946) 74 CLR 204. 
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Conversion. 
 
Conversion, as our courts have accepted,50 more or less defies definition, 
but Atkin J gave us probably the best attempt at it that we have when he 
said that: 
It appears to me plain that dealing with goods in a manner inconsistent with 
the rights of a true owner amounts to a conversion, provided that it is also 
established that there is also an intention on the part of the defendant in so 
doing to deny the owner’s right or to assert a right which is inconsistent with 
the owner’s right.51 
Conversion is therefore a tort against ownership. But because of the 
conflation in English law of the notions of ownership and possession it is 
also a tort against possession. A claimant in conversion only has to show 
a superior right of possession to the defendant. He is not required to 
demonstrate anything approaching an indefeasible right to an absolute 
interest in the asset in question.52 Moreover a person with a right to 
immediate possession may also sue in conversion.53 
Since liability in conversion is strict54 it can be seen that the tort 
gives very wide-ranging protection to owners who have been deprived 
of their assets by third parties. Where A disposes of B’s asset without his 
authority and that asset successively ends up in the hands of C through 
to Z, every single person from B to Z is liable to A in conversion 
                                                     
50 Burroughs v Bayne (1860) 5 H & N 296. Per Bramwell B. 
51 Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co v MacNicoll (1918) LJKB 601, approved by 
Scrutton LJ in Oakley v Lyster (1931) 1 KB 148. 
52 Armory v Delamire (1772) 1 Str. 505 KB 93, ER 664; Costello v Chief Constable of 
Derbyshire (2001) 1 WLR 1437. 
53 North Central Wagon & Finance Co v Graham (1950) 2 KB 7. 
54 Willis v British Car Auctions(1978) 1 WLR 438; Marfani & Co Ltd v Midland Bank 
(1968) 1 WLR 956. 
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irrespective of his knowledge or otherwise of how B came by the asset in 
the first place, or indeed of the very existence of A and B. 
The greatest weakness to a claim in conversion from the point of 
view of a claimant is that, as a personal claim, it is of limited value in the 
case of the insolvency of the defendant. However, a trustee in 
bankruptcy in possession of a converted asset may not deal with it as 
part of the bankrupt estate. It remains the property of anyone who can 
show prior and better title to the bankrupt. 
It should also be stressed that where a party obtains title to an 
asset as a result of one of the nemo dat exceptions he cannot be sued in 
conversion by the person from whom he obtained the title, but this does 
not preclude the right of a person with a prior and better title to the 
disponor from taking such action. 
What has been said above about the conversion of assets applies 
equally to money in the form of notes and coins.55 It should be borne in 
mind, however, that money as currency cannot be converted by a bona 
fide purchaser of that money56 because money as currency is an 
exception to the nemo dat rule. Moreover, it is a complete exception in 
that the bona fide purchaser of money obtains a title good against the 
whole world, not just the title of the disponor. 
Choses in Action 
 
As a matter of principle conversion does not lie in respect of a chose in 
action57 because conversion is an action in which the claimant asserts an 
immediate right of possession and, in English law, intangible assets 
                                                     
55 Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 452; Jackson v Anderson (1811) 4 Taunt 24. 
56 As was pointed out by Lord Templeman in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd (1991) 2 
AC 548 although the relevance of the rule to that particular case is uncertain.  
57 Confirmed in OBG Ltd v Allan (2007) UKHL 21. 
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cannot be possessed. This is an unfortunate combination of rules, the 
outcome of which is both illogical and the source of some unprincipled 
attempts to circumvent the perceived injustices that arise from it. 
The case of Armstrong DLW v Winnington Networks Ltd,58 is 
discussed in some detail in Chapter 5 below, but the judge in that case 
seems to have been heavily influenced by the fact that the claimants had 
no obvious alternative claim when finding that there exists at common 
law a claim that he described as a “proprietary restitutionary claim”. The 
justification for the existence of such a claim from authority was 
unconvincing, but a system which treats the protection of personal 
property rights as a matter for the law of tort, cannot simply ignore the 
growth in importance of intangible property, and leave the main tort 
designed for the protection of those rights, conversion, powerless to 
assist rights holders in such a significant area. 
Intangible property can be stolen,59 a rule derived from the fact 
that it can be bought and sold freely. It makes no sense to argue from 
that starting point that it cannot also be possessed for the purposes of 
the law of conversion. Armstrong was a difficult case because none of 
the alternative clams that might normally be available to protect 
intangible property rights, such as inducing breach of contract or causing 
loss by unlawful means,60 was available against the defendant and 
unjust enrichment could not have been called in aid first because the 
judge decided that title to the property in question remained at all times 
with the claimant and second because the defendant, having paid full 
                                                     
58 (2012) EWCH 10 (ch). 
59 Attorney General of Hong Kong v Nai-Kueng (1987) 1 WLR 1339. 
60 Although there seems to be no reason why the thief who actually caused the loss 
in this case should not be the subject of this action. 
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value for the asset, could hardly be described as having been enriched at 
all. 
This brief survey of the vindication of property rights illustrates 
the point that such vindication has nothing to do with the law of 
property. It is a matter for the law of tort. The existence of a property 
right (which is very much a matter for the law of property) carries with it 
no implications about how such a right should be vindicated. Thus, it 
cannot be said that the mere existence of a right to an asset gives any 
indication that it should be vindicated by granting a claimant rights to 
any substitute asset that can be identified. 
The Authorities. 
 
Since it would appear that no viable explanation has been put forward, 
either as a matter of principle, or as a matter of the substantive law, that 
common claims to substitute assets are based on the law of property, 
that might be taken to conclude the discussion. 
The matter cannot, however, be dealt with so simply, because 
there is, arguably, a line of authority that establishes that, however 
strong the theoretical argument may be against it, claims to substitute 
assets are recognised by the common law. In the remainder of this 
chapter we will look at the two authorities that are most often cited as 
establishing the right to make such claims. In each case the outcome is 
generally regarded as having been determined on the basis of the 
existence of such a right. In the next chapter we will go on to examine 
other cases which have been cited in support of the existence of the 
right, but which are either dependent upon the two cases discussed in 
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this chapter, or which can be more satisfactorily explained on other 
grounds. 
Banque Belge Pour L’Etranger v Hambrouck.61 
 
 Banque Belge has been relied upon many times, both judicially,62 and in 
academic writings,63 to support the notion that it is possible to trace at 
common law into substitute assets. Exactly what the case stands for, and 
the basis of the court’s decision, therefore repays careful consideration. 
The facts are fairly straightforward. One Hambrouck worked for a 
firm, owned by Mr Pelabon. By some method, Hambrouck was able to 
obtain a number of cheques, to the value of £6000, drawn in his favour, 
on Mr Pelabon’s purported authority, at Mr Pelabon’s bank. The bank 
(the claimant in the original case, and the respondent in the court of 
Appeal) paid the money to Hambrouck, who deposited it with his own 
bank. Hambrouck wrote out cheques to his mistress, Mlle Spanoghe (the 
defendant in the original action, and the appellant in the Court of 
Appeal), who received them, and paid them into her own account at the 
London Joint City and Midland Bank. By the time that the fraud was 
discovered the balance in favour of Mlle Spanoghe at her bank was 
£315. The respondent claimed against both Mlle Spanoghe and her 
bank, asking for a declaration that this balance of £315 was its property. 
The London Joint City and Midland Bank paid the £315 into court and 
the proceedings against it were stayed. 
                                                     
61 (1921) 1 KB 321. 
62 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd (1991) 2 AC 548; Trustee of the Property of F.C. Jones 
& Sons (A Firm) v Jones  (1997) Ch 159; Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson (1991) Ch 547. 
63 A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, (3rd edn OUP 2010)125-128; G. Virgo, The 
Principles of the Law of Restitution (2nd edn OUP 2006) 627; P. Birks, An Introduction 
to the Law of Restitution, (Revised Edition Clarendon Press  1994) 361. 
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The bank obtained its declaration at first instance, and Mlle 
Spanoghe appealed that decision. 
A strong Court of Appeal (Bankes LJ, Scrutton LJ and Atkin LJ) 
dismissed the appeal. All three judges delivered judgments and one of 
the problems of the case is that their reasons for doing so were by no 
means identical. 
Bankes LJ, having rejected the argument that the bank was not 
the proper claimant in the case, went on to say that had the action been 
for the recovery of a chattel, rather than for the recovery of money, 
there would be no question but that the claimant must succeed. He then 
examined three arguments put forward by the appellant as to why the 
present case should be distinguished from that concerning a chattel. He 
rejected all three.  
The first was that the appellant, having no notice that Hambrouck 
obtained the money fraudulently, had good title to the money, given to 
her by him as a gift. This was, correctly, given short shrift.  
The second was that the rules applicable to chattels have no 
application when applied to currency. Whether counsel was, or was not, 
correct in this submission turns on what exactly he meant, in this 
instance, by currency. If all that he meant was that the rules for 
following money are different from the rules for following any other 
chattel, his argument was correctly identified by Bankes LJ as resting 
upon the same misunderstanding of the notion that money has no ear-
mark, that had been rejected by Jessell MR in Hallett’s Case.64 Where 
counsel’s submission would have been correct, however, is if what he 
meant was that once money passes into currency, a bona fide  purchaser 
                                                     
64 Re Hallett’s Estate (1878 H147), (1880) 13, Ch D 696. 
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of the money obtains a good title to it.65 Bankes LJ did not address this 
aspect of the submission, but it is largely irrelevant, because it is unlikely 
that the appellant could be regarded as a bona fide purchaser of the 
money.  
The third argument raised by counsel was the crucial one for our 
purposes. It was that: 
The fact that the appellant had paid the money into her banking account 
prevented any following of the money by the plaintiff bank, and that an 
action for money had and received would not therefore lie.66 
Banks LJ’S response requires setting out in full. He said: 
The last contention for the appellant cannot in my view be supported. The 
law on the subject has been so fully discussed recently in Sinclair v 
Brougham67 that I only need point out that the law as laid down by Lord 
Ellenborough in Taylor v Plumer68 as to the right of an owner to recover 
property in common law courts from a person who can show no title to it 
where the property was capable of being traced . whether in its original form 
or in some substituted form, was fully accepted and it was explained that the 
rule in equity which was applied in Hallett’s Case69 was only introduced to 
meet cases where the money sought to be traced could no longer be 
identified owing to its having become merged in the bank’s assets and the 
relationship of debtor and creditor between the customer who had paid the 
money into the bank and the bank into which the money had been paid, 
having intervened.70 
Given that in this case counsel for the appellant did not dispute 
the point that the money in the appellant’s bank account had come from 
                                                     
65 Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 452. 
66 (1921) 1 KB 321,326. 
67 (1914) AC 398. 
68 (1815) 3 M&S 562. 
69 (13) Ch D 696 CA. 
70 (1921) 1 KB 321, 327. 
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the proceeds of Hambrouck’s fraud, Bankes LJ was satisfied that the 
claimants could trace into that money without the help of equity. 
 Bankes LJ clearly thought, therefore, that the right to trace into 
substitute assets is a part of the law of property. However, there are 
substantial difficulties with his analysis of the case. 
 First, the comparison between chattels and money in a bank 
account is misplaced. It is certainly true that, had Hambrouck 
fraudulently obtained jewellery, in circumstances that gave him a 
voidable title to that jewellery, and had he then gifted the jewellery to 
the appellant, the defrauded party could have avoided the fraudulent 
transaction and made a claim to that jewellery. But that case is not this 
case. In that case the defrauded party could point to the jewellery, and 
simply follow it into the hands of the appellant. It is not a matter of 
substitute assets, it is one of following the same asset. It certainly does 
not follow that, had the appellant herself, exchanged the jewellery for 
some other asset, a claim could be sustained in respect of that other 
asset. That case would be this case, and entirely different considerations 
come into play. 
Second, Bankes LJ’s only authority for the proposition that the 
common law permits a claimant to trace into substitute assets is Taylor v 
Plumer,71 and, as we have seen, that case is not authority for that 
proposition. This would be less critical if there were some other, 
independent, discussion of why the tracing process should be permitted, 
but there is not, which leaves the basis for the decision lacking in any 
proper foundation. 
                                                     
71 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 562. 
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Third, even if Taylor v Plumer were such authority in general, 
there is nothing in the facts of that case, or of the dicta of Lord 
Ellenborough, to suggest that it could be extended to encompass monies 
paid into a bank account. In fact, Taylor v Plumer is a poor authority for 
such a notion. It was generally thought to be the case that Lord 
Ellenborough’s dicta, concerning tracing becoming unavailable when the 
means of ascertainment failed, meant that it was impossible at common 
law to trace through a mixed bank account. But in Sinclair v Brougham,72 
Viscount Haldane LC explained that it meant more than that: 
The common law…looked simply to the question of whether the property 
had passed, and if it had not, for instance where no relationship of debtor 
and creditor had intervened, the money could be followed, notwithstanding 
its normal character as currency, provided it could be earmarked or traced 
into assets acquired with it.73 
Thus, the creation of a debtor/creditor relationship causes the 
means of ascertainment to fail. Since that is exactly what a bank account 
is, the reasoning in Taylor v Plumer cannot be extended to encompass 
tracing through bank accounts. Bankes LJ seems to half recognise that 
point when he speaks of money in a bank account resulting in a 
relationship of debtor and creditor which “intervened” in any 
proprietary interest that the defrauded party had in the original money. 
The fact that the monies were not in a mixed account has no effect on 
that basic proposition.  
Bankes LJ seems content to regard the monies in the appellant’s 
bank account as the respondent’s property, which it clearly cannot be. It 
is the property of the appellant’s bankers. If authority is needed for such 
                                                     
72 (1914) AC 398. 
73 Ibid 420. 
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a proposition, it comes from Lord Millett. In Foskett v Mckeown,74 his 
lordship said: 
We speak of money at the bank, and of money passing into, and out of a 
bank account. But of course the account holder has no money at the bank. 
Money paid into a bank account belongs legally and beneficially to the 
bank.75 
Moreover, the appellant’s bankers had a debtor/creditor 
relationship with the appellant and nobody else. Bankes LJ did not seem 
to recognise that one effect of his judgment is that at the moment 
before the appellant’s bankers paid the money into court they actually 
had a debtor/ creditor relationship, not with the appellant, but with the 
respondent. This cannot be the case.76 
In a very short judgment, Scrutton LJ said that a common law 
claim for money had and received could not lie in this case because the 
money paid to the appellant was not the property of Banque Belge. The 
payment of the money taken from Banque Belge into Hamnbrouck’s 
bank account had “changed its identity”. 
As far as common law tracing is concerned, therefore, Scrutton 
LJ’s remarks are, obiter, because he decided the case on equitable 
grounds. He does seem to be suggesting that the reason that it is not 
possible to trace at common law, in this particular case, is that the 
original asset has lost its identity. This leaves open the question of 
whether such tracing could take place in different circumstances. But he 
does not address that matter and his judgment can certainly not be used 
                                                     
74 (2001) 1 AC 102. 
75 Ibid 128. 
76 As was pointed out by Peter Birks in, P. Birks, ‘On Taking Seriously the Difference 
Between Tracing and Claiming’ (1997) 11 TLI 2. 
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to support any wider notion that the common law allows claims to 
substitute assets. 
According to Atkin LJ: 
The money was obtained from the plaintiff bank by the fraud of 
Hambrouck…it appears to me that the plaintiff bank intended to pass 
property in and the possession of the cash which under the operations of the 
clearing house they must be taken to have paid to the collecting bank. I will 
assume therefore that this is a case not of a void but of a voidable 
transaction by which Hambrouck obtained a title to the money until the 
plaintiffs elected to avoid his title, which they did when they made their claim 
in this action. The title would then revest in the plaintiffs subject to any title 
acquired in the meantime by any transferee for value without notice of the 
fraud.77 
This analysis is of no assistance to the respondent in this case, because 
the payment by Hambrouck of the money into his own bank account did 
give that bank a title acquired for value without notice of the fraud. The 
election by the respondent to avoid Hambrouck’s title, if that was what 
it was, came too late to avoid title to the money being passed to 
Hambrouck’s bank. Hambrouck by that stage had no title to the money 
at all. He merely had a debtor/creditor relationship with his own bank. If 
the respondent bank had made a claim against Hambrouck, it would 
have to have been a personal claim in money had and received. The 
backdating effects of rescission were discussed by Rimer J in Shalson v 
Russow.78 Disagreeing with Lord Mustill’s opinion in In Re Goldcorp 
Exchange Ltd,79 that rescission merely gave the innocent party a 
                                                     
77 (1921) 1 KB 321,332. 
78 (2005) ChD 281. 
79 (1995) 1 AC 74. 
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personal right for the repayment of the value of the property that has 
passed between claimant and defendant, he said: 
In particular I cannot see how the bank in Banque Belge pour L’Etranger v 
Hambrouck could have achieved the recovery it did from the fraudster’s 
mistress, since unless the rescission operated retrospectively to revest in the 
bank a proprietary title to the money sufficient to justify a tracing claim, the 
mistress’s plea that the fraudster had given her the money ought to have 
been an answer to the bank’s claim.80 
The important point here is that Rimer J was referring to equitable, not 
legal, title. He clearly saw Banque Belge as a case involving equitable 
tracing. 
Atkin LJ’s judgment is of interest because he appears to be willing 
to extend what he regards as the rule in Hallett’s Estate,81 that equity 
can trace into a mixed bank account, to the common law. But this is 
based on the presupposition that there were at the time two sets of 
rules for tracing, one at common law and one in equity. This, in turn 
depends on the now familiar misunderstanding of Taylor v Plumer.  He 
says: 
The question was always, had the means of ascertainment failed? But if in 
1815 the common law halted outside the bankers door, by 1879 equity had 
the courage to lift the latch, walk in, and examine the books: in re Hallett’s 
Estate. I see no reason why the means of ascertainment so provided should 
not now be available both for common law and equity proceedings.82 
The error in this analysis lies in the notion that, in 1815, the common law 
halted at the banker’s door, and that all that he was proposing was an 
alignment of common law and equitable rules. This is, as we have seen, 
                                                     
80 Ibid 125. 
81 Re Hallett’s Estate (1878 H 147), (1880) 13 Ch D 696. 
82 (1921) 1 KB 321,335. 
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entirely incorrect. The common law had no rules at all, because Taylor v 
Plumer was decided in equity, not at common law.  
Even if his argument could be sustained, Atkin LJ received no 
support for it from the other members of the court. Scrutton LJ regarded 
the claim as one based in equity, and Bankes LJ, who also believed that 
there were separate tracing rules at common law and in equity, was 
clearly of the view that the rules in Hallett’s Estate regarding the means 
of ascertainment, applied only to tracing in equity. It was the incorrect 
concession by counsel for the appellant, that the proceeds of the 
appellant’s bank account had come from the proceeds of Hambrouck’s 
fraud, that led him to say that the means of ascertainment had not failed 
for common law purposes in this case. But, like Atkin LJ, the only basis 
for Bankes LJ’s notion that there were separate rules for tracing at 
common law and in equity was Taylor v Plumer. 
None of the judgments, therefore, can be said to represent 
authority for the proposition that it is possible to make a claim to rights 
in a substitute asset at common law, based on the rights that the 
claimant had in the original asset. Scrutton LJ does not even try to 
engage with this argument, whilst Bankes LJ and Atkin LJ rely entirely on 
Taylor v Plumer. Both, in fact, want to extend their understanding of 
Taylor v Plumer to cover cases which involve the payment of monies 
through bank accounts, without explaining how this can be done. The 
authority most relied upon to explain this was Sinclair v Brougham,83 but 
that case does not support the reasoning in this one at all. The House of 
Lords in Sinclair v Brougham had no doubt that the passage of money 
into a bank account created a debtor/creditor relationship, which, for 
                                                     
83 (1914) AC 398. 
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common law purposes, meant that tracing failed.84 The depositors claim 
was successful in that case because it was held that the acceptance of 
the deposits being ultra vires the powers of the building society, no 
debtor/creditor relationship was ever created. According to Viscount 
Haldane LC: 
The property was never converted into a debt, in equity at all events, and 
there has been throughout a resulting trust, not of an active character, but 
sufficient in my opinion to bring the transaction within the general 
principles.85 
The question arises, therefore, as to whether there is any 
satisfactory common law explanation of the outcome of the case. This, 
essentially equitable reasoning, has nothing to do with any common law 
explanation for Banque Belge. 
Kurshid and Matthews,86 having rejected the exchange product 
theory as an interpretation of Banque Belge, put forward two possible 
alternatives. First, they suggest that maybe: 
A transferee who is not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice…from 
a person under a quasi-contractual liability in money had and received…in 
respect of the res actually transferred (here Banque Belge’s money) can be 
made equally liable in money had and received.87 
This notion, originally suggested by Professor Goode,88 has some 
support, as a general proposition, from both Peter Birks89 and Charles 
                                                     
84 See text accompanying footnote 73 above. 
85 Sinclair v Brougham (1914) AC 398, 421. 
86 S. Kurshid & P. Matthews, ‘Tracing Confusion’ (1979) 95 LQR 78. 
87 Ibid 93. 
88 R. Goode, ‘The Right to Trace and Its Impact on Commercial Transactions’ (1976) 
92 LQR 360.  
89 P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, (2nd edn Clarendon Press 2005) 87-98. 
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Mitchell.90 The simplest example is where X mistakenly hands £50 to Y 
who gifts that same £50 to D. The problem facing X in this example is 
that D’s enrichment appears to have come from Y, not from X, and it is 
therefore not possible for X to maintain an action in money had and 
received against D. However, according to Mitchell  
The evidential process of following identified by Lord Millett in Foskett v 
McKeown,91 enables X to show that D’s enrichment has been remotely 
gained at his expense.92 
Mitchell goes on to say that where the asset in D’s hands is not the same 
asset as the asset that X gave to Y, X may be able to use a combination 
of tracing and following to make a claim to the asset that is now in D’s 
hands. The authority that he gives for this is Banque Belge. But at this 
point this is no longer an alternative explanation of Banque Belge. It is 
exactly the same explanation, based on the ability to trace through the 
contents of bank accounts, that has been rejected above. It would still, 
on this analysis, be necessary to show that the money in the appellant’s 
bank account in Banque Belge was the traceable product of the 
respondent’s money, and this cannot be done. 
 There is an alternative way of looking at Kurshid and Matthews’s 
suggestion. This is to say that, whilst it is impossible to show a 
transactional link between the respondent’s money and the balance to 
the credit of the appellant at her bank, it is possible to establish a causal 
connection between the two, which would be sufficient to enable the 
conclusion to be drawn that the appellant’s enrichment came at the 
                                                     
90 C. Mitchell, ‘Liability Chains’ in S. Degeling and J. Edelman (Eds), Unjust Enrichment 
in Commercial Law, (Thomson Reuters 2008) 131. 
91 (2001) 1 AC 102, 127-8. 
92 C. Mitchell, ‘Liability Chains’ in S. Degeling and J. Edelman (Eds), Unjust Enrichment 
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respondent’s expense. The issue of whether a causal link is sufficient to 
enable a claimant to demonstrate that the defendant’s enrichment has 
come at his expense, and if so what qualifies as a causal link, is 
controversial.93 But this is not an argument that needs investigating here 
because, even if the answer is that a causal link is sufficient, establishing 
such a link has nothing to do with tracing. An example of a causal link 
would be where X pays Y £50 by mistake, Y puts the £50 into his bank 
account, and then, from a different account gifts £50 to D. Whether X 
can show that D has been enriched at his expense is uncertain but if he 
can it is not because the £50 that Y gave to D is the traceable substitute 
of the £50 that X gave to Y. Were the respondent in Banque Belge able 
to show a causal link between the payment of its money to Hambrouck 
and the money to the credit of the appellant at her bank, it is possible, 
without deciding, that this would enable the respondent to maintain an 
action for money had and received against the appellant. To the extent 
that it would this could be seen as a plausible explanation of the 
outcome of the case, although it was not one ever argued in court. 
The second possible explanation put forward by Kurshid and 
Matthews was that: 
where money and negotiable instruments are concerned the change of 
identity argument…is inapplicable.94 
Thus, one £5 note is just the same as any other £5 note and can be 
treated as if it were exactly the same. This would have the advantage of 
                                                     
93 David Hayton and Peter Birks say that a causal connection is sufficient. D. Hayton, 
‘Equity’s Identification Rules’ in P. Birks (ed), Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon 
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Tettenborn says it is not, A. Tettenborn, ‘Lawful Receipt: A Justifying Factor’ (1997) 
RLR 1. 
94 S. Kurshid & P. Matthews, ‘Tracing Confusion’ (1979) 95 LQR 78, 94. 
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explaining the outcome of the case without recourse to any notions of 
tracing or substitute assets. If one £5 note can be treated as if it is the 
same as any other £5 note then the identification process becomes one 
of following rather than tracing. The asset in the hands of the appellant 
would be the same asset as left the hands of the respondent. 
But Banque Belge is not, of course, a case about £5 notes, it is 
about bank transfers. This argument is therefore extended to bank 
transfers by saying that, when Hambrouck paid the money that he 
obtained from the respondent into his own account, his bank became 
the absolute owners of that money, but when he then transferred funds 
from his account into that of the appellant, it was treated as if it was the 
same money that Hambrouck had paid into his account, i.e. the same 
money that the respondent gave to Hambrouck. Clearly this proposition 
is devoid of authority. But, in addition, it has little merit.  It is, of course, 
a fiction. It is not being suggested that the money is the same money, it 
is being said that it should be treated as if it were, and like most legal 
fictions it is uncertain where its boundaries lie. But it is surely extending 
the fiction beyond breaking point to say at one and the same time that 
the money both is, and is not, the same money as originally possessed 
by the respondent. This suggestion of Kurshid and Matthews has little 
merit. 
 One other possible explanation for the outcome of the case is that 
it was an example of a common law court upholding an action in money 
had and received in respect of monies in which the respondent already 
had equitable rights in the form of a trust.95 Atkin L.J. did specifically 
mention this possibility, but gave it no further consideration, because he 
                                                     
95 As in Scott v Surman (1742) Wiles 400. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of this case. 
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considered that the claim could be upheld on specifically common law 
grounds.  Even without Atkin LJ’s comment, however, it is very difficult 
to see how such a procedure could ever have been adopted in this case 
because it requires the claimant to have a pre-existing right in the form 
of a trust, and the respondent in this case cannot have possessed such a 
right. They had no such right because there were no assets which could 
have formed the subject matter of a trust. There were merely a 
sequence of debtor/creditor relationships, as monies were transferred 
from one account to another. 
Hambrouck did not have any fiduciary relationship with the  
respondent bank. In fact, he had no relationship with it at all. 
Admittedly, if the respondent bank had repaid the sum taken from Mr 
Pelabon’s account to him, Hambrouck would have caused the bank a 
loss. But it is difficult to see how that alone would have given the bank 
any interest in the proceeds of Hambrouck’s balance with his own bank, 
in the form of a trust, or otherwise. Furthermore, if there was a trust of 
the monies that Hambrouck obtained from the respondent, one 
wonders why, given that the claim was solely to the balance of the 
monies standing to the credit of the appellant with her bankers, the 
action against the appellant was formulated as being in money had and 
received rather than in knowing receipt.  
Banque Belge is a difficult case to understand. One problem was 
undoubtedly the curious procedural course that the case took. It 
appears that, originally, the appellant’s bank was included as a 
defendant in the action and, presumably in order to extricate 
themselves from that action, they paid a sum of money, representing 
the balance on the appellant’s account, into court. They were effectively 
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therefore asking the court to decide who was the owner of that money, 
but the correct answer to that question is that they were. Legal title to 
the money was passed to the appellant’s bank by Hambrouck’s bank, 
who themselves had legal title because they were purchasers of the 
money for value, and acquired title before the claimant’s rescinded the 
transaction. 
The court of first instance treated the case as being a claim for 
money had and received, which is a personal claim, despite the fact that 
the argument of the claimant was that the actual money placed into 
court, belonged to it.  
Moreover, it was never explained why, if the claim was one for 
money had and received, it was restricted to the monies paid by the 
appellant’s bank into court. If an action for money had and received 
would lie against the appellant, it would presumably lie for the entire 
monies that she received, not just for the sum remaining to her credit at 
her bank. To succeed in money had and received the respondents 
should have had to show that the appellant received into her bank 
account money, which legally belonged to them. This would have 
nothing to do with the entirely different question of whether the monies 
paid into court belonged to them. 
The fact that, it seems, the respondent bank did not repay Mr 
Pelabon the money taken from his account, makes its position looks 
even less meritorious. The Court of Appeal did not seem to think that 
this mattered much since, in their opinion, the money in the appellant’s 
bank account would still belong to the claimant. But this is, yet again, a 
conclusion not an argument (in fact it is more or less what the entire 
case is about), and moreover, as we have seen, it is an incorrect 
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conclusion. The respondent seems merely to have been a middle man, 
passing money from Mr Pelabon to Hambrouck with no loss to itself. It is 
hard to see what possible beneficial interest the respondent could have 
had in any rights associated with the money.  
In fact, it is hard to see what the respondent is doing in the case at 
all. Even if an action would lie against the appellant for unjust 
enrichment (which as an indirect enrichee is at least questionable) that 
enrichment was not at the expense of the respondent. The respondent 
has suffered no loss.96 
This was a complicated case made all the more complicated by the 
unusual course that it took. Irrespective of whether it is really about 
equitable tracing, or whether there is some other explanation, or 
whether it should be regarded as wrongly decided, the only justification 
put forward in the judgments for the ability to trace at common law was 
the authority of Taylor v Plumer and that is insufficient.  
F.C. Jones & Sons (Trustee in Bankruptcy) v Jones.97 
 
There are undeniable echoes of Banque Belge in the case of F.C. Jones & 
Sons (Trustee in Bankruptcy) v Jones, certainly in the procedural history 
of the case. 
A partnership committed an act of bankruptcy, following which 
one of the partners wrote cheques to his wife drawn on the partnership 
account to the value of £11,700. Mrs Jones, the wife, invested the 
money in potato futures. The investment was successful and resulted in 
                                                     
96 L. Smith, ‘Restitution: The Heart of Corrective Justice’ (2000-2001) 79 Texas Law 
Review 2115; M.McInnes “At the Plaintiff’s Expense”: Quantifying Restitutionary 
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Mrs Jones being able to withdraw £50,760 from her brokerage account 
which she deposited at Raphaels bank. 
Although no trustee in bankruptcy had been appointed at the 
time that Mr Jones transferred the moneys to his wife it was a principle 
of bankruptcy law at the time98 that the effective date of the bankruptcy 
was the date of the presentation of the petition and from that date the 
legal interest in the partnership bank account was vested in the trustee. 
This is known as the doctrine of relation back. 
The Official Receiver therefore demanded the entire balance held 
at Raphaels bank in the name of Mrs Jones. Raphaels interpleaded, 
placed the money into court and asked the court who could give it a 
good receipt for its money. 
It would seem that if the court wished to find for the Official 
Receiver the easiest mechanism would have been to find that Mrs Jones 
was the legal owner of the money but that, owing to the doctrine of 
relation back, she held the money on trust for the trustee in bankruptcy. 
Millett LJ, however, would have none of this: 
As from the date of the act of bankruptcy the money in the bankrupts joint 
account at the Midland Bank belonged to the trustee. The account holders 
had no title to it at law or in equity. The cheques which they drew in favour 
of Mrs Jones were not “void” or “voidable” but in the events which happened 
they were incapable of passing any legal or equitable title.99 
So Mrs Jones held no legal interest and was not a trustee. The case is 
simply one of an owner asserting his rights to his own property. 
It is what Millett LJ said next that makes it impossible to regard the 
reasoning in Jones v Jones as anything but defective: 
                                                     
98 Bankruptcy Act 1914 (4&5 Geo. 5, c. 59) ss37, 38. 
99 (1997) Ch 159, 164. 
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They were not, however, without legal effect, for the bank honoured them. 
The result was to effect the identity of the debtor not the creditor, and to put 
Mrs Jones in possession of funds to which she had no title. A debt formerly 
owed by the Midland Bank , apparently to Messrs F.W.J. Jones  & A.C. Jones, 
but in reality to their trustee, ultimately became a debt owed by Raphaels  
apparently to Mrs Jones but in reality to the trustee.100 
This reasoning is unsupportable. Mrs Jones was never “in 
possession of funds” if by that expression it is meant to indicate the 
contents of her bank account. A bank account cannot be possessed, it is 
an intangible. If this judgment is correct then, by some completely 
unknown means, the contractual arrangement of debtor and creditor, 
entered into between Raphaels and Mrs Jones, has been superseded by 
one between Raphaels and the trustee in bankruptcy. The common law 
knows no such expropriation of personal rights. In fact the expropriation 
appears to have turned a personal right into a proprietary one, since the 
trustee was entitled not only to the £11,700 that Mrs Jones had 
obtained from the partnership account at the Midland Bank, but to the 
entire balance of her account at Raphaels. In addition, Millett LJ went on 
to say that the trustee could have recovered in debt from Raphaels. This 
means that Mrs Jones could not have done so, and so could not have 
given a good receipt for the money to them. Payment to Mrs Jones by 
Raphaels would not therefore have been good against the trustee. As 
Smith points out this would make the position of banks and finance 
houses untenable.101 
                                                     
100 (1997) Ch. 159, 167. 
101 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing (Clarendon Press 1997) 330. 
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Finally, it should be pointed out that Millett LJ’s analysis is 
probably incompatible with Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd.102 That case 
emphasised the point that where a person draws money from a bank 
account in a manner unauthorised by the account holder, but is effective 
as between the account holder and the bank, the withdrawer becomes 
the legal owner of the money. 
Moreover, Jones v Jones also appears to suggest that assets traced 
at common law are immediately vested in the claimant. This would also 
seem to be difficult to square with Lipkin Gorman which appears to 
stand, if anything, for the proposition that such assets are only vested in 
the claimant following some action or other on his part. 
Jones v Jones is not a reliable source of authority for the existence 
of common law tracing.  
Lionel Smith interprets the case as one concerning equitable rights 
and suggests that that the action for money had and received in this 
case was yet another example of that action being utilised for the 
protection of existing equitable rights.103 It is difficult to find any 
justification for that approach in the judgments. As we have seen from 
the quotation cited above, Millett LJ specifically denied that the 
defendant ever had any title of any sort in the money in question. 
Moreover, the action in this case was not one for money had and 
received. It was a direct claim by the claimant to the money that had 
been paid into court by Raphaels. It seems to have been based on a 
                                                     
102 [1991] 3 WLR 10. 
103 L.Smith, ‘Simplifying Claims to Traceable Proceeds’ (2009) LQR 338. 
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common law equivalent of a vindicatio. Which is in itself another reason 
why the outcome is hard to justify.104 
Smith’s analysis also fails to explain how equitable tracing could 
be engaged in this case. It is fundamental to equitable tracing that there 
has been a breach of fiduciary duty with respect to the original asset.105 
The only potential fiduciary in this case is Mr Jones. But Mr Jones was 
not the defendant. Mrs Jones was the defendant, and this was therefore 
a claim against a non-fiduciary. There is some merit in the argument that 
Mrs Jones was liable in equity for the £11,700 on the basis that a 
transactionary link could be established between Mr Jones breach of 
fiduciary duty (if there was one) and Mrs Jones receipt of that money. 
But this would not allow the clamant to get at the profits. There are 
cases where claims to the profits acquired as the traceable proceeds of 
the result of a breach of fiduciary duty have been allowed, but these 
were claims against the fiduciaries themselves. It does not follow that 
such a claim could be maintained against non-fiduciaries.      
Macfarlane, like Smith, suggests that adopting an equitable 
analysis enables one of the most troubling aspects of the case, that the 
claim was not to the value of the monies taken from the account, but to 
the entire profit made by Mrs Jones in her investment activity, to be 
explained. He says that this merely confirms the decision in Foskett v 
McKeown.  
There is, however, a striking difference between the two cases. In 
Foskett v McKeown, Murphy, who was a wrongdoer, took trust money 
                                                     
104 Given that the common law knows nothing in the nature of a vindicatio. The 
common law protects property rights via actions in tort and money had and 
received. See text accompanying notes 36-60 above. 
105 Shalson v Russow (2005) Ch 281. 
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and invested that money in a life policy of which he, or at least his 
estate, was the beneficiary. Whether that fact in itself should have been 
sufficient to allow the trust beneficiaries to trace into a proportionate 
share of the life policy is a matter of considerable controversy, but at 
least the money involved was trust money. In Jones v Jones the money 
transferred from Mr Jones to his wife was not trust money at all. Mrs 
Jones did not take the money as trustee. Macfarlane argues that the 
effect of the decision in Westdeutsche,106 is that Mrs Jones became a 
trustee of the money at the point at which she was aware that it 
belonged to the trustee in bankruptcy.107 However, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s dicta, which are the basis of this explanation, have been 
doubted. In Shalson v Russow,108 Rimer J considered them not to follow 
from the authorities cited by his Lordship in support of them. If Rimer J’s 
analysis is correct, and a thief cannot be held to be a constructive 
trustee of a stolen asset, it must surely follow that an innocent recipient 
can be in no worse a position than the thief. 
There is an alternative interpretation of Jones v Jones, which will 
be discussed in Chapter 6. This is that the case has nothing to do with 
property rights, but is based on unjust enrichment. As we shall see not 
only is this unjustifiable on the basis of both the facts and the outcome, 
it also explains nothing, since unjust enrichment is as inadequate an 
explanation for claims to substitute assets as is the law of property. 
                                                     
106 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council (1996) 
AC 669. 
107 Ibid 715. Per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
108 (2005) Ch 281. 
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Conclusion 
 
The law of property is an unconvincing candidate for the role of 
explaining the basis of rights in substitute assets. Supporters of its 
validity in the role seem to operate at the level of mere assertion. No 
good explanation has been provided as to why a right in asset A should, 
in the absence of a consensual transfer, be allowed to transmit itself to 
asset B merely because of the existence of the original right. Birks is 
correct. This is “the fiction of persistence”.109 
At the level of the substantive law Banque Belge does give undeniable 
support to the idea of the right to trace at common law based on 
proprietary interests in the original asset. But Banque Belge, on 
examination, depends heavily on Taylor v Plumer and where it takes the 
reasoning in that case further it offers little justification for doing so. 
Nothing in Banque Belge even begins to acknowledge the impossibility 
of following money through bank accounts. It is best regarded as a case 
dependent entirely on the peculiar procedural route that it took.  
The judgment in Jones v Jones is difficult to support. It seems to be at 
odds with the decision of the House of Lords in Lipkin Gorman, but, 
aside from that, it provides no explanation of the claimant’s proprietary 
right that is not in conflict with our general understanding of how the 
law of property allocates such rights and how it protects them. 
 
                                                     
109 P Birks Unjust Enrichment) (2nd ed Clarendon Press 2005) 35. 
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Chapter 5 Tracing and the Law of Property – Part 2. 
 
Introduction. 
 
In Chapter 4, the two most significant cases which appear to support the 
proposition that claims to substitute assets at common law are best 
explained as being part of the law of property, were examined.  The lack 
of any theoretical basis for this proposition was argued in the first part 
of the chapter. Upon examination, it was shown that neither of the 
cases looked at were able to overcome the theoretical objections set out 
in that argument. This chapter will look at the remaining authorities, 
which, it has been suggested, support the proposition. They are of less 
significance than those discussed in the last chapter. Some of them are 
dependent upon those authorities as the basis of their outcome. Some 
were decided on entirely different grounds, but contained dicta that 
might be considered relevant. Yet others contain difficulties with 
understanding either the factual basis of the claims, or the judgments 
themselves, and are thus difficulty to classify. Nonetheless, they are all 
of some importance because they could be seen as giving credence to 
the availability of common law claims to substitute assets. Because all of 
the theoretical work was done in the first part of the previous chapter 
this chapter is, therefore, merely a deconstruction of these particular 
cases. 
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Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson and Others.1 
 
Banque Belge,2 examined in detail in the previous chapter, formed the 
basis of some dicta in this case, in which it seems to have been 
suggested that there does exist a right to trace into substitute assets at 
common law. The case, therefore, needs addressing despite the fact 
that, in the event, it was decided on equitable grounds. 
The important facts were, that the chief accountant of the 
claimant company forged a payment order, made out by that company 
in the name of a shipping company, by changing the name on the order 
to Baker Oil Services Ltd. On receipt of the money Baker Oil transferred 
sums into an account of the defendants, a firm of chartered accountants 
acting for Baker Oil, who themselves transferred it to their clients 
account in the Isle of Man. Its ultimate destination from there remained 
uncertain, but it was not suggested that the defendants themselves had 
committed any fraudulent act. 
The claim was one for money had and received. The basis of the 
claim was that the claimant’s bank had made a mistake when paying the 
money to Baker Oil, instead of to the intended shipping company, and 
that the defendants, as recipients of the proceeds of that mistaken 
payment from Baker Oil, were equally liable in money had and received. 
In order to succeed in a claim for money had and received against 
the defendants, the claimants had to show that the defendants had 
received the claimants’ money. They tried to do this by claiming that, at 
common law, the monies received by the defendants were the traceable 
proceeds of the monies paid by the claimant to Baker Oil.   
                                                     
1  (1990) Ch  265. The case went to the Court of Appeal where it was reported at 
(1991) Ch 547. 
2 Banque Belge Pour L’Etranger v Hambrouck (1921) 1 KB 321. 
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There is little doubt that Millett J was of the opinion that authority 
held that it is possible to trace at common law in principle, and that it is 
possible to trace into the contents of un-mixed bank accounts in 
particular. The authorities cited in support of this opinion were Taylor v 
Plumer,3 and Banque Belge. He said: 
The common law has always been able to follow an asset from one recipient 
to another. Its ability to follow an asset into the same hands into a changed 
form was established in Taylor v Plumer..in following the plaintiff’s money 
into an asset purchased exclusively with it, no distinction is drawn between a 
chose in action such as the debt of a bank to its customer and any other 
asset; In re Diplock (1948) Ch 466…But it can only follow a physical asset, 
such as a cheque or its proceeds, from one person to another. It can follow 
money but not a chose in action. Money can be followed at common law into 
and out of a bank account and into the hands of a subsequent transferee, 
provided that it does not cease to be identifiable by being mixed with other 
money in the bank account derived from the same source: Banque Belge 
pour L’Etranger v Hambrouck (1921) 1 KB 321. Applying these principles, the 
plaintiffs claim to follow their money through Baker Oil’s account where it 
was not mixed with any other money and into Jackson & Co’s account at 
Lloyds Bank.4 
In the instant case, however, Millett J held that common law tracing was 
not available to the claimants, on the specific facts of this case, on two 
grounds. 
The first was that the nature of the transaction meant that the 
monies received by the defendants into their bank account had first 
been through the New York clearing system, which therefore meant that 
                                                     
3 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 562. 
4  (1990) Ch 265, 285. 
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they had been mixed with other monies. The common law, said Millett J, 
cannot trace through mixed bank accounts.  
The mechanism of clearing does undoubtedly create a difficulty 
for the orthodox theory of tracing, but the issue of mixing is not it. The 
orthodox theory says that we trace value from asset to asset through an 
uninterrupted series of transactions. But this is not what happens in 
clearing. If A makes a payment order to his bank to credit B with a sum 
of money, his bank will comply with that order by instructing B’s bank to 
credit B’s account with that sum. The difficulty with a theory of tracing 
that says that we trace value from one asset to another is showing how 
the rights that B has now acquired are directly linked with A’s instruction 
to his bank at all. The issue of the mixing of funds in a clearing system is 
irrelevant to the tracing process because it relates entirely to how the 
banks settle debts amongst themselves. A, in our example, is not trying 
to show that the money which B’s bank credited to B was the same 
money that A gave to his bank. In fact, A is not concerned whether the 
two banks ever settle the debt amongst themselves.  
The involvement of the clearing system in this way does little to 
add to the plausibility of the body of doctrine that makes up the 
supposed right to trace at common law. How, it may be asked, can an 
administrative system, set up to enable banks to more easily settle vast 
numbers of transactions between themselves, possibly affect the rights 
of individuals, vis a vis each other, making transfers between their bank 
accounts? As was said in the High Court of Hong Kong, in the case of 
Kwai Hung Realty Co Ltd v Yip Fung Sheung,5 in response to the 
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suggestion that two rights could not ever be connected if clearing 
intervened: 
The point is, after all, a simple one, namely whether the money received by 
Wing Lung under each cheque of the plaintiff is the money of the plaintiff, 
and from the plaintiff. Any layman would have no hesitation in saying yes. 
The fact that, if all of the parties in Agip had banked with the same 
banker different considerations would have applied, makes it even more 
difficult to accept Millett J’s approach, which appears to lack principle as 
well as rationality. The outcome of cases such as this should not depend 
upon the accidental circumstance of which bank the various parties 
happen to bank with. 
The second reason for rejecting the claim was that Millett J said 
that the tracing process was not engaged at all because only physical 
things could be followed, at common law, from one set of hands to 
another.  
In following the plaintiff’s money into an asset purchased exclusively with it, 
no distinction is drawn between a chose in action such as the debt of a bank 
to its customer and any other asset…but it can only follow a physical asset, 
such as a debt or its proceeds, from one person to another.6 
That it is possible to trace at common law through the contents of 
unmixed bank accounts is undeniably a conclusion that some have 
drawn from the outcome of Banque Belge. But to ascribe the right to 
trace the contents of a bank account into the hands of a third party as 
arising because a debt, or its proceeds, constitute a physical asset, is 
curious. It was never suggested in Banque Belge that the defendant had 
received a physical asset. Bankes LJ was content to assume, in that case, 
that the claimant could trace through the contents of the various bank 
                                                     
6 Ibid  285. 
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accounts as if they were physical assets. It was not asserted that they 
were. In fact the contents of a bank account are no more a physical 
thing, capable of being followed, than the “stream of electrons“7which 
the claimant was trying to follow in Agip. It is correct to say that in Agip 
there was nothing to trace. There was merely a series of payment orders 
which resulted in the claimant losing a right and the defendant gaining a 
right. What is incorrect is distinguishing this case from Banque Belge on 
the grounds that that case concerned physical assets. 
Moreover, even if the claimant in Agip had been able to show that 
the defendant did receive the traceable proceeds of his money, he 
would still not have succeeded. Despite being clearly unconvinced by the 
case,8 Millett J said of Banque Belge that: 
I think that at first instance I am bound to regard that case as authority for 
the proposition that an action for money had and received is not limited to 
the immediate recipient or his principal but may be brought against a 
subsequent transferee into whose hands the money can be followed and 
who still retains it.9 
But he doubted that there was any authority for the proposition that a 
claim in money had and received could lie, in the absence of fraud, 
against an indirect recipient of that money who no longer had it in his 
possession. Again, however, this is questionable reasoning because the 
defendant in Banque Belge did not have any money in her possession. 
All that she had was a chose in action representing the balance on her 
account with the bank. In addition, there is no particular reason why the 
                                                     
7 P. Millett, ‘Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud’ (1991) 107 LQR 71, 73. 
8 He said of it when writing extra-judicially that it was “another case which is largely 
what one chooses to make of it” P. Millett, ‘Tracing the Proceeds of Fraud’ (1991) 
LQR 71. 
9  (1990) Ch 265, 285. 
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issue of possession matters. Money had and received is a personal claim. 
The question of what the recipient did with the money that he received 
is irrelevant. 
 Ultimately there is not much in Millet J’s dicta to support the idea 
that it is possible to trace at common law. His general acceptance of the 
idea is firmly based on his (mis)understanding of Taylor v Plumer and his 
comments on the ability of the common law to trace into unmixed bank 
accounts, which he derives from Banque Belge, are, at best, obiter, since 
he is clearly of the opinion that, in this case, the monies went through a 
mixed account. At worst the comments are entirely unhelpful because 
he seems to think that following money through bank accounts can be 
equated with following physical objects.  
Armstrong DLW v Winnington Netorks Ltd.10 
 
This case is of considerable interest because it may be thought of as 
sitting at the boundaries of the laws of property, unjust enrichment, 
tracing, restitution and equity. It demonstrates many of the areas of 
confusion that sit along those boundaries. 
Moreover, in its discussion of common law claims to substitute 
assets, it reflects exactly the analytical division that is being examined in 
this part of the work, that is the differing explanations of tracing as being 
either part of the law of property or as a response to unjust enrichment. 
  In addition, it also shows how the uncertainties surrounding the 
proper explanations of Lipkin Gorman,11 and Jones v Jones,12 have led a 
subsequent court to cite them as authorities in a case in which they have 
                                                     
10 (2013) Ch 156. 
11 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd (1991) 2 AC 548.  
12 Trustee of the Property of FC Jones & Sons (A Firm) v Jones (1997) Ch 159. 
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nothing to say and for propositions for which they undoubtedly do not 
stand.  
The background is that the claimant was a company registered in 
Germany, which, as a result of its manufacturing process, produced 
emissions of carbon dioxide. As a result, it was required to participate in 
the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme.13 This scheme required 
producers of carbon emissions to purchase EU allowances (EUAs). These 
allowances were individually numbered and recorded in each member 
state, in a registry. Companies were allowed to trade in these 
allowances (i.e. to buy and sell them) provided that at the end of each 
year they had sufficient EUAs to cover their emissions. Moreover, 
companies that did not themselves emit carbon were also permitted to 
trade in the EUAs.  
Although the precise facts of the case were somewhat 
complicated they can be reduced to a fairly simple core. As a result of a 
fraud (not perpetrated by the defendant) a quantity of EUAs was 
transferred, without the authority of the claimant, from the claimant to 
the defendant. The defendant sold the EUAs on to a third party.  
The claimant put forward three alternative claims. The basis of at 
least one of them, the proprietary restitutionary claim, was uncertain. It 
would also seem that the claims were mutually exclusive, and depended 
on how the court saw the facts of the case.  
First, the claimant put forward what the judge described as a 
“restitutionary proprietary claim”.14 The essence of this claim was that 
the EUAs at all times remained the property of the claimant and that, as 
                                                     
13 Pursuant to European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/87/EC. 
14 (2013)Ch 156, 159. 
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a result of the decisions in Lipkin Gorman, Jones v Jones and Foskett v 
McKeown,15 the claimant could trace from the EUAs into the monies 
received by the defendant for their onward sale. This analysis, which 
was accepted by the judge in theory but was rejected by him on the 
facts, tells us why the claimant has a claim, but nothing about what that 
claim is. It will be recalled that Jones v Jones did not strictly involve a 
claim at all. A bank paid money into court and asked the court to decide 
who could give it a good receipt for that money. Lipkin Gorman was a 
personal claim for money had and received and Foskett v Mckeown, at 
its heart, concerned a defaulting trustee. It appears, in Armstrong, that 
the claimant was arguing for a personal remedy only, but it is difficult to 
tell how the judge regarded the claim, since he used very unspecific 
language in describing it, and the expression “proprietary restitutionary 
claim” suggests something rather more than a personal claim. 
The second claim put forward was one in unjust enrichment. This 
will be looked at in more detail in the next chapter. This also, apparently, 
relied on Lipkin Gorman, although a different understanding of that case 
from the one relied on for the purposes of the first claim. It depended 
on the EUAs in the defendant’s account no longer being the legal 
property of the claimant. The judge appeared, at one stage, to have 
rejected this claim on the basis that, on the facts, the defendant could 
not be said to have been enriched at all, but this is uncertain. 
The third claim, and the one that won the day, was a claim that 
the defendant received property, the EUAs, subject to a constructive 
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trust in favour of the claimant and as a result was liable to the claimant 
in knowing receipt.  
It is suggested that the claimant’s formulation of these claims 
represents a very considerable over-complication. If title to the EUAs 
passed to the fraudster then the claimant had to ground its claim in 
equity. If title to them remained with the claimant the claim was a 
simple one in money had and received, without any recourse to 
questions of tracing, or proprietary restitution. What seems to have 
been overlooked is that the point that, because no common law action 
appears to be available against the defendant for the receipt of the EUAs 
themselves, that does not mean that no common law action is available 
against them for the receipt of monies for their onward sale. 
First it is necessary to look at the nature of the property 
concerned. 
The EUAs. 
 
A considerable amount of space was taken up in the judgment in 
deciding exactly what type of property interest is created by an EUA. 
Whatever type of interest it is, it certainly appears to be one which is 
capable of being legally owned and transferred16 although not, 
apparently, one capable of protection by the law of conversion.17   
Ultimately it was decided that the property was intangible property but 
probably not a chose in action, because it could not be claimed or 
enforced by action. The expression “other intangible” was used by the 
judge as a possible description of its nature.18   
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17 Ibid. 
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The problem with identifying the property as an “other intangible” 
is that this says nothing about how rights in that property can be 
protected or vindicated. Indeed, counsel for the defendant suggested, 
convincingly it is submitted, that such property was not protected by 
English law at all. The Deputy Judge clearly felt that, since the EUAs 
constituted property, rights in them must be protected in some way, and 
the court’s task was to find that way. The judge held that the claimants 
were basing their claim on a pre-existing, legal, property right. Thus he 
held that the EUAs in the possession of the defendant were the legal 
property of the claimant, and could be followed by the claimant from 
the German registry, through the fraudster, and then into the 
defendant’s registry. The EUAs were the same EUAs throughout. This, of 
course, has nothing to do with tracing. It is a matter of following. There 
remains the difficulty, however, that, even after following the EUAs into 
the hands of the defendant, formulating a claim in respect of them is not 
easy. 
Conversion will not lie in the case of intangible property, since the 
essence of the tort is the claimant’s right to immediate possession, and 
intangible property cannot be possessed.19 There appears to be no 
common law vindicatio which would enable the court to simply order 
the return of intangible property in specie to the claimant.  Jones v Jones 
would not apply here because in that case the court was not ordering 
one party to give up property to another, it was deciding who owned 
property that had been placed into court by a third party. In any case the 
notion that Jones v Jones involved a vindicatio is another argument 
against the reasoning in that case. Finally, a claim in unjust enrichment 
                                                     
19 OBG Ltd v Allan (2008) 1 AC 1. 
 174 
appears to be barred by the fact that, the claimant having retained title 
to the property, the defendant had not been enriched by its receipt.  
Nonetheless, unjust enrichment may be the most fruitful area to explore 
here. The reason that a defendant is not enriched by the receipt of 
tangible property to which the claimant retains title is that he has gained 
nothing. He is merely in possession of something to which the claimant 
has a prior and better right, and, importantly the claimant is able to 
enforce that right against him. In the case of EUAs this is not the case. 
The claimant appears to have no alternative mechanism for enforcing his 
rights and it is therefore, tentatively, suggested that a defendant who 
receives an EUA to which the claimant has retained title may be 
enriched because he appears to have no requirement to account for it to 
the claimant. 
However, the question of what claim the claimant may have had 
in respect of the EUAs was largely irrelevant, because the assets were 
disposed of by the defendant immediately on receipt. The issue 
therefore became could the claimant make any claim in respect of the 
monies received by the defendant for the onward sale of the EUAs? 
This is not the same question as how the claimant could vindicate 
their rights in the EUAs themselves. It by no means follows that, simply 
because there might have been no action available to the claimant in 
respect of its rights in the EUAs themselves, there is also no action 
available in respect of the monies received for their sale. The lack of 
availability of an action in conversion of the EUAs, for example, does not 
mean that title to the EUAs did not remain in the hands of the claimant, 
and that any disposal of them without the authority of the claimant 
could not lead to the claimant being able to formulate claims in respect 
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of the proceeds. As was explained above this possibility was put forward 
in three different ways. 
The Equitable Claim 
 
In the event it was this claim which succeeded. The judge found that the 
fraudster had obtained “some form of de facto legal title to the EUAs”,20 
sufficient to enable him to hold them in trust for the claimant. He then 
went on to find that the defendant had the requisite knowledge that the 
EUAs were trust assets, for a successful claim to be brought against it in 
knowing receipt. 
This was a somewhat problematic conclusion, but its problems are 
only tangentially related to this work. Suffice it to say that, as a result of 
it, all of the dicta on common law claims were essentially obiter, and 
that, on that basis alone, they stand as doubtful authority in respect of 
those claims. 
The common law issues arose because the judge was himself in 
some doubt as to the correctness of his formulation of the claim as an 
equitable one, and he therefore took the time to examine what the 
position would have been if no equitable claim could be shown to have 
been available. This he divided into two distinct possibilities. First that 
the claimant had a “restitutionary proprietary” claim and second that he 
had one in unjust enrichment. 
The Restitutionary Proprietary Claim. 
 
The nature of a restitutionary proprietary claim will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter 6. It suffices here to say that, as generally 
understood, it involves the claimant asserting a claim to a particular item 
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of property in the defendant’s hands. There is considerable controversy 
as to the circumstances in which such a claim can succeed, but unless 
Jones v Jones can be cited to the contrary, all successful claims have 
been entirely equitable in nature. 
 But that is not how the judge in Armstrong seems to have 
understood the meaning of the expression. It is certainly true that use of 
the term proprietary is often adopted in a looser sense, to indicate that 
the claim is in respect of property, but is not to that property. Thus, a 
claim in conversion may be thought of as a proprietary claim because 
the essence of the claim is that the claimant is asserting certain rights in 
an item of property that is in the hands of, or has been through the 
hands of, the defendant. But the claim itself is a simple money claim for 
compensation. In the case of conversion the compensation usually takes 
the form of damages. Money had and received would seem to be the 
prime example of a claim for restitution where the basis of the claim is 
that the defendant has received money belonging to the claimant. But, 
again, the claim is not to any particular item of money in the defendant’s 
hands. It can be satisfied by the defendant paying any money, as long as 
it is the correct amount, to the claimant. In reading the judgment, it 
would seem that this is what the judge had in mind when he described 
the claim as being a restitutionary proprietary claim, since it is at no 
point suggested that the claimant is making a claim with respect to any 
particular money in the possession of the defendant. 
But if this is the case then all of the judge’s references to tracing 
and to Lipkin Gorman and Jones v Jones are irrelevant. Neither case 
provides any authority that is of any assistance in the disposal of 
Armstrong argued as a personal claim.  
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It again needs to be borne in mind that the claim in Armstrong 
was not in respect of the EUAs themselves but concerned the monies 
received for their onward sale. 
In order to show the irrelevance of Lipkin Gorman to this situation 
it is necessary to quickly summarise the facts of that case, which will be 
looked at in considerable detail in the next chapter. 
Norman Cass was a salaried partner in the firm of the appellant 
solicitors. In order to fund a gambling addiction he began drawing on the 
proceeds of the appellant firm’s client account, of which he was a 
signatory. He withdrew both cash and sums of money by way of 
banker’s draft. The money was spent at a casino (the Playboy Club) then 
in the ownership of the respondents. The procedure was that Cass 
exchanged the cash or drafts for chips which enabled him to both 
gamble at the casino tables and also to purchase refreshments within 
the confines of the club. Unused chips could be exchanged back for cash. 
As is usually the way with such things Cass was both a winner and a loser 
at the tables but the overall effect of his gambling was to produce very 
substantial losses. Because Cass was constantly replacing parts of his 
drawings back into the client’s account the court found it difficult to 
determine the net sum of money that had been withdrawn but it was 
agreed that it could not have been less than £220,000.  
As a result of the then law relating to gambling the club had not 
given good consideration for the receipt of the monies from Cass. 
The claim was one for money had and received, but the crucial 
question, and the only reason that the issue of tracing arose at all, was 
who owned the money with which Cass had gambled.  
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The House of Lords held that the money belonged to the firm 
because it was the traceable proceeds of the money originally 
misappropriated by Cass. It will be explained in the next chapter why 
this was an erroneous decision, but for present purposes the important 
point is that it has nothing to do with the situation in Armstrong.  The 
judge in Armstrong conceived of Lipkin Gorman as a case involving the 
question “if B steals A’s property and sells it to C does A have a claim 
against C for the property or its value”.21 But as Birks pointed out this is 
not a possible characterisation of the issue in that case.22 
What it was about was whether A had given C, B’s money or his 
own. Once it was decided that, using the process of tracing, it was B’s 
money then everything else followed as a matter of the general law of 
money had and received.  
In Armstrong this issue did not arise. On the judge’s alternative 
assumption, that title to the EUAs lay with the claimants at all times, 
there was nothing to trace unless the claim was to specific monies in the 
hands of the defendants, which it was not. All of the references to Lipkin 
Gorman as authority for the right to trace through intangible property 
rights, even if they were correct, have no relevance to Armstrong 
because in Armstrong the defendant received monies for the sale of the 
claimant’s property and the claimant merely asked the court for a 
money judgment to its value. This is a straightforward case of money 
had and received. It has nothing to do with tracing. 
The judge did not appear to see it that way. He said: 
Mr Joffe however submits that, whatever the position as regards money, 
there is no authority for there being such a basis of claim (or cause of action) 
                                                     
21 Ibid 168. 
22 P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2nd edn Clarendon Press 2005) 95. 
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where the asset in respect of which the claimant brings his claim is a chose in 
action or other intangible property. In such a case he submits there is no 
identifiable “cause of action” known to law…there is, he submits no warrant 
for extending the law to cover such a cause of action, particularly in the light 
of the frim view of the majority in the House of Lords in OGB Ltd v Allen23 
rejecting the possibility of there being a common law claim for conversion of 
a chose in action.24 
He then went on to say: 
I do not agree with this submission. In my judgment, there is no reason why, 
in an appropriate case, a claimant does not have a personal claim at law to 
vindicate his legal proprietary rights in respect of a chose in action or other 
form of intangible property…I do not accept that the proprietary 
restitutionary claim has to be characterised as, or brought in the form of, an 
action for money had and received. It is no longer necessary to fit any 
particular claim into any particular “form” of action.25 
But all of this appears to confuse the distinction between an action in 
respect of the EUAs themselves and one for the proceeds of their 
onward sale. Either the law never allows a claim where the basis of the 
claim is the ownership of an intangible asset, in which event the 
Armstrong claimant must fail, or it does, in which case the claim in this 
instance is for money had and received. 
Moreover, the last four lines quoted above are confusing. It is 
doubtless true that a claim no longer has to fit any form of action, but it 
has to disclose rights that the law acknowledges that the claimant 
possesses. In this case the right is to the value of monies received for the 
sale of property belonging to the claimant. Which, whatever one calls it, 
amounts to a personal claim for money had and received.  
                                                     
23 (2008) AC 1. 
24 (2013) Ch 156, 183. 
25 Ibid. 
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If anything, Jones v Jones is even less relevant than Lipkin Gorman. 
In Jones v Jones, as with Lipkin Gorman, tracing was utilised to 
demonstrate that the monies which were at the heart of the case 
belonged to the claimant. Unlike in Lipkin Gorman the matter concerned 
specific monies, and who had what rights in those monies. It was about 
rights in substitute assets, which Armstrong was not. Moreover, it does 
not establish the existence of a “proprietary restitutionary claim” 
because it did not involve a claim. An interpleading bank asked the court 
which of two parties could give it a good receipt for monies held in an 
account at that bank. The court had to give an answer. It did not have 
the option of saying that it did not know. Jones v Jones does not, as 
Armstrong suggests, extend Lipkin Gorman from the realms of personal 
claims to that of claims to rights in specific property. But even if it did 
that would not be relevant to Armstrong, because Armstrong was a 
personal claim. 
The judge also cited Foskett v McKeown in support of his 
argument for the existence of a common law proprietary restitutionary 
claim. He said: 
Whilst it is the case that on the facts the claimants were seeking to enforce 
their equitable property rights (arising under the pre-existing trust of their 
purchase moneys) it seems to me there is no reason why the distinction 
drawn by Lord Millett between the two types of action (that is between 
actions in unjust enrichment and actions to vindicate property rights) does 
not apply with equal force where the claimant is seeking to enforce his 
subsisting legal title to property.26 
The problem with this reasoning will be examined in greater detail in 
Chapter 7 but, in brief, it is that there is an explanation as to why a 
                                                     
26 Ibid 182. 
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person who is asserting equitable property rights can demand the return 
of property subject to those rights in specie, where that property has 
been transferred without authority by his fiduciary. That reason is that a 
fiduciary may not acquire rights arising from the conduct of his fiduciary 
duties27. No such rule arises in the absence of a fiduciary relationship 
and there is no satisfactory alternative basis on which an equivalent 
common law requirement could be founded. Simply asserting that it 
somehow follows from the law of property is insufficient without an 
indication as to why that should be the case. Foskett v McKeown is not 
about common law rights at all. 
Littlewood v Williams.28 
 
According to Calnan,29 this case gives “some credence to the idea that it 
is possible to trace into an substitute asset at common law”. It is difficult 
to see how this may be so, and in any event Calnan himself goes on to 
reject the idea,30 but the case does warrant a brief examination.  
The facts were that the sexton of a church was in the custom of 
receiving money from the executors of deceased persons who did not 
live within the parish of Hendon but expressed a wished to be buried 
there. Half of this money had traditionally been paid over to the vicar of 
the parish and half to the churchwardens for the benefit of the poor. On 
appointment, the defendant vicar told the sexton that he was in future 
to hand the entire proceeds over to him. The churchwardens sued the 
vicar for half of the proceeds as money had and received to their use. 
                                                     
27 Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61, 25 ER 223. 
28 (1815) 6 Taunt 277. 
29 R. Calnan, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency, (OUP 2010) 7.117. 
30 Ibid 7.120. 
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A major problem with citing this case as authority for anything is 
that we do not know enough of the facts. Nothing, however, leads to the 
implication that the outcome, which was a judgment for the 
churchwardens, depended on questions of the common law and 
substituted assets. 
There would seem to be two possibilities concerning title to the 
money delivered to the sexton. The first is that the executors knew 
nothing of the vicar and the churchwardens and passed the money to 
the sexton intending him to have legal title to it. If this were the case 
then legal title would indeed have passed to him. Undoubtedly he would 
have held the money in trust for either the vicar, or the churchwardens, 
or both, depending upon the correct understanding of the agreement 
between the various parties, but this is an equitable matter and has 
nothing to do with the common law, except, in the sense of the common 
law using the action for money had and received to prevent the 
unnecessary replication of actions where the claimant already possesses 
an equitable right to the money in question in the form of a trust. 
The second possibility is that the executors did know of the 
arrangement between the vicar and the churchwardens and only gave 
the money to the sexton as stakeholder. They therefore intended legal 
title to pass to whomsoever it might be that they so intended. If they 
intended legal title to pass to the vicar then the obvious action for the 
churchwardens to undertake would have been against the executors 
themselves for the payment of their portion. They would also 
presumably have an action against the vicar for money had and 
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received31 and possibly they could establish that the vicar held their 
portion in trust. Whatever would have been the case it has nothing to do 
with common law tracing. 
Gibbs CJ appears to have come to the conclusion that the money 
was paid to the sexton as stakeholder to both the vicar and 
churchwardens in equal proportion. They therefore each had legal title 
to their respective portion. He said that: 
I am of the opinion that the moiety received by the sexton, which used to be 
received for the use of the churchwardens, was received specifically for 
them, and that the money in the custody of the sexton was the money of the 
churchwardens, and that when the vicar prevailed on him to pay over that 
money, he was prevailing on him to pay over the money of the 
churchwardens and therefore the churchwardens had a right to recover it 
back from him… 32 
His Lordship may, or may not have been correct on the facts. There is 
nothing in the report to back up this interpretation but that cannot be 
conclusive. But there is no suggestion in the judgment that the 
churchwardens are entitled to any particular money. It looks like a 
personal claim only. Admittedly his Lordship says that “the money in the 
custody of the sexton was the money of the churchwardens” but to 
establish a general right to common law claims to substitute assets from 
such scanty detail is not possible. 
There is nothing in the report that tells us what the sexton did 
with the money. There is no suggestion, however, that he paid the 
money into any bank account before paying it over to the vicar. What he 
appears to have done is to mix money belonging to the vicar with money 
                                                     
31 This might be an example of Birksian interceptive subtraction. See P. Birks, Unjust 
Enrichment, (2nd edn Clarendon Press 2005) 75-78. 
32 (1815) 6 Taunt 277, 282. 
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belonging to the churchwardens and paid those monies to the vicar. But 
this has nothing to do with substitute assets. It is about following not 
tracing. It looks like those cases of following into a physical mixture 
discussed in Part 1.33 This would have been an identical case had the 
asset in question been ears of corn rather than money. As we saw in 
part there are different views on how such cases should be dealt with 
but the outcome here is within the range detailed there. 
Branwhite v Worcester Works Finance34 
 
This is a far from convincing case. It is included here because it is, 
according to one author, a “key case”35 indicating that a legal tracing 
claim can be brought against a third party in relation to a substitute 
asset, although this designation is somewhat devalued by his later saying 
that as an authority on common law tracing it “leaves a lot to be 
desired” and that “it is difficult to establish from it any general principle 
of tracing at law”. 
The judgment comes from the House of Lords. The facts were that 
the appellant owned a Talbot motor car and wished to purchase a Rapier 
as a replacement. He agreed a purchase price of £430 with the dealer 
who was selling the Rapier, the price being made up of £130 in part 
exchange for the Talbot and £300 to be funded by the appellant entering 
into a hire purchase agreement with the respondent finance company. 
The appellant signed the hire purchase forms in blank and the dealer 
substituted higher figures into the paperwork resulting in the 
respondents purchasing the car for a considerably higher figure. The 
                                                     
33 See Chapter 1. In particular the text accompanying footnotes 23-37. 
34 (1969) 1 AC 552. 
35 R. Calnan, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency, (OUP 2010) 7.104. 
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£130 was still treated as an initial payment and was deducted by the 
respondent from the money paid to the dealer. On discovering that his 
repayments were higher than expected the appellant made no 
payments under the terms of the agreement and the respondents 
repossessed the Rapier. The appellant in these proceedings sought the 
return from the finance company of £130. 
On the face of it this is a reasonably straightforward agency case. 
The respondents had received the £130, and were liable to repay it, 
because the dealer had effectively received it on their behalf as their 
agent. The majority of the House of Lords, however, refused to take this 
route, saying that a dealer who holds the paperwork of a finance 
company in such circumstances is not acting as an agent for that 
company, but as a principal on his own behalf. It is hard to justify such a 
conclusion but nonetheless it shut off the most obvious route to the 
appellant’s recovery of his money. 
Since the appellant could not show that the £130 was received by 
the dealer as agent for the respondent, he was left to claim that the 
respondent actually received that £130 from the dealer and that the 
money paid was at that time the appellant’s money. It is noteworthy 
that neither the word “trace”, nor the word “follow” occurred once in 
any of their Lordship’s judgments. The case proceeded on the basis of a 
concession by counsel for the respondent that the £130 should be 
treated as if the dealer had made an actual payment of that amount to 
the respondent. But he did not of course. He merely deducted it from 
the amount that the respondent owed him from the car.  
The problem with treating this as a tracing case is that there are 
no assets the rights to which can be the subject of a tracing exercise. The 
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appellant sold his car to the dealer for £130. He did not give the dealer 
£130, he created a liability in the dealer to give him something in return 
for that £130.36 That is not an asset which the dealer can pass on to the 
respondent. The respondent received nothing belonging to the appellant 
and nothing that could be the subject of a tracing exercise. The notion 
that the respondent did receive the appellant’s money was a fiction. 
Whether that fiction did or did not produce a desirable outcome is not 
relevant for our purposes. It is taking the fiction too far, however, to 
suggest that the rights to fictional proceeds can be traced through a 
fictional transaction. This case has nothing to do with common law 
tracing. 
Re Leslie Engineers.37 
 
This is yet another case that is not easy to understand, but it does not 
seem to have enough substance to support any principle of tracing at 
common law. 
Following the presentation of a winding up petition against the 
company a director of that company arranged two payments to a 
creditor. The first was for £250 and was effected by the director making 
a company cheque out to cash, cashing it himself at the bank, and then 
taking that cash to the post office where he purchased 5 money orders 
for £50 each, which he sent to the creditor. The second was for £800. In 
this case the director sent the creditor a cheque for £800 drawn on his 
personal account. That account was overdrawn and the cheque was 
ordered to be re-presented. By the time that it was re-presented the 
director had paid into his own account a cheque drawn on the company 
                                                     
36 See the analysis in Part 1 concerning backward tracing for a similar analysis. 
37 (1976) 1 WLR 292. 
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for an amount that both paid the creditor and cleared his overdraft. 
Under the then current insolvency provisions a compulsory winding up 
commenced at the date of the presentation of the petition.38  
By s227 of the Companies Act 1948, any dispositions of the 
property of the company made after the commencement of the winding 
up are void unless subsequently validated by the court. The issue, on the 
liquidator’s claim, was therefore whether either transaction could be 
termed a disposition of the company’s property. 
As far as the £250 was concerned, Oliver J stated that: 
I therefore feel no difficulty – and I may add no doubt – about the initial 
payment of £250. The bank notes received from the bank were as much the 
company’s property, and identifiable as such, as were the money’s in the 
account…there was throughout a clearly identifiable property of the 
company which passed directly from the company’s hands…to those of the 
respondents: see for instance Taylor v Plumer…that disposition was, in my 
judgment, clearly invalidated by the section unless and until this court 
decides otherwise.39 
On the face of it the obvious defect in these dicta is their reliance on 
Taylor v Plumer. However, this may not be the case. Oliver J says that 
the money orders in the hands of the creditor were the property of the 
company, but he does not say what the nature of the property rights 
were.  He may well have had in mind the possibility that the company 
had a beneficial interest in the money orders. Whether this would be a 
sustainable argument or not does not matter for our purposes. The 
property right in question cannot have been a legal right. When the post 
office gave the director the money orders in return for the cash they 
                                                     
38 Insolvency Act 1986, ss127 and 129. 
39 (1976) 1 WLR 292, 297. 
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undoubtedly intended to transfer legal title to him, and to nobody else. 
The money orders received by the creditor were thus the legal property 
of the director, not of the company.  
 The judge saw the £800 payment somewhat differently. He 
disallowed the liquidator’s claim on the grounds that, since the claim 
was not to the payment by the bank of the money to the director but 
was for the payment of the money from the director’s bank account to 
the creditor, it did not constitute a disposition of the company’s 
property for the purposes of s227. Despite commentary to the 
contrary40 it is possible to see some logic in Oliver J’s decision. If it were 
based on a right to trace at common law then it would make sense, 
because the alleged right to trace at common law, supposedly 
demonstrated in Taylor v Plumer,41 ceased when the means of 
identification failed and, in respect of the second payment the placing of 
the money into the director’s bank account, and the resultant mixing of 
funds would, on orthodox tracing theory, have resulted in the means of 
identification failing. 
 Those who consider that the property right identified by Oliver J 
with respect to the £250 was an equitable right maintain that exactly the 
same analysis should have applied to the £800, and to that extent the 
case was wrongly decided.42 
 If, however, it was a legal right that Oliver J had in mind then the 
problem, once again, becomes that the only authority cited by the judge 
for the availability of such a right is Taylor v Plumer, and he engages in 
                                                     
40 R. Calnan, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency, (OUP 2010) 7.96. 
41 (1815) 3 M&S 562. 
42 R. Calnan, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency, (OUP 2010) 7.97. 
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no alternative, independent, reasoning which would explain how such a 
right arises.  
 Re Leslie Engineers is not a convincing authority for the existence 
of a right to trace at common law. It may be that it is best seen as a 
technical decision on the meaning of s227 of the 1948 Act. 
Conclusion. 
 
As was said in the introduction to this chapter none of the cases 
discussed here represent any threat to the proposition that it is not 
possible to make a claim to a substitute asset at common law. Agip is 
not uncommonly cited as establishing the availability of such claims but 
it was a case decided on equitable grounds and the dicta within it 
concerning common law claims are susceptible to all of the problems 
contained in a reliance on Taylor v Plumer and Banque Belge. Armstrong, 
when properly understood has nothing to do with tracing at all. The 
remaining cases never address questions of substitute assets directly. In 
respect of the earlier ones there are too many gaps in our knowledge of 
the facts for them to represent proper authorities. Of the later ones 
Branwhite cannot be about tracing because there is no asset capable of 
being traced and Leslie Engineers is about equitable tracing, if it is about 
tracing at all. Which is far from certain.  
 It should be borne in mind that the reason that these cases have 
been discussed here is because they have been put forward by others as 
possibly supporting the notion of common law rights to make claims to 
substitute assets. They have not been chosen here because they are 
relatively simple to dismiss as authorities for that notion. They have 
been discussed because they are all that there is. There is a great paucity 
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of direct authority on the subject. Cases that appear to rely solely on 
common law rights are rare. Together with the claims discussed in the 
previous 2 chapters, and the ones discussed under the heading of unjust 
enrichment in the next, these cases represent almost the entirety of 
those cases which have been put forward in defence of the availability of 
common law claims. 
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Chapter 6 Unjust Enrichment and Claims to Substitute Assets 
 
Introduction. 
 
Having dismissed the notion that common law claims to substitute 
assets can have anything to do with rights that the claimant may have 
had in the original asset, it is now necessary to consider the idea that 
such claims arise as a response to, or in order to prevent, the unjust 
enrichment of the defendant at the claimant’s expense. 
It is now generally accepted, by both the courts1 and academic 
commentators2 that an unjust enrichment claimant must show that: 
a) The defendant has been enriched; 
b) That the enrichment was at the expense of the claimant; and 
c) That the enrichment was unjust.  
Unjust enrichment supposedly explains rights in substitute assets by 
showing that, as a result of the defendant’s interference with the 
claimant’s rights in the original asset, he will be unjustly enriched at the 
claimant’s expense, unless the claimant is able to make a claim to a new 
right in a substitute. The most important difference between the law of 
property and the law of unjust enrichment as explanations of substitute 
assets becomes, therefore, immediately apparent. Law of property 
                                                     
1 Banque Financiere de la Cite v Parc (Battersea) Ltd (1999) 1 AC 221 HL; Portman 
Building Society v Hamlyn Taylor Neck (1998) 4 All ER (2002) (CA); Rowe v Vale of 
White Horse DC (2003) 1 Lloyds Rep 418; McDonald v Coys of Kensington (2004) 
EWCA Civ 47. 
2 There are too many to mention but important ones are P. Birks, An Introduction to 
the Law of Restitution, (revised edn Clarendon Press 1989); G. Virgo, The Principles of 
the Law of Restitution (OUP 1999) 9; A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution,( 3rd edn 
Oxford 2012) 27; A. Burrows Assisted By An Advisory Group of Academics, Judges 
and Practitioners, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment, (Oxford 
2012) 3-4; Lord Goff of Chievely and G. Jones, The Law of Restitution,(6th edn Sweet 
and Maxwell, 2002). 
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explanations favour the notion of the transmission of rights from the 
one asset to the other. Unjust enrichment explanations reject this 
possibility in favour of explaining the rights in the substitute as new 
rights created to reverse, or prevent, an injustice.  
Tracing and the Institutional Structure of Unjust Enrichment Law. 
 
The major difficulty with accepting the proposition that tracing is a 
response to unjust enrichment is that this does not fit in with the way 
that the substantive law of unjust enrichment law has been developed. 
In order to ease the complications of the following argument two 
different scenarios will form the centrepiece of the discussion. These 
scenarios are related but dissimilar in one significant way. It will be 
argued that the dissimilarity is insufficient, however, to enable differing 
conclusions in respect of them. 
The first scenario is the familiar one whereby A steals B’s bracelet 
and then swaps it for C’s watch. 
In the second scenario A steals £100 from B and with the process 
purchases a watch from C, an innocent seller. 
Although for the purposes of this section it is only the issue of 
rights in the watch in A’s hands that is critical, it is also instructive to 
consider the matter of rights in the bracelet and the £100. 
The structure of the law of unjust enrichment, a matter of 
considerable controversy, adopted for the purposes of this section will 
be that outlined above. Forgetting any available defences, the claimant 
is required to show a) that the defendant has been enriched, b) at the 
expense of the claimant, c) in circumstances where the law considers 
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that enrichment to be unjust. Each of these requirements, in so far as 
they affect our examples, will be dealt with in turn. 
Enrichment. 
 
The first thing that the claimant has to show is that the defendant has 
been enriched at all. 
With respect to the original assets (the bracelet and the £100) it is 
suggested that this cannot, one possibility aside, be made out.  
The defendant is not enriched by the receipt of the original asset, 
because legal title to that asset remains at all times with the claimant.3 If 
one were to take a snap shot of the defendant’s personal balance sheet 
one would see that he is in possession of a bracelet, or of £100, but, that 
at the same time, he has a liability to the claimant in respect of the exact 
same item or amount. The defendant has acquired no rights in respect 
of the stolen property. 
It is true, of course, that the defendant has gained the capacity to 
use both the bracelet (he can wear it for example) and the £100, but this 
is a very different issue. Any claim that the claimant may have in respect 
of the use of the asset in question, is based on the wrong of interference 
with the claimant’s property rights.4 Such a claim may be restitutionary, 
that is damages may, under certain circumstances, be assessed on the 
basis of the defendant’s gain rather than the claimant’s loss, but the 
restitutionary award has nothing to do with the law of autonomous 
unjust enrichment. It is a matter of disgorgement for wrongs. 
                                                     
3 Portman Building Society v Hamlyn Taylor Neck (1998) PNLR 664; Trustee of the 
Property of FC Jones & Sons (A Firm) v Jones (1997) Ch 159; A. Tettenborn, 
‘Restitution of Property You Do Own Anyway’ in A. Hudson (Ed), New Perspectives on 
Property Law, Obligations and Restitution (Cavendish2004) 223. 
4 R. Grantham and C. Rickett, ‘Disgorgement for Unjust Enrichment’ (2003) CLJ 159. 
Although c/f  P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, (2nd edn Clarendon Press 2005) 79. 
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For Peter Birks this line of argument made no sense. Speaking of 
the notion that a person in possession of another’s property has not 
been enriched he said: 
Although it is presented as though it (the argument that there has been no 
enrichment) were logically irresistible the logic is the logic of technicality. It 
collapses as soon as the invitation is accepted to look beyond technicality and 
consider factual reality instead. If you find my money it no doubt stays my 
money, and it is true that, technically, it forms no part of your estate. The 
factual reality is that you have the spending power and I do not…The 
technical truth is that the money is still mine does not necessitate the 
conclusion that you are not enriched.5 
Birks seems to be saying that the law concerns itself with “factual” 
rather than “technical” enrichments. One would expect such a counter-
intuitive assumption to be backed up by authority. But no authority is 
forthcoming. On the face of it Birks’s assumption makes little sense. For 
the purposes of the law of unjust enrichment there is a legal 
understanding of enrichment. That understanding is “technical” because 
it treats the term enrichment in a specialised manner. It is uncertain 
where these references to factual realities are supposed to be taking us. 
In any case, such authority as there is goes the other way. In Esso 
Petroleum Company Ltd v Hall Russell & Co Ltd, The Esso Bernicia,6 Esso 
paid money to certain crofters pursuant to a voluntary agreement, 
following the spillage of oil from one of its tankers. It subsequently 
transpired that responsibility for the spill lay with the defendant 
designers poor construction of a tug that had been in attendance during 
                                                     
5 P. Birks, ‘Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths’ (1997) New Zealand 
Law Review 623, 654-655.  
6 (1989) AC 643. 
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the docking of the tanker. Esso claimed reimbursement of the money 
that it had paid to the crofters from the defendants. 
There can be no question that the defendants had been factually 
benefitted. The crofters, as a result of Esso’s payment, were no longer in 
a position to sue them. This did not help Esso at all. Although the 
crofters, factually, could not make a claim (because they had sustained 
no loss) technically the arrangement with Esso did not have the effect of 
discharging the defendant’s liability. Thus Esso had not enriched them. 
In each of Portman Building Society v Hamlyn Taylor Neck,7 and 
Jones v Jones,8 Millett LJ made the point, in very different contexts, that 
an unjust enrichment claim is unavailable against a defendant who 
receives monies belonging to the claimant, in circumstances where the 
defendant never obtains title to that money. 
We can conclude, therefore, that where the claimant retains legal 
title to the original asset the defendant cannot be said to have been 
enriched. 
The bracelet and the £100 do differ in one respect. This is that, in 
our examples, the claimant’ rights in the bracelet are still in existence, 
whereas in the case of the £100 the claimant has lost his rights because 
money as currency is an exception to the nemo dat rule.9 But this does 
not affect the analysis. A still remains liable to B for £100, so he has still 
not been enriched by its theft. 
There have been suggestions that, in respect of both the bracelet 
and the £100, A is a trustee, of the bracelet, or the £100, for B, but it is 
                                                     
7 (1998) PNLR 664. 
8 Trustee of the Property of FC Jones & Sons (A Firm) v Jones (1997) Ch 159. 
9 D. Fox, ‘Property Rights in Money’ (OUP 2008) Ch 2. 
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very difficult to see how this is supposed to work10 and there is no 
authority to support the suggestions. Such authority as there is, and it is 
scant, points the other way.11 
We know from Sinclair v Brougham,12 that for a trust to arise the 
legal and beneficial ownership of property must be in different hands. 
For this to apply in the case of theft, it can only mean that the legal 
owner of the stolen property is the thief, and the beneficial owner is the 
victim. 
But our learning is replete with denials that a thief obtains legal 
ownership of the proceeds of his theft.13 The thief undoubtedly acquires 
something; he acquires a possessory title good against the whole world, 
except anyone who can show a prior and better title than himself.14He 
cannot possibly hold that possessory title in trust for the victim of his 
theft, however, because the victim already has a better possessory title 
by dint of his ownership. The trust model cannot work here, although 
others argue differently.15 
                                                     
10 A lively debate took place between John Tarrant and Sue Barkerhall Thomas on 
this point. See J Tarrant, ‘Property Rights to Stolen Money’ (2005) 32 University of 
Western Australia Law Review 234 and ‘The Theft Principle in Private Law’ (2006) 
Australian Law Journal 531 and S. Barkerhall Thomas, ‘Thieves as Trustees: The 
Enduring Legacy of Black v S Freedman & Co Ltd’ 3 Journal of Equity 52. 
11 Possibly Shalson v Russow (2005) Ch 281. 
12 (1914) AC 398. It was held in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
London Borough Council (1996) AC 669 that the division of legal and equitable title 
did not necessarily create a trust (per Lord Browne-Wilkinson at 706) but no doubt 
was cast on the proposition that there cannot be a trust without such a division.  
13 National Employers Mutual General Insurance Association v Jones (1990) 1 AC 24, 
a decision of the House of Lords is the latest. 
14 Armory v Delamire (1772) 1 Str 505, 93 ER 664. 
15 John Tarrant does so and it would seem that Robert Chambers does as well. R. 
Chambers ‘Trust and Theft’ in E. Bant and M Harding (eds). Exploring Private Law 
(CUP 2010) 222. Chambers thinks that trusts would be unworkable if this were not 
the case because all personal property is subject to the possibility that the title of 
the possessor is not the best title. But the discussion is largely pointless because B is 
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Whether the trust model does or does not work in this instance is 
not of great importance for an examination of common law rights, 
however because even if it does the resultant claim will be an equitable 
rather than a common law one. In Chapter 7 it will be argued that it also 
fails with respect to equitable claims.   
The fact that A has been enriched by the acquisition of a legal 
right to possession, good against the whole world save B, is more 
relevant but, as we shall see when we look at the at the expense of the 
claimant requirement for a claim in unjust enrichment, it is insufficient 
to bring the receipt of the original property within the law of unjust 
enrichment. 
As far as the watch is concerned the matter is somewhat different. 
It would be very hard to argue that A has not been enriched by the 
acquisition of the watch. He now has rights in property, which, in the 
absence of an unjust enrichment claim, are not defeasible to B. It is true 
that he is still liable to B for the conversion of the bracelet and the £100, 
but that has nothing to do with his rights in the watch. It is suggested 
therefore that A is enriched by the receipt of the watch. 
At the Expense of the Claimant. 
 
The second element required of the unjust enrichment claimant is that 
he shows that the defendant’s enrichment came at the claimant’s 
expense. 
How this element can be satisfied is the subject of fierce debate. 
Space does not allow an examination of that debate here. Suffice it to 
say that, on balance, this writer considers that the best explanation of 
                                                                                                                                                        
the owner of the best possessory title anyway. He has no need of any beneficial 
interest in the second best title. 
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the meaning of the expression “at the expense of the claimant” is that, 
whatever the correct method of assessing the quantum of restitution 
that follows from this explanation,16 the claimant must have suffered at 
least some loss before a claim in unjust enrichment can be made out.17   
If we take this understanding of “at the expense of the claimant” 
and apply it to the original assets we can immediately see that 
difficulties arise. A’s enrichment, it will be recalled, is represented by the 
acquisition of a possessory title good against the whole world except B. 
But the last two words of the previous sentence are crucial. B has lost 
nothing. He previously had a possessory title good against the whole 
world, and he still has a possessory title good against the whole world. A 
has not acquired his title at B’s expense. He has acquired it by his own 
action of taking possession. B is not even “sharing” possessory title with 
A. A’s title is entirely defeasible to B. In the case of the original asset, 
therefore, B cannot show that A has been enriched at his expense. 
Things are more complicated with respect to the watch. Here the 
benefit received by A is represented by the rights that he has in the 
watch. However, the rights that A has in the watch are such rights as C 
was able to pass to him. They are not B’s rights at all. There have been 
attempts to show that the rights that A has in the watch are indeed B’s 
                                                     
16 The quantum may or may not be capped by the lower of the claimant’s gain and 
the defendant’s loss. It is an open question as to whether all that the claimant need 
do is establish a loss and that once this has been done the measure of restitution 
becomes the defendant’s gain. 
17 A position supported, one way or another, in G. Virgo, The Principles of the Law of 
Restitution (2nd edn OUP 2006); R. Grantham and C. Rickett, ‘Disgorgement for 
Unjust Enrichment’ (2003) CLJ 159; L. Smith, ‘Restitution: The Heart of Corrective 
Justice’ (2000-2001) 79 Texas Law Review 2115; M.McInnes “At the Plaintiff’s 
Expense”: Quantifying Restitutionary Relief” (1998) CLJ 472. 
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rights, but the ones that have any claim to coherence at all are restricted 
to showing that the rights in question are equitable. 
The best authority for the proposition that the rights that A has in the 
watch come from B comes from Lord Browne-Wilkinson: 
I agree that the stolen monies are traceable in equity. But the proprietary 
interest which equity is enforcing in such circumstances arises under a 
constructive, not a resulting trust. Although it is difficult to find clear 
authority for the proposition, when property is obtained by fraud equity 
imposes a constructive trust on the fraudulent recipient: the property is 
recoverable and traceable in equity.18  
Two things emerge from this statement. First, the lack of supporting 
authority even for Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s view, and second, the 
irrelevance of unjust enrichment to the whole matter. On Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s position the trust is created in response to a wrong, not to 
A’s unjust enrichment at B’s expense. 
Unjust enrichment lawyers, obviously, have other ideas. They 
maintain that the trust in question is a resulting trust, not a constructive 
trust, and that the trust in question (always) arises in response to unjust 
enrichment.19 
This analysis depends upon the assumption that a resulting trust 
arises when the defendant acquires property, which has been paid for 
by the claimant, where the claimant has no intention of making a gift to 
the defendant.20 A more traditional understanding of the resulting trust 
is that the last of these requirements is not that the claimant had no 
                                                     
18 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington Borough Council (1996) 1 AC 
669, 716. 
19 P. Birks, ‘Restitution and Resulting Trusts’ in P. Birks and F. Rose (eds), Restitution 
and Equity, 1 Resulting Trusts and Equitable Compensation (Mansfield Press 2000) 
265, R. Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Clarendon Press) 1997.  
20 R. Chambers, Resulting Trusts (Clarendon Press) 1997. 
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intention of making a gift to the defendant, but that there is a presumed 
intention on the part of the defendant to make a trust in favour of the 
claimant.21  
If the traditional understanding is correct, then quite clearly this 
formulation cannot work in the case of theft. It is generally speaking 
impossible to impute to a thief an intention to create a trust in favour of 
his victim. 
Once again, however, it is not necessary here to decide which side 
to take. Whichever side is correct the rights that the claimant may 
obtain as a result of the imposition of the trust are equitable not 
common law rights. 
The only suggestions that the rights that B may have in the watch 
in our examples, are common law rights based on unjust enrichment, 
come from one or two cases, which will be examined in detail later in 
this chapter, and be shown to be incorrectly analysed. The argument 
comes down to nothing more than the assertion that B can trace at 
common law into the watch, because the watch represents the 
traceable proceeds of B’s original asset. But to the question why does 
the watch represent the traceable proceeds of B’s original asset, the 
only answer appears to be because he would be unjustly enriched if he 
could not. But the whole purpose of the “at the expense of the 
claimant” test is to help determine whether A has or has not been 
unjustly enriched. This is not aided by saying that the very reason that 
he can show that A’s enrichment came at his expense is because, 
otherwise, A has been unjustly enriched. Whatever the position at 
                                                     
21 W. Swaddling, ‘A New Role for Resulting Trusts?’ (1996) LS 110. 
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equity it is not possible to show, in either of our examples, that A’s 
enrichment has come about at B’s expense. 
Unjust Factors and the Alternative Claim Analysis.  
 
The discussion here centres around the notion that B may sustain a 
claim in unjust enrichment by, somehow, divesting himself of the title to 
the bracelet or the money. If he can do this, the argument goes, then A 
will have acquired the rights in that property at B’s expense. This could 
potentially form the basis for showing that the rights that A 
subsequently obtains in the watch have also come at B’s expense. 
 We need not go into the question of whether this latter step 
could be taken, because the action of divesting title in favour of A, 
results in the collapsing of any claim that B may have in unjust 
enrichment.  
The obvious method of divesting title would be for B to elect to 
pass title to the A. Now A has clearly, according to Peter Birks, been 
enriched at the B’s expense.22 This is apparently what happened in 
Holiday v Sigil,23 and Moffat v Kazana.24 This argument needs quoting in 
full: 
The enrichment of the defendant is established with the aid of an election. 
The claimant elects not to insist on his pre-existing title. To insist on that tile 
would be to assert that the asset was never added to the defendant’s wealth. 
By contrast by treating it as if it had indeed enriched the defendant he 
accepts the facts of it having passed to him and abandons the contrary 
technicality. 
                                                     
22 P. Birks “Receipt” in P. Birks and A. Pretto (Eds), Breach of Trust (Hart, Oxford 
2002). 
23 (1826) 2 C & P 176. 
24 (1969) 2 QB 152. 
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Although not specifically saying so, this sounds remarkably like a 
recantation of Birks’s previous argument, that factual enrichment is 
sufficient for the purposes of unjust enrichment law. 
Setting that to one side, however, the first question that the 
proposition cited brings to mind is how does this transfer operate?  
  We know that Equity provides for elections in circumstances 
where a trustee makes an unauthorised disposition of trust property, 
but Birks gives no authority for such a power existing at common law. 
Indeed the only cases that there are on the subject suggest that it is not 
possible to convey title by intent alone,25 and that, even if the fact that 
in this instance A is already in possession of the res in question were to 
enable Cochrane v Moore to be distinguished, Standing v Bowring,26 
would still allow the him to repudiate the transfer. 
But even if Birks is right, and, somehow, an election to pass title 
could be validated, it would be largely a pyrrhic victory because there is 
now no unjust factor. Ignorance cannot apply since it is obviously with 
the full knowledge of B that A has gained title. In fact there has been no 
vitiation or qualification of intent at all. A claim in autonomous unjust 
enrichment would have to fail. Ironically a claim in conversion would 
now also have to fail since the person entitled to immediate possession 
of the res is now A. 
Perhaps, instead of transferring title to A, B may simply renounce 
it? This was a later proposition of Birks: 
There is no parallel provision [to that which arises where a claimant is 
successful in a claim in conversion] for extinguishing the title of the claimant. 
Nor should there be. The reason is that Cs election to assert that D has been 
                                                     
25 Cochrane v Moore (1890) 25 QBD 57. 
26 (1885) 31 Ch D 282. 
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unjustly enriched at his expense supposes a renunciation of his title. 
Asserting his title or complaining of a wrongful interference he denies the 
enrichment but in claiming the value of the asset as an enrichment of the 
defendant at his expense he is renouncing his title. That is the choice that the 
claimant has in this type of situation.27 
Again, the first thing that has to be said is that this sounds like even 
more of a renunciation of previous arguments than did the quotation 
above. 
Yet again it is Holiday v Sigil and Moffatt V Kazana that are asked 
to bear the weight of the proposition. They are both incapable of doing 
so. Neither case has anything to say about title, let alone representing 
authority for both of the arguments that Birks is seeking to run. Such 
arguments as there are appear to deny Birks proposition. 
Even assuming that it is possible to divest oneself of title in the 
way that Birks suggests, there yet again arises the problem that doing so 
would be fatal to a claim in unjust enrichment. The only reason that B 
could claim in unjust enrichment against A in our examples is that B is in 
some way connected to As enrichment. If B has proprietary rights in 
neither the bracelet nor the money, what is the connection? B must 
have renounced all of his proprietary rights to both, including any mere 
possessory rights, since otherwise A has still not been enriched, because 
he must still return the property in question to B. But now there is no 
unjust factor available to B to sustain his claim in unjust enrichment. A 
simply appears to be in possession of property to which B has renounced 
                                                     
27 P.Birks ‘Restitution for wrongs’ in E. Schrage (ed) Unjust Enrichment: The 
Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution (Duncker & Humblot Berlin 
1995). 
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his rights.  Yet again B appears to have foregone any rights to a claim in 
conversion for no good reason. 
This is not the place to discuss the complicated, and highly 
uncertain, law regarding abandonment of chattels, but, suffice it to say, 
Birks theory runs directly contrary to the venerable authority of Doctor 
and Student,28 where it is asserted that “there is no such law in this 
realm as goods forseken”. The venerability of the authority may 
represent a reason to challenge it, but Birks does not do so. He cites no 
authority other than Holiday v Sigil and Moffat v Kazana,29 which are not 
authority for Birks theory at all, and he makes no attempt to explain why 
they might be. 
The Argument from Authority. 
 
Just as we saw in the previous chapters, when looking at the law of 
property, the arguments from principle set out above, are potentially 
capable of being faced with the response that, irrespective of their 
correctness, there is a line of authority that clearly establishes that 
claims to substitute assets at common law are part of the law of unjust 
enrichment, and, that the theoretical position will have to adjust itself to 
accommodate that reality. 
Just as in the previous chapter, however, it will be shown that the 
cases establish no such thing. It is unquestionably true that unjust 
enrichment reasoning has been used, by both courts and academics, to 
                                                     
28 C. St. Germain, Dialogus de fundamentis legume Anglie et de conscientia  (Book II 
c.51; S.S. 1528) 290-292. This book is commonly known as Doctor and Student. 
29 Mofatt v Kazana is to all intents and purposes a simple case of conversion. There is 
certainly no identification of a specific cause of action. Similarly Holiday v Sigil looks 
more like a case of restitution for wrongs than a claim in  autonomous unjust 
enrichment. 
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analyse some cases concerning substitute assets, but the reasoning has 
been unconvincing. 
In one case the court specifically said that the tracing permitted in 
it was a response to the defendant’s unjust enrichment,30 whilst in 
another, much academic effort has been poured into explaining it on 
that basis, even though the court seemed not to regard it in that way.31 
These cases require examination to see how they can best be explained. 
A third case, in which some unjust enrichment analysis was undeniably 
used,32 has been looked at in some detail in the previous chapter but will 
also be discussed, briefly, in reference to its unjust enrichment analysis. 
Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd. 
 
 The facts of the case are, that one Norman Cass was a salaried partner 
in the firm of the appellant solicitors. He had a gambling addiction for 
which his salary supplied him with an inadequate income. He therefore 
began drawing on the proceeds of the appellant firm’s client account, of 
which he was a signatory. He withdrew both cash and sums of money by 
way of banker’s draft. The money was spent at a casino (the Playboy 
Club) then in the ownership of the respondents. The procedure was that 
Cass exchanged the cash or drafts for chips, which enabled him to both 
gamble at the casino tables, and also to purchase refreshments within 
the confines of the club. Unused chips could be exchanged back for cash. 
As is usually the way with such things Cass was both a winner and 
a loser at the tables, but the overall effect of his gambling was to 
produce very substantial losses. Because Cass was constantly replacing 
                                                     
30 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd (1991) 2 AC 548. 
31 Trustee of the Property of FC Jones & Sons (A Firm) v Jones (1997) Ch 159. 
32 Armstrong DLW v Winnington Networks Ltd (2012) EWCH 10 (Ch). 
 206 
parts of his drawings back into the respondent’s client’s account, the 
court found it difficult to determine the net sum of money that had been 
withdrawn, but it was agreed that it could not have been less than 
£220,000.  
The claim was framed as one for money had and received. The 
claimants failed at first instance and, by a majority, in the Court of 
Appeal. In the event the House of Lords held that the appeal should be 
allowed, and that the claim should succeed, but only to the extent that 
the defendant club had not changed their position as a result of the 
receipt of the claimant’s money. It was held that payment by the club to 
Cass of his winnings represented such a change of position, and the total 
award was therefore reduced to £150,960. 
The club, (the respondent in the appeal) sought to argue, inter 
alia, that a claim in money had and received must fail because it could 
not be shown that the money received by them had any connection with 
the appellant at all. 
Surprisingly, a salient fact was not mentioned in any of the 
headnotes to the reports of the case, and can only be discovered by 
reading the judgment of Lord Goff. This fact was that Cass did not, in all 
instances, simply withdraw money from the partnership account, and 
take that money to the respondent’s club to gamble with. He also, from 
time to time, withdrew money from the account, and placed that money 
in various building society accounts. He subsequently withdrew money 
from those accounts and took that money to the club to gamble with. 
This is not the easiest case to classify. It is certainly arguable that 
it should be analysed as one that falls to be determined by equitable 
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principles, since, at its heart, lies a fiduciary who has breached his duty, 
by acquiring rights during the course of his fiduciary endeavour.  
The case could also have been analysed in the previous chapter on 
the law of property. Irrespective of what their Lordships thought that 
they were doing, much of their reasoning suggested that the claimant 
had a claim to a substitute asset because of the rights that he held in the 
original asset. 
However, neither of these possibilities fits particularly well with 
the passages in the judgments, in which Lord Templeman and Lord Goff 
made it clear that, whatever the nature of the remedy available to the 
claimant, they treated the basis of the claim as being in unjust 
enrichment. Therefore, it is as an unjust enrichment case that it will be 
treated here. 
Two themes run through the speech of Lord Templeman; the first, 
is that the money received by the respondent from Cass was money 
belonging to the appellant; the second, is that appellant’s claim should 
be categorised as being in unjust enrichment.  
Reconciling these two themes is difficult. Equally difficult is 
understanding their internal logic. The difficulty with the proposition 
that Cass gave the respondent the appellant’s money was made clear by 
Lord Goff: 
The respondents relied in particular upon two decisions of the Privy Council 
as showing that where a partner obtains money by drawing on a partnership 
bank account without authority, he alone and not the partnership obtains 
legal title to the money so obtained. These cases, Union Bank of Australia Ltd 
v McClintock,33 and Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v Mann,34 were in 
                                                     
33 (1922) 1 AC 240. 
34 (1961) AC 1. 
 208 
fact concerned with bankers cheques but for the respondents it was 
submitted that the same principle was applicable in the case of cash. The 
solicitors argued that these cases were wrongly decided…I am not prepared 
to depart from decisions of such high authority as these. They show that 
where a banker’s cheque payable to a third party or bearer is obtained by a 
partner from a bank which has received the authority of the partnership to 
pay the partner in question who has, however, unknown to the bank, acted 
beyond the authority of his partners in so operating the account, the legal 
property in the banker’s cheque thereupon vests in the partner. The same 
must a fortiori be true when it is not such a banker’s cheque but cash which 
is so drawn from the bank by the partner in question.35   
So, it is reasonably clear that the money with which Cass gambled 
belonged to Cass and not to the appellant. Lord Goff, as we shall see, 
spent much time over the matter of reconciling this fact with the notion 
that the appellant’s claim should succeed. Lord Templeman, on the 
other hand, did not refer to either of these cases at all, and was content 
to assume that the money in question belonged to the appellant at all 
times.  
 Moreover, Lord Templeman made no attempt to distinguish 
between the money that Cass withdrew from the partnership account 
and paid over to the club directly, and the money which he withdrew 
from the account and, first, put into various building society accounts, 
before withdrawing it from those accounts, and paying it over to the 
club. This should have created an even greater barrier to his Lordship’s 
view that Cass gave the respondent the appellant’s money. The extract 
from Lord Goff’s opinion, quoted above, show that the money, on 
withdrawal from the partnership account, belonged to Cass, not to the 
                                                     
35 (1991) 2 AC 548, 573. 
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appellant. When Cass placed the money into the building societies the 
money placed became the property of those societies, not of the 
appellant, and not of Cass. Lord Templeman, at no stage, refers to this 
issue. 
 If the money did belong to the appellant at all times, the following 
statement of his Lordship is irrelevant: 
Conversion does not lie for money, taken and received, as currency…but the 
law imposes an obligation on the recipient of stolen money to pay an 
equivalent sum to the victim if the recipient has been “unjustly enriched” at 
the expense of the true owner…the club was enriched as and when Cass 
staked and lost to the club money stolen from the solicitors.36 
It is irrelevant, because the money with which Cass gambled, since it 
belonged to the appellant at all times, and since the respondent was not 
a bona-fide purchaser of that money for value, was never taken and 
received as currency. It was a fundamental aspect of the findings of their 
Lordships that, because the money was expended by Cass at the club in 
pursuit of a contract made void by s18 of the Gaming Act 1845, the club 
gave no valuable consideration for that money. Conversion does lie for 
money received under such circumstances37 and would have been the 
obvious claim for the appellant to have made. 
It may be thought that, when Lord Templeman said that the 
appellant owned the money at all times, he had in mind, at the very 
least in the case of the monies that had passed through the building 
societies, some sort of equitable rather than legal ownership. However, 
                                                     
36 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd (1991) 2 AC 548, 559. 
37 Miller v Race (1758) 1 Burr 452, 97 ER 398. 
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this is not the case. Having cited this passage from Black v S Freedman & 
Co,38 in the High Court of Australia: 
Where money has been stolen, it is trust money in the hands of the thief, and 
he cannot divest it of that character. If he pays it over to another person, 
then it may be followed into that other person’s hands.39 
He went on to say: 
 Although the decision in this case went on the grounds of trust, the reasoning 
applies equally to a claim for money had and received.40 
 Similarly, it is equally clear that Lord Templeman is not saying that 
the reason that the appellant has title to the money gambled by Cass, is 
that it is the traceable product of the appellant’s money. This can be the 
only feasible explanation, even if it is incorrect, of how the appellant has 
retained title to the monies that passed through the building societies. 
However, the only reference his Lordship made to tracing in his speech 
was this: 
In the course of argument there was a great deal of discussion of tracing in 
law and in equity. In my opinion in a claim for money had and received by a 
thief the plaintiff victim must show that the money belonging to him was 
paid by the thief to the defendant and that the defendant was unjustly 
enriched, and remained unjustly enriched.41 
There is no suggestion that, in this case, tracing was required in order to 
show that the money paid by Cass to the respondent was money 
belonging to the appellant. On the contrary, tracing was never 
mentioned again. 
 In support of his belief that the appellant must have, at all times, 
retained title to the money, Lord Templeman cited certain dicta of 
                                                     
38 (1910) 12 CLR 105. 
39 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd (1991) 2 AC 548, 565 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid  560. 
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Bankes L.J. in Banque Belge Pour L’Étranger v Hambrouck.42 In dealing 
with the argument that the placing, by a thief, of stolen monies into a 
bank account, meant that the victim of the theft lost legal title to it, 
Bankes L.J. said: 
To accept either of the two contentions with which I have so far been dealing 
would be to assent to the proposition that a thief who has stolen money, and 
who, from fear of detection, hands that money to a beggar who happens to 
pass, gives a title to the money to the beggar, as against the true owner – a 
proposition which is obviously impossible of acceptance.43 
These dicta are, of course, entirely incorrect. They fail to recognise the 
distinction between the inability to follow money as currency, as it 
becomes when placed into a bank account, and money as a chattel, 
which it remains when gifted to a beggar in the circumstances outlined 
above. A claim for conversion would lie against the beggar in this 
example, just as it would lie against the respondent in Lipkin Gorman, if 
Lord Templeman’s proposition, that the appellant at all times retained 
title to the stolen money were correct. 
 Because Lord Templeman fails to refer to the irreconcilability of 
his belief that the appellant at all time retained title to the money, with 
the authorities of Union Bank of Australia Ltd v McClintock,44 and 
Commercial Banking Co of Sydney Ltd v Mann,45 his analysis is somewhat 
incomplete. This incompleteness is especially stark with respect to the 
monies paid into the building society. 
 Lord Templeman’s second theme was that the appellant’s claim 
was one in unjust enrichment. It will be recalled, from the beginning of 
                                                     
42 (1921)1 KB 321. 
43 Ibid  327. 
44 (1922) 1 AC 240. 
45 (1961) AC 1. 
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this chapter, that the elements that have to be established in order for a 
claimant to succeed in an unjust enrichment claim are; that the 
defendant has been enriched; that the enrichment was at the expense 
of the claimant; and that the enrichment was unjust. Because Lord 
Templeman considers none of these elements directly, it is necessary to 
try and infer how he understands that the appellant has successfully 
maintained its claim. 
 With respect to the requirement that the respondent be enriched, 
Lord Templeman said that: 
the club was enriched as and when Cass staked and lost to the club money 
stolen from the solicitors.46 
This statement is wholly incompatible, however, with Lord Templeman’s 
conclusion on title that has just been discussed. If the appellant had at 
all times retained title to the money in Cass’s hands, it must follow that 
it continued to retain title to it in the hands of the respondent. This is 
because it was found that the respondent was not a bona-fide purchaser 
of the money for value. But, if the appellant retained title to the money 
in the respondent’s hands, the respondent has not been enriched at 
all.47 The only way that the respondent could have been enriched would 
have been if Cass had good title to the money, and passed that title to 
them. 
 On the question of whether the respondent had been enriched at 
the appellant’s expense, Lord Templeman’s analysis puts him on firmer 
ground. If, contrary to what has been said above, he can show that the 
respondent has been enriched, there seems to be little doubt that that 
enrichment would have come from the appellant, because the 
                                                     
46 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd (1991) 2 AC 548, 559. 
47 See the discussion accompanying footnotes 3-15 above. 
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appellant, on that analysis was the owner of the money that was passed 
over to the respondent. It would appear to be a case of direct 
enrichment. As we shall see below, a far greater difficulty stands in the 
way of establishing that the respondent has been enriched at the 
appellant’s expense if title to the money that was paid to the 
respondent lay with Cass.  
With respect to the third element of an unjust enrichment claim, 
the unjust factor, Lord Templeman is silent. In the extract cited from his 
Lordship’s opinion set out above48 the words “unjustly enriched” in line 
3 are, curiously, in inverted commas. Why this should be is uncertain, 
but it suggests that the expression is somehow devoid of precise 
meaning, or that the term is being used in a metaphorical, or unusual, 
way, rather than as the description of a specific legal doctrine. It 
indicates that the words unjustly enriched constitute a catch-all phrase 
rather than one that can be analysed with precision. 
Lord Templeman sees the issue as reasonably straightforward. If 
the respondent has been enriched, as a result of receiving money stolen 
from the appellant, that, of itself, is sufficient to demonstrate the unjust 
nature of the transaction. But this is incorrect. As Birks pointed out, the 
term “unjust” looks down to the cases: “It can never be made to draw 
on an unknowable justice in the sky.”49 In order for an enrichment to be 
unjust it is necessary to bring it within the analogical reach of previously 
decided cases. Lord Templeman makes no attempt to do so. Admittedly, 
he does cite Banque Belge,50 in support of his argument, but says that 
                                                     
48 See text accompanying note 36 above.   
49 P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, (revised edn Clarendon Press 
1989) 99. 
50 Banque Belge Pour L’Étranger v Hambrouck (1921) 1 KB 321. 
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the “judgments deal with the case on the basis of following trust assets”, 
which rather excludes unjust enrichment as the basis of the claim. In 
fact, the only support that he actually utilises from Banque Belge is Atkin 
LJ’s statement that: 
As the money paid into the bank can be identified as the product of the 
original money, the plaintiffs have the common law right to claim it, and can 
sue for money had and received.51 
But even if this is a supportable argument, it has nothing to do with 
unjust enrichment. It is a pure law of property analysis.  
 It does appear that Lord Templeman gave no consideration to 
what the unjust factor might be in this case. Indeed it is uncertain 
exactly how Lord Templeman conceives of the action in unjust 
enrichment in general. Because of this it would be difficult to rely on his 
judgment to support the notion that Lipkin Gorman demonstrates that 
common law claims to substitute assets are claims in unjust enrichment. 
Lord Goff’s speech is entirely different from that of Lord 
Templeman. Indeed, it is difficult to understand how Lord’s Griffiths and 
Ackner could say that they agreed with the reasoning in both speeches, 
since those speeches contain contradictory arguments. Lord Templeman 
argued that money gambled by Cass was the same money that Cass 
stole from the appellant, whilst Lord Goff regarded that conclusion as 
contrary to principle, and said that the appellant was asserting rights in a 
substitute asset.   
On one point they agreed. Lord Goff, like Lord Templeman, 
regarded the case as being one based on the law of unjust enrichment. 
Referring to the submission of counsel for the respondent, that the 
                                                     
51 (1991) 2 AC 548, 566. 
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appellant’s claim in money had and received could only succeed if the 
appellant could show that the respondent was unjustly enriched at the 
appellant’s expense, Lord Goff said: 
I accept that the solicitor’s claim in the present case is founded on the unjust 
enrichment of the club, and can only succeed if, in accordance with the 
principles of the law of restitution, the club was indeed unjustly enriched at 
the expense of the solicitors.52 
The remainder of Lord Goff’s speech, however, was devoid of any 
analysis of why the appellant could make out such a claim in the present 
case. He, correctly, says that a court does not have carte blanche to 
reject a claim in unjust enrichment merely because it thinks that would 
be unfair to the defendant to allow it. Recovery, or the lack of it, 
depends upon established legal principles. But those principles are never 
expounded. The only unjust enrichment issue directly addressed by His 
Lordship was whether the defence of change of position was available to 
the respondent. The only way to determine why Lord Goff thought that 
the appellant had successfully made out a claim in unjust enrichment, is 
to look at the part of his speech which concerns title, to see if anything 
may be gleaned from that.  
Because Lord Goff was clear that when Cass withdrew the money 
from the partners account, he became the legal owner of that money, 
his judgment was concerned with attempting the task of making the 
appellant the legal owner of the money with which Cass gambled at the 
respondent’s club.  
Lord Goff accepted that the appellant had no legal property in the 
money in its bank account before it was withdrawn, because it was 
                                                     
52 Ibid 578. 
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merely a debt owed to the appellant by the bank. But he then went on 
to say: 
Such a debt constitutes a chose in action, which is a species of property; and 
since the debt was enforceable at common law, the chose in action was legal 
property belonging to the solicitors at common law. There is in my opinion no 
reason why the solicitors should not be able to trace their property at 
common law in that chose in action, or in any part of it, into its product, i.e. 
cash drawn by Cass from their client account at the bank. Such a claim is 
consistent with their assertion that the money so obtained by Cass was their 
property at common law.53 
This analysis does not hold good. It was established in R v Preddy,54 that 
when a sum of money leaves a bank account, the chose in action in 
respect of that sum is extinguished. There is nothing from which a 
tracing exercise can be commenced. No rights are transferred from the 
chose in action into anything else. Cash taken from a bank account is not 
in any sense the traceable product of a chose in action. There has been 
no substitution.55  
This is most clearly illustrated in the instances where Cass placed 
the monies that he withdrew from the appellant’s account into various 
building society accounts. When the bank paid the money to Cass they 
paid their money to him, and it became legally his. The appellant’s chose 
in action with their bank was extinguished as a result of the transaction, 
and a new chose in action arose, representing the value of the new debt. 
There is no such thing as “any part” of such a chose in action – it is a 
single entity. Lord Goff seems to be treating a bank account as being the 
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54 (1996) AC 815,841. 
55 See also Robb Evans & Associates v European Bank Limited [2004] NSWCA 82 
[139], and Hillig v Darkinjung [2006] NSWSC 1217 [20]. 
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equivalent of a physical mixture. But it is not. A bank account, in credit, 
is a single debt owed by the bank to the customer. There was nothing 
that could be traced. 
 The rights that Cass acquired as a result of depositing those 
monies were personal rights, constituted by a debt owing to him from 
those societies, at law. They were totally different rights to those that 
the appellant had with respect to its bankers.  
 Lord Goff supported his analysis by reference to Taylor v Plumer,56 
and Marsh v Keating.57 As we now know Taylor v Plumer is concerned 
only with the ability to trace in equity.58 As was explained in Chapter 3, 
Marsh v Keating also had nothing to do with common law tracing. The 
appellant firm in that case undoubtedly had a fiduciary relationship with 
Mrs Keating, but, in the event, Mrs Keating made no attempt to trace 
into its bank account. She merely brought an action for money had and 
received on the basis that the firm was accountable to her for the 
proceeds of the sale of her stock. She was not claiming that any 
particular monies at the firm’s bank belonged to her. 
 If Lord Goff’s analysis were correct, it would leave insoluble 
difficulties in its wake. The legal title to the money, which Lord Goff says 
undoubtedly belonged legally to Cass, appears to have been transferred 
to the appellants, since both Cass and the appellant cannot possibly 
both be legal owners at one and the same time. The question of when, 
and how, that transfer took place, and exactly what legal interest the 
appellant has acquired, is not capable of an easy answer. Nor is the 
question as to why it should be that the appellant, having started out 
                                                     
56 (1815) 3 M & S 562. 
57(1834) 1 Bing (NC) 198.  
58 See Chapter 3 above. 
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with a personal obligation owed to them by their bank, should end up 
with a proprietary interest in money. 
  If the case were treated as being one founded in equity, and the 
property interests involved were therefore equitable ones, a solution to 
these problems would be could be found. But this solution is unavailable 
because Lord Goff himself specifically denies that that is what he is 
referring to.  
It therefore needs establishing when and how it could be that the 
appellant regained legal title to an asset, or its traceable substitute, 
which it had unquestionably lost when Cass withdrew money from the 
its bank account. Unfortunately, Lord Goff is entirely unhelpful in the 
quest for the nature of this property right.  
The first question concerns the point at which the appellant 
acquired its right.  The claim, according to Lord Goff was one in unjust 
enrichment. Liability in unjust enrichment arises at the moment of 
receipt.59 Thus the money that the respondent received from Cass must 
have already belonged to the appellant by that time. But Lord Goff has 
already conceded that it belonged to Cass at that point. It could not have 
legally have belonged to both – English personal property law does not 
work in that way- so to whom did it belong? 
No answer is provided to this question. Indeed, there is not even 
any recognition that there is a problem at all. Instead His Lordship says 
this: 
Of course tracing or following property into its product involves a decision by 
the owner of the original property to assert his title to the product in place of 
                                                     
59 A fact that has caused almost insoluble problems to those who have sought a 
satisfactory normative explanation for the claim. See L. Smith, ‘Justifying the Law of 
Unjust Enrichment’ (2000-2001) 79 Texas Law Review 2177. 
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his original property. This is sometimes referred to as ratification. I myself 
would not so describe it, but it has in my opinion at least one feature in 
common with ratification, that it cannot be relied upon so as to render an 
innocent recipient a wrongdoer.60 
The fact that this process requires the original owner to displace the 
ownership of the new owner seems to have passed un-noticed. No 
reason is forthcoming as to why he should be able to do so. All that we 
are told is that one potential explanation – ratification- is incorrect.  
It is not even certain what the property right now acquired by the 
original owner consists of. It would seem that it is sufficient to allow the 
holder of the right to maintain an action in unjust enrichment, but not, 
apparently, one in conversion. This is despite the fact that the whole 
purpose of the law of conversion is to protect property rights, and one 
of the ways that it does so is to, indeed, “render innocent recipients 
wrongdoers”. Why this property right should have this characteristic is 
uncertain. It appears to be a new right previously unknown to our law. 
This, in itself, makes any analysis of the contents of the right somewhat 
problematic.   
Lord Goff advances no principled reason for displacing the rule 
that legal title passes on the basis of the intention of the transferor. The 
appellant clearly intended to pass title to the money to Cass, and Cass to 
the respondent. Cass had authority to draw on the account. No doubt if 
the bank had been made aware of all of the facts its intention may have 
been affected in some way, but that would, at best be a factor in an 
unjust enrichment claim by the bank against Cass. It would not change 
the position that title had passed.  
                                                     
60 (1991) 2 AC 548, 573. 
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Moreover, the fact that this case concerns money that has passed 
through a bank account, and title to which was therefore lost to the 
appellant, obscures the difficulties that would arise from Lord Goff’s 
analysis in cases where the claimant does not lose title to the original 
asset. 
To take a simple example, if a thief steals my bicycle and then 
swaps it for a bracelet, I must have retained my legal rights in the 
bicycle, pace the nemo dat rule, but it seems that I can now also assert a 
title to the bracelet. Lord Goff gives no answer to how this may be 
resolved, partly because he never discusses how the I might lose my 
interest in the bicycle in the first place. 
There have been suggestions that Lord Goff was thinking of a 
power in the appellant to regain a property right, rather than that the 
right arose automatically.61 This, it is said, would have allowed the 
appellant to revest title to the cash that Cass withdrew from the 
appellant’s bank account in itself.  
But a power is not a property right, it is merely a right to obtain 
one, and so the does not explain what property right is being acquired 
by the exercise of the power, now why that the respondent would have 
that right.  
In fact, the power analysis does not explain how rights to the 
monies that were deposited in the building societies come to be vested 
in the appellant at all. The appellant must, presumably, have been 
required to exercise its power in some way before it could take effect, 
even if the exercising of the power does not, in all circumstances, 
                                                     
61 B. Hacker, ‘Proprietary Restitution After Impaired Consent Transfers: A 
Generalised Power Model’ (2009) CLJ 324; P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, (2nd edn 
Clarendon Press 2004)198. 
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require communication of that fact to the other party.62 Some action on 
the part of the appellant would have been necessary, but whatever 
action that was, it could not, on the facts have occurred before Cass 
placed some of the monies withdrawn from the partnership account into 
the building societies. At that moment, title to those monies passed to 
the building societies, and, unless the power involved is some type of 
previously unknown right, it could not be revested in the appellant since 
the building societies were bona-fide purchasers of that money for 
value. Since Lord Goff makes no attempt to distinguish between the 
monies that Cass gambled with directly upon receipt from the bank, and 
monies that he gambled with after they had been deposited in the 
building societies, it is unlikely that he could have had a power analysis 
in mind. 
 In any case, if there is a power involved it is an unusual one since, 
it appears, unlike the power that arises when a contract is obtained by 
fraud, to enable the victim not to revest title in himself to an asset that 
he once owned, but to claim title to something that has never previously 
been his. The cash with which Cass gambled was owned, at various 
stages, by the appellant’s bank, by Cass himself, and by the building 
societies. It was never owned by the appellant. Nothing was transferred, 
which at any stage, belonged to the appellant, and in which title could 
be revested. It seems highly unlikely that the explanation of how the 
appellant came to acquire the rights to the money gambled by Cass can 
be based on a power analysis. 
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When looking at what the right that the appellant has acquired 
itself, Lionel Smith, for one, is clearly in some difficulty in trying to 
describe its nature. He says it is: 
A proprietary right, less than ownership, which does not carry with it a right 
to immediate possession; hence it will not generate liability in conversion. 
Moreover although it will generate a …liability in money had and received on 
the part of a subsequent recipient it will not generate that liability on the 
part of a trustee in bankruptcy.63 
All of this, Smith confesses, might seem “contrived”,64 which it certainly 
does. 
Smith is also unable to say when this peculiar right is created. 
Possibly it is created whenever a right to restitution arises as a result of 
an unjust enrichment. The right would therefore arise at the moment of 
enrichment. He tentatively suggests that in addition to this common law 
right there may also be an equitable property right. He clearly feels 
uncomfortable with the entire approach, however, accepting that there 
is enough opposition to the idea that unjust enrichment can ever create 
equitable property rights without adding common law property rights to 
the mixture.65 
When speaking of how this proprietary right is to be protected 
Smith is no more enlightening. Apart from an action in money had and 
received, Smith also suggests a personal right that is “somewhat 
analogous to detinue”66 in that the value of the claim is to be measured 
at the time of the trial not at the point of interference with the 
claimant’s rights. The basis for this right cannot, we now know, be unjust 
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64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid 338. 
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enrichment because the Supreme Court has decided that liability in 
unjust enrichment arises at the moment of receipt, and the whole 
notion of measuring enrichment by value surviving has been rejected.67 
What the basis of the action might therefore be is unknown.  
This un-named, and previously unknown, action is also one in 
which the protection of a proprietary right appears to give rise to a 
personal right only since otherwise it would give rise to priority in 
bankruptcy and Smith denies such a possibility.68 
Smith even considers the possibility that this proprietary right 
differs from all other common law property rights in that it need not 
have as its subject matter tangible assets.69 He makes no attempt to 
explain how this fits in with the law as we currently understand it, nor 
does he refer to any dicta of Lord Goff supporting this idea. He is 
effectively forced into it because it is a consequence of Lord Goff’s 
conclusion, rather than his reasoning. 
Smith concludes that “all of this is speculative and uncertain”,70 
which may be thought to be a somewhat generous summary. 
None of Lord Goff’s reasoning contains any germ of an 
explanation of how the appellants could successfully maintain a claim in 
unjust enrichment. His problems in this regard are exactly the same as 
Lord Templeman’s. If the respondent received the appellant’s money 
they did not gain title to it, and were thus not enriched at all. If they 
received Cass’s money they may well have been enriched, but they were 
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enriched at Cass’s expense, not at that of the claimant, and nothing was 
said about what the unjust factor might have been.  
Peter Birks undoubtedly considered Lipkin Gorman to be an unjust 
enrichment case,71 but this was on the basis, shown above to be 
erroneous, that a claimant is able to renounce title to an asset that has 
been transferred to him and, subsequently, make a claim based on the 
defendant’s possession of that title. As we have seen, this cannot be 
correct, since, if the defendant has retained title to the asset, there 
appears to be no unjust factor, which would underpin an unjust 
enrichment claim. 
On examination Lipkin Gorman is just another case where the 
reasoning rests almost entirely on Taylor v Plumer. The addition of 
Marsh v Keating as authority is, as we have seen, unsatisfactory, given 
that that case had nothing to do with common law tracing. The other 
case on which some reliance was placed, Clarke v Shee & Johnson,72 is 
equally inappropriate. In that case an employee of the claimant was 
required to collect debts owing to him on the claimant’s behalf. On 
receiving the money he used it to gamble on the lottery. The claimant 
sued the persons who had received the gambled money, in money had 
and received. They were successful because, lotteries being illegal at the 
time, the defendants could not show that they had given value for the 
monies received. But the crucial difference between this case and Lipkin 
Gorman is that in Clarke it cannot be doubted that at all times the 
claimant was the legal owner of the money. It is obvious that the 
debtors who paid the claimant’s employee must have intended to pass 
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legal title to the money in question to the claimant, not to the 
employee. The notes that the employee used for gambling purposes 
actually belonged to the claimant, and the defendants were unable to 
bring themselves within a nemo dat exception. This has nothing to do 
with tracing and nothing to do with Lipkin Gorman. 
Arguably, the best analysis of Lipkin Gorman is that it involves a 
claim to trust money. This was never put before the court however, and, 
moreover, it was specifically rejected by both Lords Templeman and 
Goff as being in any way part of their reasoning. In any event there are 
difficulties with a trust analysis on the facts of the case as we know 
them. If we take the simplest transactions, those where Cass did not 
place the relevant monies into a building society account, then it is 
relatively easy to say that, since Cass was a fiduciary, the beneficial 
ownership of the monies with which he gambled lay with the solicitors. 
It is also true to say that, since the club gave no consideration for the 
receipt of the monies, the solicitors retained a persisting equitable 
interest in them when the club received them. However, no attempt was 
made to show that the club still retained any of the gambled monies, so 
we simply do not know if this was the case. If they were no longer in 
possession of them it is difficult to see how any claim could be made out 
against the club in respect of them. The fact that the club gave no 
consideration for the monies cannot have had the effect of making them 
the equivalent of knowing recipients. They took the monies in good 
faith, and having parted with them, could no longer have been liable for 
them. They certainly could not have been liable for any traceable 
proceeds of the monies because, as we will see in Chapter 7, equitable 
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claims to substitute assets may only be made against a fiduciary, and it is 
impossible to categorise the club as such with respect to the solicitors.   
As befits the overall nature of this thesis, the examination of 
Lipkin Gorman has concentrated on analysing the reasoning adopted by 
the House of Lords in coming to its decision. It is worth bearing in mind, 
however, that it is far from certain that the outcome produced by that 
reasoning could be regarded as fair and just, even if the reasoning had 
been shown to have been impeccable.  
The critical feature of the case, the one that allowed the solicitors 
to have any prospect of a successful claim against the club, was the fact 
that the effect of s18 the Gaming Act 1845 was that the club gave no 
consideration to Cass in return for the monies that he expended with 
them. This was because that Act provided that there was no enforceable 
agreement between the parties. Had Cass spent the money that he 
obtained from his fraudulent activities at his local supermarket, no claim 
could have arisen against the supermarket. It is hard to justify such a 
discrepancy in outcomes. The club was just as much an innocent 
recipient of Cass’s money as the supermarket would have been. It could, 
of course, be argued that gambling is an activity which should be 
discouraged, and this may, or may not, be correct in social terms, but 
the same could well be said of both smoking and excessive consumption 
of alcohol, but, to repeat the point, no claim could have been made by 
the solicitors against any supermarket at which Cass had spent the 
money, even if he had expended it all on cigarettes and drink. 
The members of the House of Lords may well have thought the 
solicitors the more worthy party of the two, and contrived to find a 
solution to fit this perspective, but, if this is the case, then it is suggested 
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that not only is the decision doctrinally defective, it is also socially 
questionable. If conformation is needed of this latter point it may well 
be seen in the fact that, a mere 24 years after judgment in the case was 
handed down, Parliament passed the Gambling Act 2005. By s334 of that 
Act, s18 of the Gaming Act 1845 was directly repealed, and by s335 
gambling contracts became legally enforceable. Thus, Lipkin Gorman 
could not today have been argued in the way that it was. 
Thus, not only was the analysis in the case defective, the outcome 
was also far from satisfactory. But, leaving this to one side, whatever 
explanation of the case may be found, it certainly cannot be unjust 
enrichment. 
Unjust Enrichment and Proprietary Claims. 
 
The next authority to be examined in this chapter is that of Trustee of 
the Property of F.C. Jones & Sons (A Firm) v Jones.73 Like Lipkin Gorman, 
Jones v Jones has been put forward as a case that demonstrates that 
common law claims to substitute assets arise as a response to unjust 
enrichment.74  
 Jones v Jones was discussed in Chapter 4, where it was analysed in 
response to arguments made by some that it demonstrated that such 
claims lie entirely within the boundaries of the law of property. This was 
shown to be incorrect, but the notion that its origins lie in the law of 
unjust enrichment are equally untenable. 
 Before re-examining the case in any detail, one specific aspect of 
it must be dealt with. This is that, in this case, we are asked to accept 
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that a successful claim in unjust enrichment may lead to proprietary, 
rather than merely personal relief. It will be recalled that the claimant 
was identifying specific money, placed into court, as belonging to it 
rather than to the defendant. It is far from certain that a claim in unjust 
enrichment can ever lead to a proprietary response. Moreover, it had 
never previously been suggested, by those who support the notion that 
a successful unjust enrichment claim may lead to the gaining of 
proprietary rights, that those rights are legal rights. There was no 
authority for that proposition at all. 
The leading authority for the availability of a proprietary 
restitutionary claim is the unsatisfactory case of Chase Manhattan Bank 
NA v Israel- British Bank (London) Ltd.75 
The essential facts are not complicated. C, a bank incorporated 
and trading in the state of New York, paid money into M, another bank 
incorporated and trading in New York, for the benefit of D, a bank 
incorporated and trading in London. As a result of a mistake by one of its 
employees, C paid the money to M twice, and each time M credited it to 
the account of D. It was found that D was aware of the mistake within 
two days of its occurrence. About one month later D petitioned the High 
Court in London, praying to be wound up, and a winding-up order was 
duly made two months later. Immediately it became aware of the 
petition, C sought leave to trace in equity and recover the second 
tranche of moneys paid to D. C was also allowed to prove in Ds 
insolvency, the High Court having held that nothing precluded it from 
asserting both a proprietary claim over specific assets, and a personal 
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claim for money had and received.76 The insolvency left C with the 
likelihood of only a small return from its personal claim.  
The case came before Goulding J as one turning on matters of 
Private International Law. The question was whether the correct law 
governing the case was the law of New York or that of England. In the 
event, the judge decided that the conflict of laws issue did not matter 
because the law of New York and the law of England were the same on 
the crucial issue. He held that, despite having no authority to cite for his 
proposition, the recipient of a mistaken payment is a constructive 
trustee of that payment for the mistaken payer. This certainly reflects 
the law of New York, but there is a fundamental difference between the 
nature of the constructive trust in New York and in England. 
In Re Omegas,77 a creditor claimed that the bankrupt debtor had 
defrauded it by assuring it of its solvency, when the debtor was in fact 
on the point of insolvency. The creditor argued that, as a result, the 
debtor held moneys transferred to it by the creditor, as constructive 
trustee of the creditor. This is hardly an argument likely to succeed 
before an English court,78 but the point is that the United States court 
held that, even if a constructive trust had arisen, a mere entitlement to a 
constructive trust was not an interest that would exclude the assets in 
question from distribution amongst creditors in bankruptcy. The 
reasoning is anathema to the ears of English equity lawyers and is 
summed up by the court saying: 
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A constructive trust, unlike an express trust, is a remedy, it does not exist 
until a plaintiff obtains a judicial decision finding him to be entitled to a 
judgment. 
This is not to say that the decision in Re Omegas has been 
welcomed. It may not even be correct. But even its critics recognise that 
it represents an attempt to deal with the widely regarded, perceived 
unfairness that constructive trusts have the potential to cause in 
insolvency situations. Having roundly condemned the reasoning in Re 
Omegas, Spector J in Re Dow Corning Corp,79 went on to say, however: 
Cases in which the remedy of constructive trusts are sought run the gamut: 
some supplicants like… (that in Re omegas) have a dubious call upon equity; 
while others…present far more sympathetic situations. In the middle lie the 
vast majority of cases where fine distinctions necessitate extremely 
subjective determinations. Trial courts are, as a result of Omegas mercifully 
spared from this onerous task. 
This takes us as far from an English legal conception of a 
constructive trust as it is possible to get. An essential purpose of a 
constructive trust in English law is to give priority in bankruptcy. This 
American version seems neither fish nor fowl. It seemingly creates non-
proprietary property rights. 
This part of the decision in Chase Manhattan did not survive the 
House of Lords determination of Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale 
v Islington District Council.80 In delivering his opinion in Westdeutsche 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson gave it as his opinion that Chase Manhattan was 
wrongly decided. His Lordship considered that the court’s error was 
fixing the date of the formation of the constructive trust at the point of 
                                                     
79 192 BR 428 (Bankr. Ed Mich., 196), Quoted in C. Rotherham, Proprietary Remedies 
in Context, (Hart, 2002) 61. 
80 1996 (AC) 669 (HL). 
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the mistaken payment, rather than at the date that the defendant 
became aware that the payment had been made by mistake. This 
difference is crucial. The remedy for the making of the mistaken 
payment (and hence the unjust enrichment) was a personal one only. 
The creation of the trust in favour of the claimant should have been a 
response not to the defendant’s unjust enrichment per se but to the 
unconscionability of his retaining money which he knew had been 
transferred to him by mistake, and which, he knew he should return to 
the claimant. 
A problem with the Chase Manhattan judgment is that no reason 
was given why the claimant should have acquired a proprietary right. 
The purpose of the law of restitution is to make the defendant “give 
back” to the claimant that which he has unjustly gained at the claimant’s 
expense.81 It is arguable, therefore, that where the subject of the claim 
is the transfer of a right from the claimant to the defendant, the correct 
restitutionary response is to require him to return that right to the 
claimant.82 But this is not what happened in Chase Manhattan. No 
transfer of a right took place. All of the transfers simply created various 
debtor/creditor relationships between the parties. The purpose of the 
trust would presumably be to enable title to the money to be revested in 
the claimant but nothing was transferred from claimant to defendant in 
this case in which title could possibly be revested. 
It is against this background, that there is no good authority for 
the existence of proprietary remedies as a response to unjust 
enrichment even in equity, that the question of whether Jones v Jones 
                                                     
81 M.McInness, “At the Plaintiff’s Expense”: Quantifying Restitutionary Relief” (1998) 
CLJ 472. 
82 A.V.M. Lodder, Enrichment in the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Hart 2012). 
 232 
can be said to be authority for the existence of such a remedy at 
common law must be examined. 
The facts were that a partnership committed an act of bankruptcy, 
following which one of the partners wrote cheques to his wife drawn on 
the partnership account to the value of £11,700. Mrs Jones, the wife, 
invested the money in potato futures. The investment was successful 
and resulted in Mrs Jones being able to withdraw £50,760 from her 
brokerage account which she deposited at Raphaels bank. 
Although no trustee in bankruptcy had been appointed at the 
time that Mr Jones transferred the moneys to his wife it was a principle 
of bankruptcy law at the time83 that the effective date of the bankruptcy 
was the date of the presentation of the petition, and from that date the 
legal interest in the partnership bank account was vested in the trustee. 
This is known as the doctrine of relation back. 
The Official Receiver therefore demanded the entire balance held at 
Raphaels bank in the name of Mrs Jones. Raphaels interpleaded, placed 
the money into court, and asked the court who could give it a good 
receipt for its money. 
It was Peter Birks who first suggested that, properly understood, 
Jones v Jones is an unjust enrichment case. He described it as an 
“unequivocal example” of interceptive subtraction84 – a concept tied 
entirely to the law of unjust enrichment. Birks entered into 
correspondence with one of the judges who decided the case in the 
Court of Appeal, Millett LJ, on that very issue, Millett LJ being equally 
                                                     
83 Bankruptcy Act 1914 (4&5 Geo. 5, c. 59) ss.37,38. 
84 P. Birks, ‘At the Expense of the Claimant: Direct and Indirect Enrichment in English 
Law’ in R. Zimmerman (ed), Unjustified  Enrichment, (CUP 2002) 493. 
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unequivocal that the case had nothing to do with unjust enrichment at 
all. The correspondence was later published.85 
At one level Birks cannot be correct, since the case involved no 
claim of any sort. It will be recalled that the issue was, who was entitled 
to money deposited at Raphaels bank. The bank interpleaded, asking 
which of the parties could give it a good receipt for the money. It is 
possible, however, to re-characterise the action, and describe it as being 
one in which the claimant was saying that, if the defendant were to have 
rights to the money in the account the defendant would be unjustly 
enriched at the claimant’s expense. To a certain extent that did appear 
to be Beldam LJ’s understanding of the case. Even if one does this, 
however, there are substantial problems in the way of viewing the case 
as one based on unjust enrichment. 
First, liability in unjust enrichment is determined at the point of 
receipt of the enrichment. The quantum of liability therefore should 
have been restricted to the £11,700 that Mrs Jones initially received. 
Birks has tried to get around this problem by saying that liability should 
be for not just the receipt of the value by the defendant, but also for the 
ability to exploit the value received. For him it was a clear case of 
interceptive subtraction since the defendant  
Must be understood as intercepting wealth already attributed by law to (the 
claimant) by virtue of arising from the earning opportunities inherent in the 
ownership of the original sum.86 
This is a complete re-write of what had up until that point been 
regarded as the nature of interceptive subtraction. The point of this 
                                                     
85 P. Millet, ‘Jones v Jones: Property or Unjust Enrichment’ in A. Burrows and Lord 
Rodger of Earlsferry (eds), Mapping the Law: Essays in memory of Peter Birks (OUP 
2006) 265. 
86 P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, (2nd ed, Clarendon Press 2005) 82. 
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doctrine was to allow a claimant to make a claim against a defendant 
who had intercepted a benefit that was certainly on its way to the 
claimant. To quote an earlier Birksian version of the doctrine: 
If the wealth in question would certainly have arrived at the plaintiff if it had 
not been intercepted by the defendant en route from the third party, it is 
true to say that the plaintiff has lost by the defendant’s gain.87 
Interceptive subtraction has become, on the new understanding of it, a 
device to prevent a defendant from making a profit by using the 
claimant’s property. But this sounds very much like the law of property 
argument, rejected in the previous chapters, that the rationale behind 
tracing is that the claimant may make a claim to rights in a substitute 
asset simply as a result of having had rights in the original.  
In the case of Jones, moreover, the entire profit was made as a 
result of Mrs Jones skill in investing wisely in the market. If anybody 
stood to be unjustly enriched, it was the claimant who had received the 
benefit of Mrs Jones’s skill and effort, in circumstances where she 
certainly did not intend to benefit the claimant in that way. 
Another difficulty with the Birksian analysis is that it fails to 
address the question of correspondence of loss. It is a moot point as to 
whether an unjust enrichment claimant must show a loss and, if so, 
whether the quantum of the claim is restricted to that loss. Birks did not 
believe it to be the case that a loss must be shown at all88 but judicial 
dicta on the matter are contradictory and confusing89 and it is by no 
                                                     
87 P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Clarendon Press 1989) 
133. 
88 Ibid chap 4. 
89 Hambly v Trott (1776) 1 Cowp 371, 98 ER 1136 (arguably) supports Birks whereas 
B.P. Exploration Co (Libya) v Hunt (No2) (1979) 1 WLR 783 (arguably) goes against 
him. Most of the authorities on the issue come from the United States or Canada. 
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means certain that Birks’s argument has won the day.90 On the face of it 
the only loss made by the claimant was the £11,700 paid by Mr Jones to 
the defendant. As we have seen, Birks would extend liability to cover the 
entire sum in the defendant’s account, on the basis of his new 
understanding of interceptive subtraction, but, unconvincing as that 
argument is, it is not the same thing as saying that the claimant has 
made a loss equal to the increased sum. That would require further 
justification, which has not, so far, been forthcoming.  
There is an alternative argument, which follows from an extended 
understanding of the term “enrichment”.91 According to this argument 
enrichment consists of both the acquisition of value, and the acquisition 
of rights. Thus, if A mistakenly transfers to B a painting, B is enriched 
both by the value of the painting and by the acquisition of rights in that 
painting. If the painting is worth £1000 at the point of receipt, then the 
enrichment in terms of value is £1000. If it subsequently increases in 
value to £5000 and is then sold the enrichment in value terms remains 
at £1000, but the claimant may claim the £5000 representing the 
traceable proceeds of the rights that he had in the painting. Whether 
this analysis works or not with paintings it cannot work in the case of 
Jones. In Jones Mrs Jones received a cheque and banked it. She then 
                                                     
90A. Burrows, The Law of Restitution, (3rd edn OUP 2010) 64 and M. Rush, The 
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Chambers, ‘Two Meanings of Enrichment’ in R. Chambers, C. Mitchell and J.Penner 
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made a series of investments that resulted in a different sum appearing 
to her credit in her bank account. Unlike in the case of the painting, and 
as we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, the right that the claimant was claiming 
in the £50,760 could not have been the same right as he had in the 
£11,700. Such analysis does not work with bank accounts.  
The final case that we will look at in this chapter is Armstrong 
DLW v Winnington Networks Ltd,92 a case discussed in some detail in the 
previous Chapter. To summarise the facts briefly, the claimants were 
fraudulently induced to transfer some EUAs (a transferable European 
carbon trading right, and thus an intangible asset) to the defendants, 
who sold them on to a third party. The claim succeeded in equity on the 
grounds that the fraudster had obtained sufficient legal title to the EUAs 
to enable him to hold them on trust for the claimants. The defendants 
had thus received trust assets in circumstances which, the judge found, 
constituted knowing receipt.  
 However, the judge took time to look at what the position would 
have been had this conclusion been incorrect. He decided, based on his 
understanding of Lipkin Gorman, that the claimants would have had a 
“restitutionary proprietary claim” to the proceeds of the sale of the 
EUAs if legal title to them had at all times remained in their hands. This 
argument was criticised in the previous chapter, but in practical terms it 
is of little significance, since the judge had already decided that title had 
passed to the fraudster. 
Following his discussion of the proprietary restitutionary claim the 
judge went on to consider the possibility that the claimants may have 
had a claim in unjust enrichment. There is a curious contradiction here. 
                                                     
92 (2013) Ch 156. 
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According to the judge there are two distinct ways of looking at 
Lipkin Gorman. It can either be seen as authority for the existence of a 
proprietary restitutionary claim or it could be viewed as being based on 
unjust enrichment. In order for there to be a claim in unjust enrichment, 
however: 
By definition such a claim would suggest that the claimant has lost, and the 
defendant has gained property.93 
This is correct, which makes the statement further on in the judgment 
that: 
So, if contrary to my conclusion above, the Lipkin Gorman case were to be 
correctly analysed as a restitutionary claim for unjust enrichment (because, 
for example Foskett v Mckeown cannot be said to apply to legal title) then I 
would accept that Armstrong’s claim in the present case could have been 
made on this basis, if legal title to the EUA’a did not pass to anyone.94 
On the face of it the last words of the paragraph are a complete 
contradiction of the previous dicta. The judge appears to be saying here 
that the claim in unjust enrichment will lie provided that legal title at all 
times remained with the claimants. Which is both incorrect, and a 
reversal of what he had previously said. 
The most likely explanation for this is that the judge has not made 
it clear that any successful claim in unjust enrichment must be in respect 
of the monies received by the defendants for the onward sale of the 
EUAs, not for the receipt of the EUAs themselves. As far as the EUAs 
themselves are concerned, if title to them remained at all times with the 
claimants, it would be unable to maintain an unjust enrichment claim in 
respect of them because the defendants have not been enriched. If title 
                                                     
93 Ibid 177. 
94 Ibid 186. 
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passed to the defendants, then the claimants would still struggle to 
show that the defendants had been enriched because he gave full value 
for them.95 
However, the monies that the defendant’s received for the 
onward sale of the EUAs are a different matter. If title to the EUAs 
remained with the claimants then, since the defendants sold property 
belonging to the claimants, they must be liable to an action for unjust 
enrichment with respect to the monies received for the sale. If title had 
passed to the defendants it is hard to see how they could be liable at 
common law for the receipt of monies for the sale of property to which 
they held an unencumbered legal title.   
But whatever the rights and wrongs of these arguments they have 
nothing to do with tracing and nothing to do with Lipkin Gorman. The 
reason that tracing mattered in Lipkin Gorman was that it somehow had 
to be shown that Cass was gambling with the solicitor’s money. That is 
not an issue here. The EUAs had, on the judge’s alternative analysis, 
been found to be the property of the claimants. Tracing is therefore 
irrelevant to any personal claim to the monies received by the 
defendants for the sale of that property. 
The judge had, in fact, already rejected the reading of Lipkin 
Gorman as an unjust enrichment case but this does not matter for our 
purposes. Lipkin Gorman is not a relevant authority for the facts in 
Armstrong at all. The fact that it is not a case supporting any direct 
                                                     
95 This is not a universally accepted explanation of the way that unjust enrichment 
works, although it was how Lord Templeman saw it in Lipkin Gorman. Another 
explanation would be that the defendant would have been enriched but would have 
had a defence of change of position available to it.  
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proprietary claim does not automatically make it an authority for an 
unjust enrichment based claim. 
Conclusion. 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the proposition that 
common law claims to substitute assets are a part of the law of unjust 
enrichment. It has been shown that this proposition cannot be 
reconciled with the substantive law of unjust enrichment. Because two 
cases of great significance have been put forward, by academic and 
judicial authority alike, as demonstrating the contrary argument, both 
cases have been looked at in this light. Close analysis of each case shows 
that neither are, properly understood, unjust enrichment claims at all. In 
neither case did the court explain how the facts of that case allowed the 
claimant to establish such a claim. 
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Chapter 7. Equitable Claims To Substitute Assets. 
 
Introduction. 
 
Part 2 of this work was devoted to explaining why it is that the common 
law does not allow claims in respect of rights to substitute assets, and 
why, therefore, it is meaningless to speak of a right to trace at common 
law.  
There is no doubt, however, that it is possible to make claims in 
respect of rights to substitute assets, and there is equally no doubt that 
there are “rules of tracing,” that are part of the substantive law, which 
do determine when one asset may be regarded as a substitute for 
another for the purpose of making a claim.1  It is obvious that claims are 
available in equity in respect of rights in substitute assets. The problem 
arises in explaining the basis on which equity allows such claims, and 
how and why it differs in that respect from the common law. I have 
argued that the explanation for claims to substitute assets cannot come 
from either the law of property or the law of unjust enrichment.2 This 
leaves the common law without any foundational basis for such claims. 
What we need to understand is why equity is able to permit such claims, 
and the circumstances in which it does so.  
 This chapter seeks to explain the basis of the equitable claim, as 
an idiosyncrasy of equity itself. The explanation is the rule that a 
fiduciary may not acquire rights during the course of the performance of 
                                                     
1 See, for example, Clayton’s Case: Devaynes v Noble (1816) 1 Mer 529, 35 WE 781; 
Pennell v Deffell (1853) 4 De G M & G 388, 43 ER 551; Re Hallett’s Estate (1878 
H147), (1880) 13 Ch D 696; Re Oatway (1903) 2 Ch 356; James Roscoe (Bolton) Ltd v 
Winder (1915) Ch 65; Re Tilley’s Will Trust (1967) Ch 1179. 
2 See Part 2 of this work. 
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his fiduciary duties, and that if he does so he must return those rights in 
specie, to his principal.  
In Part 1 it was argued that tracing is an exercise in the normative 
allocation of claims. The purpose of that normative allocation, it will be 
shown here, is to assist courts in ensuring that fiduciaries are held to 
their fiduciary responsibilities.  This has the effect of placing tracing 
where it belongs, firmly within the realm of equity. The effect of this is 
to add further strength to the fundamental argument of this work, that 
tracing, and claims contingent upon it, have nothing to do with the 
common law. There is a reason why equitable claims to rights in 
substitute assets might be available and that reason is unique to equity. 
The reason is the nature of the fiduciary relationship itself. This is 
important, because it also resolves the argument as to whether a 
fiduciary relationship is, or is not, a sine qua non of the application of the 
rules of tracing. Clearly it must be, since the whole purpose of those 
rules is directed at ensuring that a fiduciary does not acquire rights in 
the course of the performance of his fiduciary duties. This argument will 
be developed further in the second section of this Chapter. First, 
however, it is necessary to establish the basic point -  that the 
explanation for the right to assert claims to substitute assets lies in the 
nature of the fiduciary relationship itself. 
Agents Acting Within Their Authority. 
 
The starting point for the explanation of the basis of equitable claims to 
substitute assets lies in the situation of principals whose agents have 
become bankrupt. 
 243 
  We saw in Chapter 3 that until the early years of the 18th century 
principals who vested goods in agents were faced with the problem that 
in the event of the agent’s bankruptcy the law decreed that anything 
found in the agent’s hands at the time of the bankruptcy became subject 
to distribution to his creditors. In Burdett v Willett,3 this perceived 
injustice was resolved by a court of equity holding that where the 
original goods could be distinguished in the hands of the factor4 or an 
identifiable asset could be found in the hands of the factor, which had 
been acquired by him in return for goods exchanged by him pursuant to 
his agreement with the plaintiff, a trust arose in favour of the plaintiff. 
Equity did this by extending the long-held principle that a 
specifically enforceable obligation to convey title to land gave the 
purchaser a proprietary interest, in the form of a trust,5 to debts, so, 
that where the court recognised an obligation to assign a right in specie, 
(as was the case with a principal and a factor) it thereby recognised a 
trust. The basis of equity’s jurisprudence on this issue was agreement. 
The trustee and the factor had to transfer the right in specie to the 
beneficiary or the principal because that is what he had agreed to do. 
We then saw that in Scott v Surman an action for money had and 
received was allowed to lie for the realised value of a right that already 
belonged, in equity, to the claimant. The reason that the right already 
belonged in equity to the claimant was the same reason as was 
identified above. The defendant had agreed to sell the goods on behalf 
of the plaintiff and hand over the proceeds to him and equity treated 
                                                     
3 (1708) 2 Vern 638, 23 ER 107. 
4 Copeman v Gallant (1716) 1 P Wms 314, 24 ER 404; Paul v Birch (1743) 2 Atk 621, 
26 ER 771. 
5  As was explained later in Beckford v Wade (1805) 17 Ves Jun 87, 34 ER 1181, 96. 
 244 
such an obligation as sufficient to create a trust in favour of the 
claimant. Claims such as this are not in any way based upon any 
ownership rights that the claimant had in the original asset. They are 
based entirely on what the defendant had promised to do on the 
disposal of that asset. 
As it is based on agreement the above analysis pre-supposes an 
agent acting within the scope of his authority. When it comes to 
unauthorised investments, such agreement is obviously lacking, and it 
might be thought that an alternative basis of reasoning needed to be 
found. But Chapter 3 showed that this was not the case. The decision in 
Taylor v Plumer,6 extended the principle to agents acting outside the 
scope of their authority. The problem then became to identify the 
underlying basis for this new principle. That it cannot have anything to 
do with the rights that the claimant had in the original asset was shown 
in Chapter 4 and that it is nothing to do with unjust enrichment was 
demonstrated in Chapter 5.  
Justifying Claims Against Agents Acting Outside Their Authority.  
 
The answer proposed here is that the basis is the nature of the fiduciary 
relationship itself. This has nothing to do with fiduciaries making profits 
or acting unconscionably. It is because the fiduciary by accepting his 
fiduciary role accepts that he must prioritise the interests of his principal 
within a particular sphere of activity. As a consequence, by the very 
nature of the fiduciary relationship, the fiduciary may not acquire rights 
in the course of pursuing his fiduciary duties and if he does do he has to 
                                                     
6 (1815) 3 M & S 562. 
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return them to his beneficiary, in specie. This is a purely equitable 
analysis. It cannot be extended to rights arising at common law.  
In Keech v Sandford,7 a trustee was granted a lease to hold on 
trust for an infant. When the time for renewal came the landlord 
refused to renew for the benefit of the infant. The trustee renewed for 
himself. The Court ordered the trustee to assign the benefit of the lease 
to the infant and to account for all profits arising from it.   
There are two significant features of this decision. First it can have 
nothing to do with the principle that a trustee cannot make a profit at 
the expense of his beneficiary. The beneficiary in this case did not, and 
would not in the ordinary course of events, have had the benefit of the 
lease, and therefore could not be said to have made a loss as a result of 
the trustee’s action. Second the court did not order that the lease be set 
aside. It ordered that the lease, together with the profits of the lease, be 
conveyed to the beneficiary. This might be thought of as treating the 
fiduciary as if he had acted within the legitimate sphere of his authority 
but a more compelling suggestion, especially given the way that the law 
subsequently developed, is that the court adopted the principal that a 
principal can claim any gains that a fiduciary acquires in the course of his 
duty. 
20 years after Keech v Sandford, Lord Hardwicke held in 
Whelpdale v Cookson,8 that a trustee could not benefit from the 
purchase of trust property irrespective of whether the beneficiary had 
suffered a disadvantage as a result of the purchase.9  
                                                     
7 (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61, 25 ER 223. 
8 (1747) 1 Ves Sen 9, 27 ER 856. 
9 A similar principle can be found enunciated in York Building Co v MacKenzie (1795) 
7 Bro pc 42, 3 ER 432,67. 
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Each of these cases was cited as authority by Lord Eldon when he 
enunciated the principle that: 
This doctrine as to purchases by trustees, assignees and persons having a 
confidential character, stands much more upon general principle than upon 
the circumstances of any individual case. It rests upon this: that the purchase 
is not permitted in any case,10 however honest the circumstances: the 
general interests of justice requiring it to be destroyed in every instance; as 
no Court is equal to the examination and ascertainment of the truth in much 
the greater number of cases.11 
 We therefore have a clear principle being applied consistently at this 
stage to the effect that a fiduciary cannot act self-interestedly in any 
activity that arises from the performance of his fiduciary duty. 
Somewhat inexplicably, over the course of time, the fairly clear principle 
outlined in this line of cases became altered.  
In Bristol & West Building Society v Motthew,12 for example the 
court seems to have regarded a fiduciary who makes a profit in 
pursuance of his fiduciary duty as being in breach of some ill-defined 
obligation of loyalty, or even of a direct obligation not to make a profit 
out of the trust. According to Millett LJ: 
The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. A 
fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he 
must not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may 
conflict; he must not act for his own benefit or for the benefit of a third 
person without the active consent of his principal.13 
But this ignores the order that was made in Keech v Sandford, 
which was not that the lease be set aside, but that it be conveyed to the 
                                                     
10 Italics not in original. 
11 James, Ex Parte (1803) 8 Ves 337, 32 ER 385. 
12 (1998) Ch 1. 
13 Ibid 18. 
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beneficiary. If the defendant in Keech v Sandford had been found to 
have committed some sort of wrong the correct remedy would have 
been to put the parties back to the position that they were in before the 
wrong was committed. This could not have resulted in the order that the 
court actually made in that case. Prior to the defendant’s acquisition of 
the lease neither claimant nor defendant had it. The effect of Keech v 
Sandford is not to remedy a wrong committed by a fiduciary against his 
beneficiary, but to prevent a fiduciary from ever coming into conflict 
with his principal’s interests in the first place. And it does this by making 
the fiduciary immediately liable for any gain made as a result of any 
transaction carried out in the course of his position. 
Perhaps even more inexplicably, it somehow came to be accepted 
that a loss to the principal is a relevant factor in breach of fiduciary duty 
cases. In Sinclair v Versailles,14 Lord Neuberger said that: 
The beneficiary of a fiduciary’s duties cannot claim a proprietary interest, but 
is entitles to an equitable account, in respect of any money or asset acquired 
by a fiduciary in breach of his duties to the beneficiary, unless the asset, or 
money is, or has been, beneficially the property of the beneficiary, or the 
trustee acquired the asset, or money, by taking advantage of an opportunity 
or right which was properly that of the beneficiary.15 
 In other words the trustee’s actions must have caused the beneficiary a 
loss.  Such a proposition has no basis either historically or in principle. As 
Lord Russell stated: 
The rule of equity which insists on those, who by use of a fiduciary position 
make a profit, being liable to account for that profit in no way depends 
on…whether the profit should or would otherwise have gone to the plaintiff, 
                                                     
14 (2012) Ch 453, applied in FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious (2013) EWCA 
Civ 17. 
15 Sinclair v Versailles (2012) Ch 453.  
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or whether the profiteer was under a duty to obtain the source of profit for 
the plaintiff…or whether the plaintiff has in fact been damaged or benefitted 
by his action…the liability arises from the mere fact of a profit having…been 
made.16 
It is difficult to think of a more explicit statement of the principle 
involved. In commenting on the later case of FHR European Ventures LLP 
v Mankarious,17 Lionel Smith explained Lord Russell’s words as laying 
down a rule that: 
It is not activated by wrongdoing…it is a direct implication of the fact that a 
fiduciary acts, within a sphere of activity, for and on behalf of the principal. 
The implication is that whatever may be extracted from that sphere of 
activity is attributed, as between the fiduciary and the beneficiary, as a 
matter of primary right, to the beneficiary.18 
Smith also referred to the case of Soulos v Korkontzilas,19 
admittedly a Canadian case but nonetheless one that seems perfectly in 
accordance with English law, in which a fiduciary was required to 
transfer a right acquired in the course of his duty, to his beneficiary 
despite the fact that the principal had actually made a loss as a result of 
the transaction. 
The last part of Lord Neuberger’s dicta cannot be regarded as 
saying that it is a requirement that the beneficiary could, or would, have 
had the possibility of actually enjoying the relevant right or opportunity, 
because we have been told that such a question is irrelevant in 
determining the proprietary liability of principals in such 
                                                     
16 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver (1942) 2 AC 134. 
17 (2013) EWCA Civ 17. 
18 L.Smith, ‘Constructive Trusts and the No-Profit Rule’ (2013) 72 CLJ 260. 
19 (1997) 2 SCR 217. 
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circumstances.20 It can only realistically, therefore, mean that the mere 
acquisition by the fiduciary of an opportunity or right, which was 
properly that of the beneficiary, is sufficient to trigger liability. It is the 
principal’s acquisition, not the beneficiary’s loss, which triggers 
proprietary liability. 
In fact, Lord Neuberger had the opportunity to revisit similar 
issues in FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC.21 In 
that case he recognised that the acquisition of a benefit by a fiduciary 
pursuant to an opportunity which results from his fiduciary position, is 
to be treated as having been acquired on behalf of his principal, thus 
giving rise to a proprietary liability. The fiduciary does not have to have 
committed any sort of wrong, and it does not matter that he may have 
acted outside the scope of his fiduciary duty. The fact of acquisition is 
sufficient. 
The role of a fiduciary is to act solely in the interests of his 
principal within the sphere of the fiduciary activity. It is inevitable, 
therefore that, as Lionel Smith explains: 
Whatever may be extracted from that sphere of activity is attributed, as 
between the fiduciary and the beneficiary, as a matter of primary right, to 
the beneficiary.22 
If we now re-examine Taylor v Plumer in the light of these 
authorities, we can see that the best explanation for the case is that by 
acquiring substitute rights in the course of performing his fiduciary 
duties, and the management of trust rights is clearly performing such 
duties, Walsh acquired those rights as a trustee. The effect of Keech v 
                                                     
20 Keech v Sandford, 1726) Sel Cas Ch 61, 25 ER 223; Boardman v Phipps, (1967) 2 AC 
46. 
21 (2014) 3 (WLR) 535. 
22 L.Smith, ‘Constructive Trusts and the No-Profit Rule’ (2013) 72 CLJ 260, 262. 
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Sandford is that there was no other capacity in which he could have 
acquired them. Having thus acquired them he became immediately 
accountable to his principal in respect of them. 
This, then, is the explanation for the basis of the new right that a 
claimant may assert when a fiduciary has acted outside the scope of his 
authority. His accountability arises solely from the fact that the right has 
been acquired in the course of his fiduciary endeavour. It has nothing to 
do with any loss made by the principal. If the fiduciary is a trustee then 
showing that a right acquired by him has arisen as a result of a 
transactional link23 between the acquisition of that right and a right 
originally held on trust for the beneficiary is sufficient for that right to be 
transferred to the beneficiary in specie. The question of whether the 
beneficiary has made a loss as a result of the acquisition is irrelevant. 
The transactional link demonstrates that the right was acquired in the 
course of the defendant’s fiduciary endeavour. Tracing and the 
transmission of value are irrelevant to the analysis. 
When speaking of new rights acquired by trustees and other 
fiduciaries, therefore, proprietary claims do not fit into the pattern of 
the orthodox theory of tracing. They are not explicable by the exchange 
product theory. They have nothing to do with the transmission of claims 
from one right to its traceable proceeds. The reason that the claimant 
has rights in the substitute asset has nothing to do with the rights that 
he had in any original asset. It is purely attributable to the defendant 
having obtained his rights in the course of performing his fiduciary 
duties.  
                                                     
23 See Chapter 2 and the text following footnote 34 for a discussion of transactional 
links. 
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Fiduciary Liability Without Assets. 
 
We have seen that a fiduciary must account in specie for any right 
acquired by him in the course of performing his fiduciary endeavour. Nor 
may he acquire rights by exploiting an opportunity acquired in the 
course of such endeavour. The latter emphasises the point that the rule 
is not based on any rights that the beneficiary had in some original asset 
and that it operates in exactly the same way irrespective of whether 
such an asset existed or not. Thus, in Boardman v Phipps,24 the 
appellants were solicitors to the trustees of a will and a beneficiary of 
that trust. They purchased a controlling interest in a company in which 
the trust itself had a substantial number of shares. The purpose was to 
liquidate the company and return a profit to the trust in respect of the 
shares that it held. The remaining beneficiaries of the trust were not 
informed of the plan. The plan was carried out successfully. One of the 
effects of the success of the plan was that the appellants themselves 
made a profit. In upholding the decision of the Court of Appeal the 
House of Lords made it clear that, although no wrongdoing could be 
attributed to the appellants, they had acquired the rights to the shares 
whilst acting in their fiduciary capacity and that, therefore, they had to 
account for the profit made to the beneficiaries of the trust. 
No trust property has been transferred without authority in this 
case. It has nothing to do with original rights or tracing. It exemplifies 
the point that the rules regarding claim against fiduciaries are not based 
on any rights that a beneficiary may have in an original asset. They are 
based on the nature of the fiduciary relationship itself. 
                                                     
24 (1967) 2 AC 46. 
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The Boundaries of Liability. 
 
Clearly there has to be a limit to the scope of the fiduciary’s liability, and 
that limit is that the fiduciary is only liable for the acquisition of rights 
that he acquires in the actual course of the performance of his fiduciary 
duty. He is not, however, accountable for rights acquired as a result of 
an opportunity that he himself discovers, even if exploitation of such 
opportunities is within the general scope of activities of his principal. 
Thus where a director of a property investment company sees a 
potential investment plot on his way to work and purchases it on his 
own behalf no liability to account arises25 because the fiduciary 
exploited an opportunity that did not arise as a result of the 
performance of his fiduciary duties.26 By contrast where the director is 
sent by his company to assess a plot of land and decides to purchase it 
for himself instead of his company liability to account does indeed arise 
since the fiduciary has exploited an opportunity arising from the 
performance of his fiduciary duty itself.27 The general point of 
importance here is that the presence or absence of a conflict of interest 
between the fiduciary and his beneficiary is irrelevant. The boundaries 
of fiduciary liability have been determined not by specific instances of 
actual conflict between fiduciary and beneficiary but by the general rule 
that the fiduciary can never place himself in the position of exploiting his 
role in the performance of his duties to his own profit. 
                                                     
25 Although it would seem to if the fiduciary was part of a partnership rather than a 
company director. See Partnership Act 1980 s 30. 
26 This example is based on Bhullar v Bhullar (2003) EWCA Civ 324. 
27 This is loosely based on O’Donnell v Shanahan (2008) EWHC 1973. 
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The Fiduciary Requirement. 
 
Having established that the reason that equity allows claims with 
respect to substitute assets is essentially based on the nature of the 
fiduciary relationship, it would be expected that the existence of such a 
relationship is a sine qua non of making such a claim. This is, however, a 
matter of some considerable controversy. Much of this controversy has 
been caused by an over-reliance on the importance of Lionel Smith’s 
“powerful insight”28 concerning the dichotomy between tracing and 
claiming.29 Once it is accepted that this dichotomy is merely a useful 
analytical tool, and cannot be utilised to make points about the nature 
of the substantive law, a large part of the argument opposing the 
fiduciary requirement falls away. 
According to a well-respected textbook:30 
The present position of the English cases is that an initial fiduciary 
relationship is a prerequisite of the right to trace in equity. This was 
reaffirmed in Westdeutsche Landesbank Giroentrale v Islington London 
Borough Council. While the House of Lords overruled the earlier decision of 
Sinclair v Brougham, Lord Browne-Wilkinson was at pains to stress that this 
did not amount to a rejection of the requirement of a fiduciary relationship 
since the House of Lords was not wishing to cast any doubt on the principles 
of tracing established in the later case of Re Diplock. 
Given the weight of authority behind it, this pre-requisite must be taken 
as currently representing the law. In Shalson v Russow,31 Rimer J 
                                                     
28 E. O’Dell, ‘Tracing’ (1999) Dublin University Law Journal, 131. 
29 See Chapter 2 and the text following footnote 57. 
30 R. Pearce, J. Stevens & W. Barr, The Law of Trusts and Equitable Obligations (5th 
edn Oxford 2010). 
31 (2003) EWHC 1637 (Ch). 
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rejected the notion that Foskett v McKeown,32 had effected any change 
in the law, and insisted that a fiduciary requirement remains a pre-
requisite for setting equitable tracing in train. He pointed to the 
speeches of each of their Lordships in that case to show that they either 
had nothing to say on the question; had specifically rejected the idea 
that they were making any attempt to remove the pre-requisite; or 
agreed with the dicta of those of their Lordships who had rejected that 
idea.33  
Orthodox theorists reject the necessity for any such pre-requisite. 
Most attempts to deny its existence turn out to be merely assertions of 
its illogicality, and thus appeals for its removal, rather than as 
demonstrations that the law operates without it. Thus, Lord Millet 
argues that:   
There is certainly no logical justification for allowing any distinction between 
them (i.e. between rules for tracing at common law and rules for tracing in 
equity) to produce capricious results in cases of mixed substitutions by 
insisting on the existence of a fiduciary relationship as a precondition for 
applying equity’s tracing rules.34   
 This argument depends for its validity on the acceptance of the 
basic premise that there is a significant distinction to be drawn between 
tracing and claiming, and that tracing is merely a mechanical exercise in 
identification. But as was shown in Part 1 the utility of this basic premise 
is highly questionable. 
The orthodox position cannot be promoted by showing that the 
courts have extended the notion of a fiduciary to breaking point in order 
                                                     
32 (2001) 1 AC 102. 
33 Ibid 103-104. 
34 Ibid. 
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to get around the pre-condition.  Calnan (who is unquestionably not a 
member of the orthodox school but who supports their analysis in this 
instance) says that there are no examples of claims failing because of the 
lack of a fiduciary duty, since where a fiduciary duty is required it will 
always be found.35 This may be true but it tells against his general point, 
that a fiduciary duty is unnecessary.  Why would courts go to the bother 
of looking for unnecessary (and apparently artificial) relationships if they 
saw no need to do so?  
The Argument from Authority. 
 
In The Law of Tracing,36 Lionel Smith, having pointed out what he 
considers to be the illogicality of any fiduciary pre-condition, goes on to 
argue that its existence is a misunderstanding of the relevant 
authorities.  He commences with In Re Hallett’s Estate.37 
It will be recalled that H was a deceased solicitor who, it was 
discovered during the administration of his estate, had mixed the 
proceeds of the sale of two sets of Russian bonds with his own money in 
his own personal bank account. The first set of bonds belonged to his 
marriage settlement trust (of which he was a trustee) and the second set 
belonged to C for whom he acted as a solicitor and for whom he kept 
the bonds in safe keeping. At first instance Fry J held that C could trace 
from her bonds into the proceeds of H’s account. This was upheld on 
appeal but the court took the opportunity to dissent from certain dicta 
of Fry J in Ex parte Dale & Co,38 where he held that he was bound by a 
                                                     
35 R. Calnan Proprietary Rights and Insolvency (OUP 2010) 314. 
36L. Smith, The Law of Tracing, (Clarendon Press 1997) 120-130. 
37 (1880) 13 Ch D 696. 
38 Re West of England & South Wales District Bank; Ex parte Dale & Co (1879) 11 Ch 
D 772. 
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line of authority to rule that the necessary relationship required, before 
a claimant could trace into the defendant’s bank account, was that of 
trustee and beneficiary.  Almost the entirety of Jessell MR’s judgment 
was devoted to showing that this was incorrect and that any fiduciary 
relationship was sufficient to allow the tracing process to commence. 
Jessell MR, said: 
Has it ever been suggested, until very recently, that there is any distinction 
between an express trustee, or an agent, or a bailee or a collector of rents or 
anyone else in a fiduciary position?...it can have no foundation in principle, 
because the beneficial ownership is the same wherever the legal ownership 
may be. If you have goods bargained and sold to a man upon trust to sell and 
hand over the net proceeds to another; and that other is the beneficial 
owner; but if instead of being bargained and sold, so as to vest the legal 
ownership in the trustee, they are deposited with him to sell as agent, so that 
the legal ownership remains in the hands of the beneficial owner, can it be 
supposed, in a Court of Equity, that the rights of the beneficial owner are 
different, he being entire beneficial owner in both cases? 
I say in principle it is impossible to imagine there can be any difference. In 
practice we know there is no difference, because the moment you get into a 
Court of Equity, where a principal can sue an agent as well as a cestui que 
trust can sue a trustee no such distinction was ever suggested, as far as I am 
aware. Therefore the moment you establish a fiduciary relation, the modern 
rules of Equity, as regards following trust money apply. 
Smith’s analysis of this passage is that it: 
Can be interpreted in two ways. The reference to “following trust money” is a 
compendious reference to the process of tracing and the establishment of 
equitable proprietary rights in the traceable proceeds. The relationship 
between the fiduciary relation and the ability “to follow trust money “is 
unclear. It appears to be a statement that the fiduciary relation is sufficient to 
invoke the “modern rules of equity”. This is a different matter from a 
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statement that it is a necessary condition, or, the other alternative, that it is 
both necessary and sufficient. 
It appears, however, that what Jessel MR was really driving at was not so 
much the process of tracing as the establishment of equitable proprietary 
rights in the traceable proceeds of an asset. In the first part of the quotation 
he stresses that a bailor is the beneficial owner of the thing bailed; like the 
beneficiary of a trust he holds proprietary right. He can therefore assert an 
equitable proprietary interest in its traceable proceeds.39 
It is difficult to accept Smith’s reading of Jessell MR’s dicta. All of the 
judgment leading up to the quoted passage quite clearly deals with the 
question of the circumstances in which a beneficiary can identify a 
substitute asset in the hands of his trustee, when trust monies have 
been mixed with the trustee’s own money, and also how the proceeds 
of an asset purchased with mixed funds may be identified. It is 
concerned with tracing.  The quoted passage simply says that it is not 
only the relationship of trustee and beneficiary which permits the 
commencement of the tracing process. Any fiduciary relationship will 
suffice. Contrary to what Smith says, it is actually extremely unlikely that 
Jessell MR had anything in mind other than tracing. Much of the 
judgment is devoted to showing that the following dicta of Fry J in Ex 
parte Dale were correct and that he should not have departed from 
them: 
Wherever a fiduciary relationship exists, and money coming from the trust 
lies in the hands of persons standing in that relationship, it can be followed 
and separated from any money of their own. That seems to me to be the 
logical result of Pennell v Defell.40 
                                                     
39 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing, (Clarendon Press 1997) 124-125. 
40 Re West of England & South Wales District Bank; Ex parte Dale & Co (1879) 11 Ch 
D 772, 779. 
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This is clearly about tracing.  
 Smith is correct to say that nowhere does Jessell MR state that a 
fiduciary relationship is both a sufficient and a necessary pre-condition 
for commencing the tracing process. However, even if he does not do so 
explicitly, it can surely be inferred from the judgment. The question that 
Jessell MR was addressing was whether tracing could only be 
commenced by a trust beneficiary against his trustee or whether it could 
be commenced by the principal of any fiduciary relationship against the 
fiduciary. If a fiduciary relationship was not necessary at all, the question 
could not have arisen: if tracing could be commenced by any claimant 
against any defendant, the exact nature of the fiduciary relationship in 
Re Hallett’s Estate would have been irrelevant.   
It is suggested, therefore, that Hallett’s Estate does stand for the 
principal that a fiduciary relationship is a necessary pre-condition for 
equitable tracing to take place. 
Smith suggests that Sinclair v Brougham,41 which has also been 
regarded as establishing the need for a fiduciary relationship as a pre-
condition for equitable tracing, is also really about the pre-conditions for 
claiming, not tracing. 
A building society commenced operating as a bank, an action 
which was made ultra vires by legislation. On the society’s insolvency 
the question arose as to whether those depositors who had deposited 
money with the society in its banking capacity could make a claim 
dependent upon tracing their deposits into the assets of the society. The 
personal claim in money had and received was rejected on the grounds 
that such a claim was based on an implied contract to repay and that 
                                                     
41 (1914) AC 398. 
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since an actual contract to repay would not have been possible, being 
ultra vires, it followed that an implied contract would also have been 
impossible. The court appeared unwilling to countenance the natural 
result of this finding, which was that the shareholders would have 
received a very considerable windfall at the expense of the depositors. It 
was held that the depositors had an equitable proprietary claim to the 
traceable proceeds of their deposits. The decision has always been 
controversial,42 not least because of the difficulties in reconciling the 
individual judgments. In Westdeutsche,43 considerable doubt was cast on 
the correctness of much of what was said in the case. 
However, a full reading of the judgment of Lord Parker of Sinclair 
v Brougham, undoubtedly leads to the conclusion that he went out of 
his way to find a fiduciary relationship between the society and the 
depositors. There are difficulties with the one that he found. A depositor 
of money with a bank is in a debtor/creditor relationship with that bank 
not in a fiduciary relationship with it. The point is, however, that the 
reason why such a relationship was being sought after by his Lordship 
was because he recognised that, in its absence, the depositors would be 
unable to trace at all, this being an inevitable consequence of the 
judgment in Hallett. 
 Smith applied the same analysis with respect to the case of In Re 
Diplock.44 The executors of a will made distributions, in what they 
thought was accordance with the terms of the will, to a series of 
charitable bodies. It was subsequently held that the will was void for 
                                                     
42E. O’Dell, ‘Sinclair v Brougham’ in C. Mitchell and P. Mitchell (eds), Landmark Cases 
in the Law of Restitution, (Hart 2006). 
43 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London Borough Council, (1996) 
AC 669 (HL). 
44 (1948) Ch. 465. 
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uncertainty,45 and the next of kin of the testator commenced 
proceedings against the unlawfully paid beneficiaries for the return of 
the monies paid to them. Claims were made both in personam and in 
rem. The substance of the claims in rem was that the claimants could 
trace from the proceeds paid to the beneficiaries into whatever assets 
had subsequently been acquired with those proceeds. 
The Court of Appeal relied heavily on In Re Hallett’s Estate and the 
interpretation of that case in Sinclair v Brougham for its answer. 
According to Smith,46 the Court had nothing to say about the pre-
conditions for equitable tracing and merely emphasised the need for a 
proprietary base before an equitable proprietary claim could succeed in 
a substitute asset. This is a doubtful proposition. 
During the course of his judgment Lord Greene MR said: 
First of all it appears to us to be wrong to treat the principle which underlies 
Hallett’s case as coming into operation only where the person who does the 
mixing is not only in a fiduciary position but is also a party to the tracing 
action…suppose that the sole trustee of (say) five separate trusts draws 100l 
out of each of the trust banking accounts, pays the resulting 500l into an 
account which he opens in his own name , draws a cheque for 500l on that 
account and gives it as a present to his son. A claim by the five beneficiaries 
to follow the money of their respective trusts would be a claim against the 
son. He would stand in no fiduciary relationship to any of them. We recoil 
from the conclusion that all five beneficiaries would be dismissed empty 
handed by the court. 
Unquestionably there are difficulties with this passage. In the example 
that Lord Greene gives there is no tracing that takes place with respect 
to any non-fiduciary at all. The only tracing involved would be to show 
                                                     
45 In Chichester Diocesan Fund and Board of Finance (Inc) v Simpson (1944) AC 341. 
46 L.Smith The Law of Tracing, (Clarendon Press 1997), 127-128. 
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that the money received by the son was trust money. But that would be 
tracing through the bank account of the trustee, who was a fiduciary. As 
explained below, the son in this instance would be liable to return the 
money that he received to the trust, but this has nothing to do with 
tracing. 
 The second difficulty, also discussed in more detail below, is that 
the general principle outlined by Lord Greene, that it is possible to trace 
through the hands of a non-fiduciary provided that the asset being 
traced was originally the subject of a fiduciary relationship, makes little 
sense.  
What is certain, however, is that Lord Greene is saying that a 
fiduciary relationship is necessary before the tracing process can be 
commenced. The court did not accept the overly wide principle 
submitted for the depositors in Hallett’s Estate that “if the property of B 
is found in the hands of A prima facie A is in a wide sense in a fiduciary 
relationship towards B”,47 but it is clear from the judgment that they 
regarded a fiduciary relationship as a fundamental starting point for the 
tracing exercise. According to Smith: 
The case is supposed to show that while the plaintiff must show a fiduciary 
relationship to trace in equity it need not be a fiduciary relationship between 
the plaintiff and defendant. In Agip (Africa) Ltd V Jackson the plaintiff was 
held to be able to trace in equity the value of the money which it had been 
defrauded. It was sufficient that the plaintiffs accountant who had been 
instrumental in the fraud but who had received none of the money owed 
fiduciary obligations to the plaintiff. The artificiality of the reasoning is 
manifest and is manifest and is manifestly unnecessary.so long as it is 
thought that a fiduciary relationship must be established to permit the 
                                                     
47 In Re Diplock, (1948) Ch 465, 527. 
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plaintiff to commence the exercise of tracing in a court of equity the 
inevitable result will be increasingly fictitious attempts to locate fiduciary 
relationships in facts which do not support them.48 
This appears to be conflating two separate arguments. Whatever the 
rights and wrongs of Agip,49 and whether or not the requirement of a 
fiduciary relationship leads the courts to find more and more such 
relationships where such relationships do not truly exist, has nothing to 
do with whether Diplock does, or does not, demonstrate the need for 
such a relationship. The argument that the rule is absurd is not the same 
as demonstrating that it does not exist. The court in Agip clearly thought 
that it did. 
 Interestingly Smith’s language has changed somewhat since the 
publication of The Law of Tracing. Commenting on dicta of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington London 
Borough Council,50 to the effect that it would be possible to trace in 
equity against a thief he says that they represent “the death knell for the 
misguided prerequisite which arguably51 was always based on a 
misunderstanding.”52 In fact they do not represent such a death-knell at 
all. The basis of Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s analysis was that a thief 
becomes a constructive trustee of the stolen asset for the benefit of the 
victim. This analysis has been subsequently doubted.53  
 
                                                     
48 Ibid 128. 
49 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson (1991) Ch 547. 
50 (1996) AC 669 (HL). 
51 My Italics. This is a rather less uncompromising position than the analysis set out 
in The Law of Tracing which does not seem to find the counter position arguable at 
all. 
52 L. Smith, ‘Tracing’ in P. Birks and F. Rose (eds), Lessons of the SWAPS Litigation 
(Mansfield Press 2000) 234. 
53 Shalson v Russow (2005) Ch D 281. 
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The Argument from Principle. 
 
Third Party Liability 
 
The best view on the current state of the authorities is therefore that a 
fiduciary requirement is a necessary pre-condition of the 
commencement of the tracing process. It will be argued in this section 
that it is also the best view taken as a matter of principle alone. The 
underlying basis of the argument that any such pre-condition is 
unprincipled, is the assertion that tracing and claiming are two entirely 
distinct processes, and that the former is solely devoted to the question 
of the identification of an asset which is to be regarded as a substitute 
for an original asset. This line of reasoning was rejected in part 1 of this 
work. This rejection does much to undermine the notion that the 
fiduciary pre-condition is illogical.  
There is, however, a further argument that goes to demonstrate 
that the fiduciary requirement is not only logical, but is also a natural 
consequence of the availability of claims to substitute assets. It will be 
recalled that a central reason that this work rejects the idea that it is 
possible to trace at common law is that the common law allows no 
claims in respect of substitute assets. Thus, it was argued, the 
identification of substitute assets at common law would be a pointless 
exercise. A parallel argument will be advanced here. This states that, 
since the only claims allowable in equity in respect of substitute assets 
are against fiduciaries,54 it makes as little sense to allow equitable 
tracing against non-fiduciaries, as it does to permit common law tracing 
at all. 
                                                     
54 As was shown in the first part of this Chapter. 
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 The simplest example with which to commence the analysis is as 
follows. Suppose that A is a trustee of a £10 note for B. In breach of trust 
A purchases a bottle of wine with that £10 and gives it to X. A has 
acquired the rights to the bottle of wine in the course of his fiduciary 
duty. B has a claim to the right against A and also against anyone in 
whose hands the subject matter of the claim happens to reside except 
for a bona-fide purchaser of the right for value. It is thus unquestionably 
the case that A can claim the bottle of wine in X’s hands. The reason for 
this was explained by Lord Millett: 
A beneficiary of a trust is entitled to a continued beneficial interest not 
merely in the trust property but in its traceable proceeds also, and his 
interest binds everyone who takes the property or its traceable proceeds 
except a bona-fide purchaser without notice.55 
A beneficiary is entitled to require any person into whose hands trust 
assets come, to transfer those assets back to the trust.56 It can be said 
that the beneficiary’s equitable right persists into the hands of any 
person who has those rights in his possession and who is not a bona-fide 
purchaser of those rights for value.  
In our example the bottle of wine is undoubtedly the traceable 
proceeds of the original £10 note. Moreover, the claim to the bottle of 
wine is not against A, the trustee, but X. However, the tracing process 
itself did not involve X. The bottle of wine was established as the 
substitute for the £10 before it came into X’s possession. This is because 
B is entitled to adopt A’s unauthorised substitution of the £10 note for 
the bottle of wine. Having done so the bottle of wine became impressed 
                                                     
55 Foskett v McKeown (2001) 1 AC 102. 
56 Pilcher v Rawlins (1871-72) LR 7 Ch App 259. 
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with an equitable interest under the original trust.57 X is not liable to 
return the bottle of wine to the trust because it is the traceable 
proceeds of the original £10 note. He is liable to return it because the 
bottle of wine in his possession is itself a trust asset. The wine has been 
followed into X’s hands, not traced into them. 
This analysis makes good sense where X knows that the bottle of 
wine is a trust asset. It is less certain that it makes such good sense 
where X is an innocent recipient. X is in no sense a fiduciary and has no 
reason to put B’s interests above his own. Moreover, there is a stark 
contrast to the situation where X is the innocent recipient of goods that 
A has stolen from B where no trust exists. In such circumstances X 
cannot be compelled to give up the property. B has a personal claim 
only. It is difficult to justify this dichotomy. 
 This simple example can be made rather more complicated 
however. Suppose that X gives the bottle of wine to Y. Much now 
depends on whether X was an innocent recipient or not. If he was, no 
claim will lie against him. There is no proprietary claim available because 
he is no longer in possession of any trust asset. Equally there is no 
personal claim because the claim in knowing receipt requires that the 
recipient knows that he received trust assets in breach of trust.58 If, on 
the other hand, X did know that the bottle of wine was a trust asset he is 
personally liable to B in knowing receipt. The basis of this liability has 
never been properly articulated, but what it is has ramifications for the 
tracing argument being conducted here.  
                                                     
57 C. Mitchell & S. Watterson, ‘Remedies for Knowing Receipt’ in C. Mitchell (ed), 
Constructive and Resulting Trusts, (Hart 2010) 115, 116. 
58 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc, (1995) 69 P 7 CR D25 
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 Despite much ink having been spilt in devising arguments to the 
contrary59 the best explanation of the liability of the knowing recipient is 
that he holds trust assets on the basis that he is personally liable to 
account as a constructive trustee.60 One argument in favour of this 
conclusion is that it is supported by a long line of authority showing that 
equity fixes knowing recipients with some of the duties that are 
voluntarily assumed by express trustees.61 Perhaps the clearest 
statement to this effect came from Lord Westbury LC: 
The wrongful receipt and conversion of trust property place the receiver in 
the same situation as the trustee from whom he received it, and by the 
principles of this court he becomes subject in a Court of Equity to the same 
rights and remedies as may be enforced by the parties beneficially entitled 
against the fraudulent trustee himself.62 
The conclusion that a knowing recipient receives trust property as a 
constructive trustee also makes sense as a matter of principle. His core 
                                                     
59 P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution, (Clarendon Press 1985) 80-82; P. 
Birks, ‘Persistent Problems in Misdirected Money: A Quintet’ (1993) LMCLQ 218, 
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duty is to restore the misapplied trust property.63 If he has disposed of it 
he must account to the trustees for the current monetary value of the 
property.64 The trust beneficiary need not allege any wrongdoing on the 
part of the knowing recipient when seeking relief. All that he needs to 
show is that the recipient received the property. The primary obligation 
to restore the property operates irrespective of any wrongdoing on the 
recipient’s behalf.65 
 It is true that the lack of any need for the claimant to demonstrate 
that the recipient has committed any form of wrong still permits of the 
possibility that the basis of the claim is one in unjust enrichment. There 
are, however, substantial difficulties facing an argument that a knowing 
recipient is unjustly enriched at the expense of a trust beneficiary.66 
First, what the knowing recipient in our example acquired was legal title 
to the bottle of wine. This was something that the beneficiary never had. 
Legal title rested previously with the trustee. Second, an unjust 
enrichment analysis would not require a defendant to receive trust 
property at all. It is a requirement of liability in knowing receipt that a 
defendant does actually receive the property,67 but if the only purpose 
of that requirement were to demonstrate enrichment it would be 
unnecessary, because enrichment can, in certain circumstances, be 
identified without it. Suppose that A is a trustee of a £10 note for B and 
                                                     
63 C. Mitchell & S. Watterson, ‘Remedies for Knowing Receipt’ in C. Mitchell (ed), 
Constructive and Resulting Trusts, (Hart 2009) 115, 132. 
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65 Green v Weatherill (1929) 2 Ch 213. 
66 For a detailed survey of these difficulties see L. Smith, ‘Unjust Enrichment, 
Property and the Structure of Trusts,’(2000) 116 LQR 412. 
67 Satnam Investments Ltd v Dunlop Heywood & Co Ltd (1999) 1 BCLC 385 (CA); 
Goose v Wilson Sandford & Co (a firm) (2000) EWCA Civ 73; Trustor AB v Smallbone 
(No 2) (2001) 1 WLR 1177. 
 268 
uses that money to pay a debt that X owes to Y. Doubtless it can be 
shown that X has been enriched at B’s expense, because B’s property 
has been used to discharge his debt, but X is not liable in knowing 
receipt in such circumstances.68 The requirement that the defendant 
actually receives trust property only makes sense in the context of him 
owing custodial duties as a trustee of the property.69 
 The reason that it is important for the tracing discussion to 
establish that a knowing recipient receives trust assets as a constructive 
trustee is that it opens the door to the argument that tracing against a 
knowing recipient involves tracing in circumstances where the 
defendant is a fiduciary. To say that a person is a constructive trustee is 
not necessarily to say that he is a fiduciary. The connection between the 
two was drawn in Ultraframe (UK) Ltd v Fielding,70 where Lewison J 
attributed the liability of a knowing recipient to account for profits that 
he made from trust assets to the “fundamental rule that a fiduciary must 
not make any unauthorised profit from his position.”71 
However, many writers have stressed the inapplicability of notions 
such as fiduciary liability in respect of trusts created by operation of 
law.72 This is because, in their view, trusts can arise where the 
constructive trustee knows nothing of the trust. But even if this is 
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possible in certain circumstances,73 the case of the knowing recipient is 
not one of them. The knowing recipient receives trust assets knowing 
that they are exactly that. None of the arguments that could be 
employed to argue that fiduciary duties should not be imposed on 
unknowing actors can be employed here. 
It is certainly the case that consent is usually regarded as being 
central to fiduciary responsibility.  Thus, according to Millett LJ:74 
A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another 
in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of 
trust and confidence. The distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the 
obligation of loyalty…a fiduciary must act in good faith; he must not make a 
profit out of his trust; he must not place  himself in a position where his duty 
and his interest may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the 
benefit of a third person without the informed consent of his principal. This is 
not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature 
of fiduciary obligations. They are the defining characteristics of a fiduciary.75 
However, this is not a universally accepted view, and Lord Browne-
Wilkinson has warned us against making too many generalisations with 
respect to fiduciary responsibilities: 
The phrase “fiduciary duties” is a dangerous one giving rise to the mistaken 
assumption that all fiduciaries owe the same duties in all circumstances. This 
is not the case. Although so far as I am aware every fiduciary is under a duty 
not to make a profit from his position…the fiduciary duties owed by, for 
example, an express trustee, are not the same as those owed by an agent.76 
                                                     
73 Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington 
London Borough Council (1996) AC 669 appears to have closed off the possibility by 
rejecting the notion that a trust exists whenever legal and equitable titles are 
separated. 
74 In Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew (1998) Ch 1. 
75 My Italics. 
76 Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (1995) 2 AC 145. 
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Even if it could be said that the essence of fiduciary responsibility 
is that the fiduciary volunteers for that responsibility, it could be argued 
that the acceptance of trust assets knowing that the receipt makes him a 
constructive trustee is the moral equivalent of accepting fiduciary 
responsibility by volunteering to do so.  
This, therefore, is the response to the argument that tracing 
through the hands of a knowing recipient demonstrates that the 
fiduciary pre-condition for tracing is incorrect. The knowing recipient is a 
fiduciary. To return to our example, A is a trustee of a £10 note for B. In 
breach of trust A purchases a bottle of wine with that £10 and gives it to 
X. If X knows of the breach of trust and subsequently sells the bottle of 
wine to Y then B can trace from the bottle of wine into the proceeds 
received by X. The reason for this is that X has acquired a right during 
the course of the performance of the fiduciary duty that he owes to B. 
 None of this analysis, however, can be applied to the situation 
where X receives property not knowing that it is trust property, and then 
sells it to Y. Here X cannot be deemed a fiduciary, but it would seem that 
B can nonetheless trace from the bottle of wine into the proceeds of the 
sale. The difficulty is understanding why this should be the case. In an 
otherwise detailed examination of persistent equitable rights Mitchell 
and Watterson relegate the matter to a footnote which says: 
This does not explain why the beneficiaries should acquire an equitable 
proprietary interest in new property which has been acquired with 
misdirected trust property by a recipient other than a bona fide purchaser. In 
this case, if the recipient has knowledge of the breach, then it might be said 
that he acts unconscionably if he uses the trust property to acquire the new 
property and that he holds the new property on constructive trust for that 
reason; alternatively (and necessarily in cases where he has no knowledge of 
 271 
the breach) the source of the beneficiaries equitable interest in the new 
property is the law of unjust enrichment.77 
But we saw in Part 2 of this work, and in the discussion above, that it 
cannot be the law of unjust enrichment that explains the defendant’s 
liability. The use of the word “necessarily” in the quotation above is 
strongly suggestive of the fact that no alternative explanation exists if 
unjust enrichment is excluded.  
There are almost no cases that directly address this issue. It is 
simply regarded as a given that, in our example, B can make a 
proprietary claim to the proceeds of the sale of the wine in X’s hands.78  
In the absence of any feasible explanation as to why this should be so, it 
is suggested that this is incorrect. It cannot be enough to merely cite the 
notion of a persistent equitable interest, as if all of the consequences 
that follow from that notion speak for themselves. We saw above why 
the trust asset itself remains in the beneficial ownership of the 
beneficiary wherever it may be sited, and we also saw why a knowing 
recipient who has disposed of the trust asset may be subject to tracing 
in order to make a proprietary claim in respect of the proceeds of the 
sale of the trust asset. None of this has any relevance to the case of an 
innocent recipient who disposes of trust assets. Unless and until we 
have a case where the court considers facts that are on all fours with our 
example the better view is that it has not been established that it is 
possible to bring a proprietary claim against an innocent recipient for 
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the proceeds of the disposal of trust assets. Given that such a claim is 
not possible it follows as a matter of practicality that tracing is also not 
possible in such circumstances. To repeat the question that has been 
asked before in this work, what is the point of allowing the identification 
of a substitute asset in circumstances where no claim can be made in 
respect of that asset? 
There is an intermediate argument, supposedly attributable to 
dicta in Diplock,79 cited above,80 to the effect that it is necessary to 
identify a fiduciary relationship with respect to the original asset before 
equitable tracing can commence, but the resultant claim need not be 
against the fiduciary himself. But even more than in the examples we 
have just looked at, this calls for a proper explanation telling us why this 
should be the case, and none has been forthcoming. It entails accepting 
the proposition that, in our initial example, because A has a fiduciary 
relationship to B in respect of the £10 note, B can make a claim against X 
in respect of the proceeds of the sale of the bottle of wine, which X was 
given by A, without knowledge of its provenance. This is not 
supportable. How can the fiduciary relationship between A and B in any 
way affect X?  That fiduciary relationship tells us nothing about why B 
can make his claim against an innocent third party. A fiduciary 
relationship is a peculiarly personal relationship whereby one party 
agrees to make his own interests subsidiary to that of his beneficiary for 
the purposes of dealing with the assets that form the basis of the 
relationship. The fiduciary relationship by itself is sufficient to explain 
why a fiduciary must return rights, in specie, that he has acquired during 
                                                     
79 Re Diplock (1951) AC 251. 
80 See text accompanying footnote 46 above. 
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the course of his fiduciary endeavour. This argument is unavailable 
against an innocent third-party recipient, and it cannot be somehow 
transmitted to him merely because the original asset was subject to such 
a relationship. In the absence of any explanatory justification, to the 
contrary, it is best to confine the liability of innocent recipients of trust 
assets to the proprietary liability to return the trust asset if it is still in 
their possession.  
We can therefor conclude that with respect to third party 
recipients of trust assets, the only tracing that is permitted is that 
against a knowing recipient who no longer has possession of the asset. 
The reason that tracing is permitted is that the recipient is not only a 
constructive trustee with respect to that asset, he is also a fiduciary. 
Theft. 
 
The only other area of any significance where it might be thought that a 
fiduciary relationship is not necessary before equitable tracing can 
commence is that of theft. Thus, if A steals B’s bicycle and sells it to C for 
£10, it has been suggested that B has an equitable claim to the £10 in A’s 
hands, which can be established by showing that the £10 is the traceable 
proceeds of the bicycle. This suggestion appears to have the backing of 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson. In Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v 
Islington London Borough Council,81 his Lordship said that: 
Moneys can only be traced in equity if at some stage there has been a breach 
of fiduciary duty, i.e. if either before the theft there was an equitable 
proprietary interest or such interest arises under a resulting trust arising at 
the time of the theft…I agree that the stolen monies are traceable in equity. 
But the proprietary interest which equity is enforcing in such circumstances 
arises under a constructive not a resulting trust…although it is difficult to find 
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clear authority for the proposition, when property is obtained by fraud equity 
imposes a constructive trust on the fraudulent recipient; the property is 
recoverable and traceable in equity.82 
Despite the authority of the source of these dicta they cannot be 
correct. In our example B has retained legal title to the bicycle 
throughout. As Lord Browne-Wilkinson himself pointed out in the same 
case a person who holds the unencumbered legal title to property does 
not hold both the legal and the equitable title to it. There is no equitable 
title to hold. All of that person’s rights with respect to the property are 
attributable to his ownership of the legal title alone. It is, of course, true 
that A has acquired a possessory title to the bicycle that is good against 
the whole world except B, but that cannot be the trust right in question 
because A does not hold it for the benefit of B. B already has that right 
independently of A.  
As far as the few authorities cited by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in 
support of his proposition are concerned there is considerable doubt as 
to their utility. In Shalson v Russow,83 Rimer J said: 
As to Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s more general proposition in the second 
paragraph that property obtained by fraud is automatically held by the 
recipient on a constructive trust for the person defrauded, I respectfully 
regard the authorities he cites as providing less than full support for it.84 
Critically for the argument put forward here, the judge also said, 
speaking of the common law’s inability to trace into a mixed bank 
account: 
Equity has traditionally been regarded as similarly incompetent unless it 
could first identify a fiduciary relationship, but in many cases of theft there 
                                                     
82 Ibid 716. 
83 (2005) Ch D 281. 
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will be none. The fact that, traditionally, equity can only trace into a mixed 
bank account if that precondition is first satisfied provides an unsatisfactory 
justification for any conclusion that the stolen money must be trust money so 
as to enable the precondition to be satisfied. It is either trust money or it is 
not; if it is not it is not justified to supposedly change its character so as to 
supposedly bring it within equity’s power to trace.85 
We learn from Shalson v Russow, therefore, that the stolen bicycle in 
our example is not held in trust for B by A, that A is not a fiduciary for B, 
and that therefore B cannot trace from the bicycle into the £10 received 
by A as proceeds for the sale of the bicycle. 
The Expansion of Fiduciary Liability. 
 
The main argument of this chapter has been that it is the nature of the 
fiduciary relationship itself that explains why a principal may demand 
the transfer, in specie, of any right that a fiduciary acquires in the course 
of the performance of his fiduciary duty. It is the clear message of Keech 
v Sandford,86 and the line of cases derived from it, that the purpose of 
this rule has nothing to do with the stripping of ill-gotten gains, or the 
reinforcement of duties of loyalty. Its purpose is to prevent a fiduciary 
from ever coming into conflict with his principal, by ensuring that any 
rights acquired by the fiduciary during the course of performing his 
fiduciary duty are acquired for the benefit of the principal. The reason 
for this, is that this is exactly what the fiduciary has undertaken to do. 
Tracing is a mechanism developed by courts of equity to ensure that the 
fiduciary cannot defeat this purpose by saying that, since he is no longer 
in possession of the right in question, or that the right in question 
cannot be precisely identified in his hands, the principal can make no 
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claim to it. From this basis, the courts have developed a series of 
normative rules (which we refer to as the rules of tracing) to assist them 
in this regard. Provided that we understand that these rules are indeed 
normative, and are not the natural outcomes of following value as it 
moves from one asset to another, nor are designed in order to prevent 
some ill-defined conception of unjust enrichment, this is a perfectly 
satisfactory development. 
Because this is the essential purpose of the tracing process, we 
have seen that, unsurprisingly, tracing can only take place where the 
defendant stands in a fiduciary relationship to the claimant, in respect of 
the original right being traced. This is no accident. It is fundamental to 
the tracing process. Nor can this rule be reduced to the principle that 
equitable tracing may be utilised by any claimant who can show an 
equitable interest in the original asset. We have already seen that there 
is no foundation for such a right outside the ambit of the fiduciary 
relationship. Demonstrating that the claimant had an equitable interest 
in the original asset cannot explain why he should have any interest in a 
substitute asset in the hands of a non-fiduciary. Neither the law of 
property nor the law of unjust enrichment can supply that explanation. 
 It has been argued by orthodox theorists that the fundamental 
link between the fiduciary relationship and equity has been weakened 
by the seeming willingness of courts to extend the boundaries of 
fiduciary relationships, when they wish to allow the tracing exercise, in 
cases where the existence of such a relationship looks doubtful. Thus, 
Calnan says that: 
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It is difficult to find an example of a case in which an equitable tracing claim 
has failed solely on the basis that there was no fiduciary relationship 
between the parties.87 
This is not a particularly compelling statement, and unfortunately the 
only case that Calnan cites going the other way, that is confirming his 
belief that courts will always find a fiduciary relationship if they need 
one, is Chase Manhattan,88 which, as will be shown below, is not 
promising ground for the development of such an argument. This is not 
to say that Calnan must be wrong. It is perfectly possible that faced with 
the alternatives of identifying marginal fiduciary relationships, or of 
refusing what they consider to be otherwise meritorious claims, courts 
might sometimes adopt the former approach. But the number of times 
that this has occurred should not be overstated, and the fate of some of 
the more well- known examples of such an approach suggests that, in 
reality, it does not represent a challenge to the argument put forward 
here, that tracing is an exercise dedicated to the preservation of the 
integrity of the fiduciary relationship. Indeed, Calnan can do little better 
than cite two Australian cases on theft, and some dicta of La Forest J in 
the Canadian case of Lac Minerals v International Corona Resources,89 as 
authorities for his argument. By contrast, it was made clear by Rimer J in 
Shalson v Russo,90 that the process of finding fiduciary relationships 
where none exist is illegitimate. Speaking of the common law’s inability 
to trace into a mixed fund his Lordship said: 
Equity has traditionally been regarded as similarly incompetent unless it first 
could identify a relevant fiduciary relationship, but in many cases of theft 
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there will be none. The fact that, traditionally equity can only trace into a 
mixed bank account if that precondition is first satisfied provides an 
unsatisfactory justification for any conclusion that the stolen money must 
necessarily be trust money so as to enable the precondition to be satisfied. It 
is either trust money or it is not. If it is not it is not legitimate to artificially 
change its character so as to bring it within the supposed limits of equity’s 
power to trace: the answer is to develop those powers so as to meet the 
special problems raised by stolen money.91 
Perhaps the best-known example of a court “creating” a fiduciary 
relationship in order to, as it saw it, do justice, is Sinclair v Brougham.92 
But, even in that case, the court did not find a fiduciary relationship out 
of thin air. It believed that the reasoning in Hallett’s Estate,93 backed up 
its conclusion that a bank which borrowed money from depositors when 
such borrowings were ultra vires the power of the bank, took the monies 
as resulting trustees for those depositors. It was not a big step to go 
from there to saying that the bank was a fiduciary of the depositors in 
respect of those monies. Sinclair v Brougham did not survive its re-
examination in Westdeutsche,94 on this point, although a judge as 
eminent as Lord Goff disagreed strongly with its overruling, and it is now 
accepted that it had nothing to do with tracing anyway, but it cannot be 
utilised to demonstrate the court’s disregard for the relationship 
between fiduciary relationships and claims to substitute assets. 
More difficult to explain is Chase Manhattan.95 Here a fiduciary 
relationship was deemed to exist between banker and customer on the 
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basis of a mistaken payment made to the bank by the customer (as it 
happened, a different bank). The banker/customer relationship is clearly 
one of debtor and creditor but the court found that, the very fact that 
the payment by the customer constituted an operative mistake 
sufficient to found a claim in unjust enrichment, was sufficient to change 
that relationship to that of trustee and beneficiary. This finding also 
failed to survive Westdeutsche but, irrespective of that, it entirely lacks 
credibility with respect to any fiduciary relationship. To say that a 
fiduciary relationship can be created when the supposed fiduciary has 
no knowledge whatsoever of his role, or even of the circumstances 
which created it, is not to extend the boundaries of the fiduciary 
relationship but to reinvent it entirely. Moreover, although there was 
much discussion of tracing in Chase Manhattan, it is hard to see its 
relevance. Once it was decided that the claimant had an equitable 
interest in the monies deposited with the defendant then it simply had 
to argue that monies to that value did not form part of the defendant’s 
insolvent estate. Tracing did not need to come into the discussion at all. 
It is undoubtedly true that fraud, and especially large-scale cross 
boarder fraud, is a substantial problem in the modern world, but it is 
suggested that the way to deal with such issues is not to adopt, or adapt, 
a doctrine designed for far different purposes, but to develop 
specialised, modern, procedures for a specialised, modern, problem. 
Creating new fiduciary relationships where they clearly do not exist is 
not the solution, and, as Shalson v Russo demonstrates, is not in any 
case a legitimate process. 
 Moreover, the fact that tracing may not be available to a claimant 
need not mean that he is left without any form of remedy. For example, 
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we saw in Chapter 2, that, In the context of monies transferred without 
authority from company bank accounts, in circumstances which meant 
that the claimant could not avail himself of the tracing exercise, it is 
possible to reconceptualise the issues to obviate the need for any 
tracing. So, it was shown that, in cases such as Relfo v Varsani,96 it is 
possible to use the notion of a transcational link to demonstrate that, 
what appears to be a series of transactions going through mixed bank 
accounts, can be reduced to a single one between the claimant and 
defendant. This process enables claims to be brought by the claimant 
based on a direct transfer, and removes issues of tracing entirely from 
the case. By developing and extending this type of analysis it should be 
possible to come to terms with the problems of 21st century fraud 
without artificially treating the cases involved as being dependent on 
tracing. 
Conclusion. 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to explain why tracing is, under some 
circumstances, available to a claimant in equity when it can never be 
utilised in order to make a common law claim. The reason is the nature 
of those circumstances themselves. The only claims that are available to 
a claimant in respect of a substitute asset are where the claim is an 
equitable one against a defendant who was a fiduciary of the claimant. 
This also explains why a fiduciary relationship is a necessary 
precondition to the tracing process. Since no claims are available to 
where the defendant is not a fiduciary it makes no sense to say that 
tracing can take place where such a relationship does not exist. 
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Fortunately, the precondition remains part of the substantive law and no 
attempts to utilise the supposed dichotomy between tracing and 
claiming should be allowed to change this. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion. 
 
It was said in the introduction to this thesis that, in order to answer the 
question “is it possible to trace into substitute assets at common law”, it 
would be necessary to question the entire basis of what was described 
as the orthodox theory of tracing. What has emerged from this work is 
that the answer to the question is no. Moreover, we have also seen that 
there is very little in the orthodox theory that it is possible to support. 
 In Part 1 the critical underpinnings of the orthodox theory were 
shown to be without foundation. It was shown that following is not, in 
all but its simplest manifestations, a simple process of tracking an asset 
as it moves from person to person. In particular, following assets that 
have become mixed with other assets was shown to be a normative 
process. Who is entitled to what under such circumstances depends 
upon considerations which have little to do with determining the exact 
physical make-up of the resultant mixture. Importantly, for the 
argument in the remainder of the work, it was also argued that following 
money as it passes through bank accounts cannot be treated as being 
the same process as following physical assets into mixtures. Money in a 
bank account is not a mixture at all. A bank account is a debtor/creditor 
relationship. The account holder has rights against his bank to the value 
of the balance held in his account. If he withdraws money from that 
account his existing right is expunged, and a new right arises to the value 
of his new balance. Any money placed into the account becomes the 
property of the bank. Bank accounts are thus entirely different to 
physical mixtures.  
According to the orthodox theory we trace value from asset to 
asset. Tracing is thus, like following, merely a process of identification. 
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The only difference is that following concerns identifying the same asset 
as it moves from one person to another whereas tracing is about 
identifying a new asset (by following the same value) in the hands of one 
individual, which can be said to represent an original asset in which a 
claimant had rights.   
We have seen that the idea that tracing is a simple process of 
identification in which value is followed from one asset to another 
cannot be sustained. Value is too imprecise a notion to permit the idea 
of it being followed. When we trace we do not, in fact, pursue anything 
continuous. Tracing is a metaphor for the normative process of deciding 
which claims the law should permit with respect to substitute assets. 
This has consequences for the orthodox position that there is a rigid 
distinction to be drawn between the processes of tracing and claiming. 
Since tracing is not a neutral process of identification, but is a normative 
exercise in the allocation of claims, it makes no sense to say that tracing 
can be available to a claimant in circumstances in which it is impossible 
for him to make a claim. Tracing and claiming are all part of a single 
process. What has emerged over the course of the work is that the law 
only permits claims to substitute assets to be made against fiduciaries by 
those entitled to the benefit of the fiduciary’s loyalty. Since this is the 
case it follows that tracing can only ever take place where the defendant 
is a fiduciary and the claimant is a person who is entitled to the benefit 
of that relationship.  
It is against this background that the discussion of common law 
tracing, which occupies Part 2 of this work, should be understood. The 
central argument of Part 2 is that the common law allows no claims to 
substitute assets. Since such claims can never be sustained it would 
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make no sense, given what has just been said, for the law to engage in a 
process of identifying a substitute asset where a claim in respect of that 
asset is necessarily unavailable. 
For many years, Taylor v Plumer,1 was cited as the central 
authority for the right to trace at common law. It is now universally 
accepted that that it is a case decided entirely on equitable 
considerations, and says nothing about the availability of common law 
rights and claims. This fact, however, has had little effect on the 
assumption that such claims are possible. This thesis shows that this is 
entirely the wrong approach. In Taylor v Plumer a common law court 
recognised an already existing equitable right. It had been established in 
Scott v Surman,2 that common law courts could recognise such rights in 
order to prevent a claimant’s action failing in a common law court when 
it would inevitably succeed in a court of equity. But this is not the same 
as saying that any common law rights were recognised in Taylor v 
Plumer.  But there is no authority for the existence of the common law 
right that is not, in one way or another, dependent on Taylor v Plumer. 
Even those cases that do not cite it directly rely on other cases, which 
are themselves reliant on it. Such little independent judicial reasoning as 
there has been has almost exclusively concentrated on explaining the 
nature of the right, without ever asking whether it exists at all. The lack 
of any proper judicial support would be less critical were it not for the 
absence of any normative support for such claims. Neither the law of 
property nor the law of unjust enrichment can explain why it is possible 
to make the claim. 
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In general, those who support the notion of common law tracing 
do so by default. They seldom seek to justify its existence. It is regarded 
as a given fact that it is permitted. The most that one gets is some 
discussion concerning the limits of that tracing – for example whether it 
is possible to trace at law into a mixed bank account. Even those who 
have contributed to demonstrating the lack of supporting material for 
the existence of common law tracing have been prepared to concede its 
existence. This thesis demonstrates that such concessions are illogical 
and unnecessary. 
 One of the few direct justificatory supporting analyses for the 
existence of common law tracing comes from Millett LJ 
In  Jones v Jones,3 he stated that: 
In Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson I said that the ability of the common law to trace 
an asset into a changed form in the same hands was established in Taylor v 
Plumer…In this it appears that I fell into a common error, for it has since been 
convincingly demonstrated that, although Taylor  v Plumer was decided by a 
common law court, the court was in fact applying the rules of equity…but this 
is no reason for concluding that the common law does not recognise claims 
to substitute assets or their products. Such claims were upheld by this court 
in Banque Belge Pour l’Etranger v Hambrouck and by the House of Lords in 
Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd. It has been suggested by commentators that 
these cases are undermined by their misunderstanding of Taylor v Plumer but 
that is not how the English doctrine of stare decisis operates. It would be 
more consistent with that doctrine to day that, in recognising claims to 
substituted assets, equity must be taken to have followed the law even 
though the law was not declared until later. Lord Ellenborough C.J. gave no 
indication that, in following assets into their exchange products, equity had 
                                                     
3 Trustee of the Property of F.C. Jones & Sons (A Firm) v Jones  (1997) Ch 159. 
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adopted a rule which was peculiar to itself or which went further than the 
common law.4 
These dicta are not easy to understand. They appear to be saying that, 
despite the previously accepted leading case on common law tracing 
being revealed as having nothing to do with that doctrine, subsequent 
cases have confirmed the existence of such a right. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that those cases depend upon Taylor v Plumer 
for a large part of their reasoning. It is hard to see how the doctrine of 
stare decisis could justify such a notion. Banque Belge,5 relied heavily on 
Taylor v Plumer,6 and Lipkin Gorman,7 relied on Banque Belge as well as 
on Marsh v Keating,8 which has also been shown to have had nothing to 
do with tracing at common law. It is difficult to see how these cases can 
form the basis of any worthwhile precedent.  
The argument about whether judges do, or do not, make law is 
outside the scope of this work. But, even allowing that they do, that is 
not what the judges in Banque Belge or in Lipkin Gorman thought that 
they were doing. They thought that they were merely applying 
precedent; yet they were not. That surely cannot be how Millett LJ 
envisages that the “English doctrine of stare decisis” works. Nowhere in 
either case do any of the judges suggest that the common law is 
defective in having no doctrine of tracing, and that it ought to mirror 
equity by having one. They just assume that it has one. 
By arguing that in Taylor v Plumer the court, in applying equitable 
principles, was merely following the common law, Millett LJ is taking the 
                                                     
4 Ibid 169. 
5 Banque Belge Pour L’Etranger v Hambrouck (1921) 1 KB 321. 
6 Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 562. 
7Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd (1991) 2 AC 548. 
8 Marsh v Keating (1834) 1 Bing (NC) 198. 
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principle of the declaratory theory of law9 to the stage where that 
particular doctrine ceases to do the law any service. He appears to be 
saying that Lord Ellenborough, in Taylor v Plumer was adopting a 
principle in equity and that, in doing so he was recognising a principle of 
the common law that was undiscovered until 100 years later. This may 
be thought to be considerably overworking a principle that has already 
been described as a “childish fiction”10.  There is a substantial difference 
between adopting a theory designed to explain the apparent democratic 
deficit in allowing unelected judges to make the law, and extending that 
theory to pretend that, once the law has been declared, not only has 
that been the law all along, but that all of the judges have all the time 
been aware of that fact. The whole point of the explanation of Taylor v 
Plumer as being a case based in equity, is that all of the arguments in 
that case were concerned with equitable principles. To describe Lord 
Ellenborough as merely following the common law is to replace a fiction 
with a fabrication. Millett LJ is saying, in the dicta quoted above, that 
Lord Ellenborough CJ adopted equitable principles in order to follow a 
law that he did not know existed, and which would probably never even 
have been thought to have existed if his dicta had not been 
subsequently misunderstood. Moreover, there would obviously be no 
reason for Lord Ellenborough CJ to indicate that equity was in this 
instance adopting a rule that was peculiar to itself, or went further than 
the common law, because the question of whether the common law did 
or did not possess such a rule was wholly outside the issue with which 
                                                     
9 For an exposition of the declaratory theory of law see R.W. Cross & J. W. Harris, 
Precedent in English Law 4th Edition (Clarendon Law 1991) 27-34, and N.Duxbury, 
The Nature and Authority of Precedent (Cambridge University Press 2008) 39-45. 
10 J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law, 2 Vols 5th 
Edition, ed R. Campbell ( Murray 1885) II 634. 
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he was dealing. In addition, Millett LJ misses the point that the reason 
that: 
Such claims were upheld by this court in Banque Belge Pour l’Etranger v 
Hambrouck and by the House of Lords in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd11 
is that those courts made exactly the same mistake with regard to Taylor 
v Plumer as Millett LJ himself did in Agip (Africa) Ltd,12  
The correct position was stated in a short article by Lionel Smith 
published in 2009. He said that: 
In fact, the law in these cases follows equity, as it has done since the 
beginning of the 19th century if not before by allowing claimants to use 
common law claims to vindicate equitable interests under a trust. There is no 
room, and no need, for proprietary common law claims to assets that are the 
traceable proceeds of an unauthorised substitution.13 
This reflects the impossibility of justifying these cases in terms of any 
common law rights to make claims to substitute assets that do not 
simply enforce already existing equitable rights. The common law offers 
no justification for these rights. It merely, in the interests of expediency, 
upholds them.  
This acknowledgment, by such an important figure in the 
development of our understanding of tracing, makes the position of 
those authors who were initially sceptical about the existence of a right 
to make common law claims to substitute assets, but subsequently 
changed their minds, all the more curious. 
Writing jointly with Salman Kurshid in 1979 Paul Matthews said 
that: 
                                                     
11 Trustee of the Property of F.C. Jones & Sons (A Firm) v Jones  (1997) Ch 159, 169. 
12 Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson (1990) Ch, 265. 
13 L.Smith, ‘Simplifying Claims to Traceable Proceeds’ (2009) LQR 338. 
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Contrary to the generally held view the right to trace, at law, subsists only so 
long as the goods remain in their original form, whether mixed or not, unless 
the form of the transaction is such as to vest title to the exchange product in 
the original owner (e.g. agent acting within his authority).14 
By 1995 Matthews seemed very much more resigned: 
The decisions (Banque Belge and Lipkin Gorman) can be attacked as based on 
misunderstandings of earlier cases but it is not easy to treat them for that 
reason as per incuriam and not of authority. They are inconsistent with the 
results of Privy Council cases (expressly approved by Lord Goff!)…however 
reluctant I may be to do so I must accept that in practical terms these 
decisions now represent the applicable English law.15 
Richard Calnan, having effectively demonstrated that none of the cases 
regarded as authority provide such authority either by virtue of 
precedent or reasoning concludes that: 
There are dicta of eminent judges which support the proposition that a 
wrongful disposal of A’s assets by B can result in A becoming the legal owner 
of the substitute asset. 
The key case which is always cited as authority for the proposition – Taylor v 
Plumer – is not in fact anything of the sort and the proposition is contrary to 
principle. 
What is needed is an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court which 
considers the issue in the light of all the cases and of the underlying common 
law principles. Only then can it clearly be established whether there really is a 
rule of tracing at common law which is an exception from the basic principle 
that title passes as a result of intention.16 
Having struck the appropriate note of scepticism, however, Calnan goes 
on to say that: 
                                                     
14 S. Kurshid & P. Matthews, ‘Tracing Confusion’ (1979) 95 LQR 78, 98. 
15 P. Matthews, ‘The Legal and Moral Limits of Common Law Tracing’ in P. Birks (ed), 
Laundering and Tracing (Clarendon Press 1995) 23, 65. 
16 R. Calnan, Proprietary Rights and Insolvency, (OUP 2010 ) 293. 
 290 
In the meantime it would seem from the decision of the House of Lords in 
Lipkin Gorman that the principle of common law tracing is as follows: 
If B wrongfully disposes of A’s asset in return for a substitute asset A will 
become the legal owner of that substitute asset if the substitute asset is 
chattel money and, possibly, other tangible moveable assets and the 
substitute asset is clearly identifiable as being the proceeds of A’s original 
asset without being mixed with other assets17. 
The only explanation for the change in Matthews’s position would seem 
to be Lipkin Gorman. Nothing else of any importance occurred between 
the writing of the two articles except the decision in Jones v Jones, and it 
can hardly be that the doubtful judgment in that case has caused such a 
fundamental change of mind. Similarly, Calnan, having rejected the 
reasoning in all of the cases that he examined, seems to regard Lipkin 
Gorman as the tipping point between complete opposition and reluctant 
acceptance. 
This cannot be right. Admittedly Lipkin Gorman is a decision of the 
House of Lords, but we saw in Chapter 6 that it is an unconvincing 
precedent. Moreover, it is one that has never been fully understood, and 
has as “many theories…as there are writers on the subject.”18 It has 
subsequently been relied upon only in Jones v Jones, where some of its 
fundamental premises were overlooked,19 and in Armstrong v 
Winnington Networks,20 where it appears to have been largely 
misunderstood.21 Apart from that it has been cited only as authority for 
the existence of an English law of autonomous unjust enrichment, and 
the establishment of a defence within that law of change of position. 
                                                     
17 Ibid 294. 
18 L.Smith, ‘Simplifying Claims to Traceable Proceeds’ (2009) LQR 338. 
19 See chapter 4 above.    
20 Armstrong DLW v Winnington Networks Ltd (2012) EWCH 10 (ch). 
21 See Chapters 5 and 6. 
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Peter Birks summed up the position of the advocates of the 
existence of a right to trace at common law: 
The main proposition…has been that the principles governing tracing are 
common to law and equity. The proposition is not touched by the revelation 
that it is only very recently, and then only by mistake, that common law 
began to recognise claims to substitute assets. Notwithstanding the gravity of 
this revelation…the best course will be to accept that there is a common law 
contribution however unsound its deeper foundations22 and rather than 
demolish one to press on with unifying both contributions to this area of 
law.23 
This unsatisfactory statement is probably the best that can be said for 
common law tracing. But not only is the statement unsatisfactory, it sits 
in strange contrast to the far more principled comment of the same 
author to the effect that: 
The more plural that society becomes the more important it is that judges 
should respect the most basic of interpretive disciplines, namely the 
obligation to demonstrate from the authorities that their conclusion is 
already the law.24 
The existence of a right to trace at common law cannot be 
demonstrated in the way that Birks demands. It is time to stop 
pretending that it can. This thesis is a contribution to the process of 
moving beyond that pretence. 
 It is recognised, of course, that claims to substitute assets are 
permitted at law. Part 3 shows that such claims are entirely equitable in 
nature. Unlike common law claims they do have a normative basis. The 
                                                     
22 Italics not in the original. 
23 P. Birks, ‘Overview: Tracing, Claiming and Defences’ in P. Birks (ed), Laundering 
and Tracing (Clarendon Press 1995) 289, 300. 
24 P. Birks, ‘Proprietary Remedies in Context: A Study in the Judicial Redistribution of 
Property Rights (a book review)’ (2003) LQR 156. 
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basis is the rule that a fiduciary may not retain a right acquired in the 
performance of his fiduciary duty. Nor may he retain a right acquired by 
exploiting an opportunity that has arisen as a result of his fiduciary 
position. If he does so he is required to return that right in specie to his 
principal. Tracing is a process which assists the courts in enforcing this 
principle. But this is all that it is. It has no other role. It can only take 
place within the confines of the fiduciary relationship. 
 If the argument of this thesis is accepted, tracing plays a 
substantially different role from that which the orthodox theory would 
have us believe. In engaging in this process of re-conceptualisation, we 
need to concentrate on explaining the true nature of various claims 
which are currently regarded as being dependent on tracing, but fall 
outside the properly understood scope of that process.  Claims that are 
not against fiduciaries are one example.  Claims that involve the 
following of money through bank accounts are another. Our 
understanding of personal property law can only be enhanced by our so 
doing. 
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